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Abstract
This study uses panel data analysis, which is rarely used in the accounting literature; 
to investigate the benefits of increased disclosure, namely lower market beta and 
higher firm value, in the Egyptian emerging capital market.
Little direct empirical evidence exists with regard to the implications of increased 
disclosure for market beta and firm value in general and in emerging capital markets 
in particular. Moreover, most prior studies limit the investigation of benefits of 
increased disclosure to voluntary disclosure assuming that mandatory disclosure 
would not differ among companies. However, if the level of compliance with 
mandatory disclosure varied, prior studies would have ignored benefits of 
compliance with mandatory disclosure.
This study extends the financial reporting literature and the capital market literature 
by investigating the relationships between the extent of different types of corporate 
disclosure and market beta for the Egyptian emerging capital market. Furthermore, it 
contributes to the literature by investigating the direct link between the extent of 
different types of corporate disclosure and firm value.
The results generally show that individual measures of disclosure levels are 
negatively associated with estimated market beta. However, these results, consistent 
with the research hypotheses, depend on the proxy for the market used to estimate 
market beta, and the specification of the model. Furthermore, the results, consistent 
with prior studies, generally suggest that disclosure level is positively associated 
with firm value.
1 0
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Chapter (1) An introduction
1.1 Overview
Accounting information is intended to be useful to different users’ groups in their 
decision-making processes. For example, investors need accounting information 
about alternative shares to make their investment decisions. Assuming that this 
information is useful, more information should reduce the uncertainty surrounding 
corporate future performance and facilitate trading in shares. However, providing 
information to outside investors is a crucial decision that has costs and benefits 
associated with it. Among the costs of disclosure are costs of information production 
and dissemination, costs of weakened competitiveness as a result of making more 
information available to competitors, and litigation costs in case the company is sued 
regarding its disclosure information, for example in case of reporting misleading 
information or errors. Potential benefits of increased disclosure include, for example, 
a lower cost of capital, higher firm value, improving analysts’ forecasts accuracy, 
and number of analysts following the company. The current study attempts to 
explore the benefits of increased disclosure in the Egyptian capital market, namely: 
lower market beta and higher firm value.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows: Section (1.2) provides a brief 
description of the nature of the current research. Section (1.3) discusses the main 
motivations and contributions of the current study. Section (1.4) highlights the 
importance of this research. Finally, Section (1.5) provides the structure of the 
current study.
1.2 Nature of this study
Finance theory provides a theoretical framework to explain the benefits of increased 
disclosure. It predicts that more public information will enhance stock liquidity by
16
reducing transactions costs and increasing the demand for shares. Moreover, it 
predicts that increased disclosure will reduce asymmetric estimation risk. This means 
that firms for which more information is available will be perceived as less risky in 
terms of systematic risk. Ceteris paribus, the rate of return required by investors to 
buy the firm’s shares will decrease; hence the firm’s cost of equity capital will 
decrease and firm value will increase. Moreover, it is argued that increased 
disclosure can influence firm value through pure cash flow effects by reducing 
agency costs. Increased disclosure is expected to reduce the potential diversion of 
the firm’s cash flows to managers and controlling shareholders (Lang, Lins and 
Miller, 2003). Therefore, the extent of corporate disclosure could affect the firm’s 
value through the firm’s cost of capital, or pure cash flows effects or both.
Empirical studies on the benefits of increased disclosure can be classified into four 
streams. The first stream of research attempts to explore the association between 
disclosure level and market beta (see, for example, Firth, 1984; Clarkson and 
Thompson, 1990; Clarkson and Satterly, 1997; and Lam and Du, 2004). The second 
stream of research links disclosure with some measures of stock liquidity (see, for 
example, Welker, 1995; Healy, Hutton and Palepu, 1999; and Leuz, and Verrecchia,
2000). The third stream of research investigates the direct association between 
disclosure and an overall measure of cost of capital (see, for example, Botosan, 
1997; Sengupta, 1998; Richardson and Welker, 2001; Hail, 2002; and Botosan and 
Plumlee, 2002). Finally, the fourth stream of research tries to explore the link 
between disclosure and firm value (see, for example, Patel, Balic and Bwakira, 2002; 
Lang, Lins and Miller, 2003; Silva and Alves, 2004; and Baek, Kang and Park
2004).
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A  careful review of prior studies shows that most empirical prior studies have been 
conducted in developed capital markets, mainly the US. Prior studies have focused 
on investigating either the link between disclosure quantity and/or quality and stock 
liquidity, or testing the link between disclosure quantity/quality and an overall proxy 
for the cost of equity capital. Very little has been done to explore the association 
between disclosure level and market beta as a proxy for asymmetric estimation risk. 
Moreover, little direct empirical evidence exists with respect to the relationship 
between disclosure level and firm value. Since little has been done to investigate 
both issues in general, and in emerging markets in particular, this research 
contributes to both the theory and practice by investigating both issues in the 
Egyptian emerging capital market.
Listed companies in the Egyptian Stock Exchange (ESE) have some unique features: 
they can be classified into public offering companies and closed companies. In 
addition, they can be classified into heavily traded companies and less traded 
companies. These two characteristics of listed companies in ESE influenced the 
selection of the sample. This study depends on a quite large sample of heavily traded 
public offering companies, since this study argues that firms can benefit from 
disclosing more information to the public. Furthermore, a departure from full 
compliance with mandatory disclosure is observed from prior studies in the ESE. 
This particular characteristic provides an opportunity to examine the benefits of 
compliance with mandatory disclosure.
In line with the research hypotheses and models, the data required to test the 
hypotheses have been identified. They are the annual reports of a sample of non- 
financial public offering companies in the ESE and their daily price information.
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After contacting some potential sources, the researcher was able to collect the 
required data from the Capital Market Authority in Egypt. After some refinements of 
the collected data, the final sample includes 272 firm-year observations. Then the 
researcher was able to process the data in terms of variables measurement and testing 
the outlined hypotheses using both univariate and multivariate analyses.
The extent of financial disclosure is measured via the traditional disclosure index 
technique. A  final list of 49 items of mandatory information and 26 items of 
voluntary information is used. Because this study is a longitudinal study and 
preference to information disclosure could have varied over time and among 
industries, the researcher used the unweighted approach in creating the disclosure 
indices. An item of information is given the value of one if it is disclosed and the 
value of zero if it is not. In order to not penalize companies for non-applicable items 
of information, the total index is calculated as the total scores awarded to a particular 
company for a particular year divided by the maximum number of applicable items 
of information. Furthermore, an assessment of the reliability and validity of these 
indices as measures of different types of information disclosure is provided.
Market beta estimation was obtained using two different approaches in order to 
obtain more reliable results. Market beta estimation was initially obtained by using 
daily returns over six months after the financial year-ends for the sample firms using 
the simple ordinary least square market model and two alternative proxies for the 
market. Market betas were then obtained by using weekly returns over a moving 
five- year period of time using a more reliable proxy for the market via the pooled 
least squares market model. Firm value as well is measured using two proxies: the
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natural logarithm of Tobin’s q ratio and the natural logarithm of market to book ratio 
in order to obtain robust results.
The results generally show that the extent of information disclosure is negatively 
associated with market beta. However, this result depends on the proxy for the 
market used to estimate market beta and the specification of the model. Moreover, 
consistent with expectations, the extent of information disclosure is generally 
positively associated with firm value. This in turn means that more disclosure 
enhances firm value. However, mandatory disclosure is found to be negatively 
associated with firm value measured by Tobin’ s q ratio, which could be due to 
measurement biases.
1.3 Main motivations and contributions of the current study
Regulators have long argued that more transparency1 is required in equity markets in
order to function efficiently. In Egypt, the logo of the Cairo and Alexandria Stock 
Exchanges (CASE) is: efficiency, fairness and transparency. Theoretically, the 
platform for more transparency is to provide comprehensive useful information. This 
should benefit listed companies in terms of lower cost of capital and higher firm 
value. However, there is a lack of direct evidence of a relationship between 
disclosure level and both market beta and firm value in general, and from emerging 
capital markets in particular. Hence, this study extends the accounting literature by 
investigating benefits of increased disclosure in an emerging capital market.
1 Bushman, Piotroski and Smith (2004: 210) defined transparency as the widespread availability of 
firm-specific information concerning publicly listed firms in the economy to those outside the firm.
2 0
In detail, this research tries to fill five gaps explored in the current literature. Firstly, 
most prior studies focus on companies listed on developed capital markets, mainly 
the US. This study extends the literature by investigating benefits of increased 
disclosure in the Egyptian emerging capital market.
Secondly, this study tries to demonstrate how disclosure affects cost of capital 
through market beta as a proxy for asymmetric estimation risk. Thirdly, this research 
tries to explore empirically the direct association between disclosure level and firm 
value.
Fourthly, most prior studies focus on voluntary disclosure assuming that mandatory 
disclosure would not differ among companies. However, if level of compliance with 
mandatory disclosure did vary among different companies, prior studies would have 
ignored the potential benefits of compliance with mandatory disclosure. Since a 
departure from full compliance with mandatory disclosure is observed in the 
Egyptian context over the period of study, this study tries to explore the benefits of 
expanded different types of disclosure: aggregate disclosure, mandatory disclosure 
and voluntary disclosure.
Finally, this study contributes to the existing literature on disclosure by using panel 
data analysis, which is rarely used in the accounting literature. Panel data sets 
possess advantages over traditional cross-sectional or time series data sets. They 
usually give the researcher a large number of observations, increasing the degrees of 
freedom and reducing the collinearity problem among explanatory variables, hence 
improving the efficiency of the econometric estimates. Moreover, the use of panel 
data provides a means of reducing the magnitude of the problem of omitted variables 
that are correlated with explanatory variables (Hsiao, 1986: 1-3).
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1.4 The importance of the current study
The main purpose of the current study is to test the implications of increased 
disclosure for market beta and firm value in an emerging capital market, which could 
improve our knowledge in this area. However, the current study could benefit other 
interested parties such as investors, companies and standard setters and regulators. 
Increased disclosure may benefit individual investors when planning their 
investment choices through reducing uncertainty surrounding future corporate 
performance. This in turn will reduce the rate of return required by investors to 
invest in the company’ s shares; hence it reduces firms’ cost of equity capital and 
increases its value. For standard setters and regulators, demonstrating a negative 
(positive) relationship between the level of disclosure and firm cost of equity capital 
(firm value) provides a justification for the need for more disclosure and may also 
define the areas of disclosure that need to be improved.
1.5 Structure of the study
This section outlines the structure of the current study. Chapter (2) concerns the 
measurement of corporate disclosure in annual reports. It discusses potential proxies 
for corporate disclosure offered in prior studies. It also highlights the importance of 
assessing the reliability and validity of a measure of disclosure. It concludes with the 
relevant technique to measure corporate disclosure in Egyptian companies’ annual 
report. Chapter (3) discusses both the theoretical framework of the benefits of 
increased disclosure and empirical prior studies in the field. It concludes with the 
main gaps in the current literature, which the current research aims to fill. Chapter
(4) provides an overview of the Egyptian capital market and financial reporting by 
listed companies, which provides the particular case of this study. It concludes with 
the main features of listed companies in the ESE that influence the current study.
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Chapter (5) covers the research design. It starts with the research hypotheses and 
models to be tested. In line with these hypotheses, the required data, and their 
sources are identified. Methods of analyzing the data performed in the current study 
are then discussed.
The next step is to measure the research variables and to proceed in the analysis. So, 
Chapter (6) covers the measurement of corporate disclosure in the Egyptian context 
via the disclosure index technique. Chapter (7) provides an assessment of the 
reliability and validity of the disclosure indices used in the current study. Then 
Chapter (8) examines the link between the extent of corporate disclosure with market 
beta. Chapter (9) examines the link between the extent of corporate disclosure and 
firm value. Finally in chapter (10) a discussion of the research results, limitations 
and future research is provided.
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Chapter (2) The extent of corporate disclosure---- a review
2.1 Overview
Considering the separation of ownership and control of resources in a firm, corporate 
disclosure is a potential important means of communication between management 
and outside investors and market participants in general. Demand for corporate 
disclosure arises from the information asymmetry problem and agency conflicts 
between management and outside investors (Healy and Palepu, 2001). The 
information asymmetry problem between management and outside investors arises 
from information differences and conflicting incentives between them. Agency 
conflicts arise when the agent acts self-interestedly through making decisions, which 
expropriate outside investors’ funds. Enhanced corporate disclosure is believed to 
mitigate these problems.
Generally, there are several means for management to communicate firm 
performance and prospects to market participants, such as press releases, conference 
calls, and general-purpose reports: annual and interim reports. The corporate annual 
report is considered the main formal disclosure vehicle, and hence attracts most prior 
studies to investigate issues relating to corporate disclosure.
Corporate disclosure in annual reports can be divided into two broad categories, 
mandatory disclosure and voluntary disclosure. Mandatory disclosure is information 
revealed in the fulfillment of disclosure requirements of statute in the form of laws, 
professional regulations in the form of standards and the listing rules of stock 
exchanges. Voluntary disclosure is any information revealed in excess of the 
mandatory disclosure. In order to study issues concerning corporate disclosure, one 
might need to measure disclosure. But, disclosure is a theoretical concept that is 
difficult to measure directly. It does not possess inherent characteristics by which
24
This chapter concerns the measurement of the extent of corporate disclosure in 
annual reports. The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section (2 .2) 
emphasizes the importance of the corporate annual report as a primary means for 
management to communicate their firms’ performance to outside investors. Section
(2.3) discusses different proxies of disclosure offered in previous studies. Section
(2.4) emphasizes the importance of revealing evidence that a measure of the extent 
of disclosure is a reliable and valid one in order to give useful inferences about 
corporate disclosure level. Section (2 .5) discusses the approach followed by the 
current research in measuring the extent of disclosure for Egyptian listed companies. 
Section (2 .6) covers the concluding remarks.
2.2 The importance of the annual report as a disclosure vehicle
There are different means for companies to disclose information2 such as annual
reports, conference calls, investor relations, interim reports, prospectuses, press 
releases, websites, etc. The corporate annual report is considered a very important 
official vehicle of information, although not sufficient3 (Marston and Shrives, 1991; 
Epstein and Palepu, 1999; and Hope, 2003a). Prior studies highlight the importance 
of the corporate annual report as a disclosure vehicle; for example, Lang and 
Lundholm, 1993; and Botosan and Plumlee, 2002 found a high and significant
2 Corporate disclosure can also be directed to parties other than outside investors such as stakeholders, 
strategic investors, and strategic debt holders.
3 Since other means of disclosure could provide more timely information such as conference calls and 
interim reports.
on e can determ ine its in tensity  or quality  lik e  the cap acity  o f  a car (C o o k e  and
W allace , 1989: 51 ). T he literature on  d isc losu re , h ow ever , o ffers so m e p oten tia l
proxies.
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positive correlation between annual report disclosures and other forms of disclosure4. 
Furthermore, the weights applied to the annual report disclosure by the Association 
for Investment Management and Research (AIMR) range between 40-50%, which 
made Botosan and Plumlee (2002: 30) conclude that the annual report is viewed as a 
particularly important form of disclosure. Therefore, it is not surprising that most 
prior research used annual reports to investigate issues relating to corporate 
disclosure (see, for example, Wallace, Naser and Mora, 1994; Meek, Roberts and 
Gray, 1995; Inchausti, 1997; Botosan, 1997; Ahmed and Courtis, 1999; Depoers, 
2000; Hail, 2002; Botosan and Plumlee, 2002; Hope, 2003a; Hope, 2003b; Abd- 
Elsalam and Weetman, 2003; Coy and Dixon, 2004; and Campbell, 2004).
2.3 Proxies for disclosure
In a review study, Healy and Palepu (2001) discussed three proxies for voluntary 
disclosure used in prior studies: management forecasts, the Association for 
Investment Management and Research scores, and self-constructed measures. 
However, this classification of potential proxies for disclosure is limited to voluntary 
disclosure only. To provide an overview of proxies of disclosure offered in prior 
studies, two approaches are observed: the first approach includes some proxies for 
disclosure quantity or quality, which are not necessary directly based on examining 
the original disclosure vehicle(s). The second approach provides some techniques to 
measure the extent of disclosure by inspecting the original disclosure vehicle(s).
4 Lang and Lundholm (1993) found that the correlation between annual report disclosures and other 
publications disclosures was 0.62 (compared to 0.634 in Botosan and Plumlee 2002); and the 
correlation between the annual report disclosures and the investor relations’ disclosures was 
0.41(compared to 0.49 in Botosan and Plumlee 2002). Moreover, Botosan and Plumlee (2002) found 
that the mean correlation coefficient between the annual report disclosure and a total measure of 
disclosure (includes: annual report disclosure, timely disclosure and investor relations) was 0.824.
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2.3.1 First approach: not based on examining the original disclosure vehicle
This approach includes some proxies for disclosure quantity and/or quality which are 
not necessary based on examining the original disclosure vehicle(s), but give some 
inferences about corporate disclosure or the information environment5 in general, 
such as: financial analysts’ perceptions about the firm disclosure practices, 
management forecasts, American Depositary Receipts (ADR), attributes of analysts’ 
forecasts, and the number of analysts following the company.
2.3.1.1 Financial analysts’ perceptions about corporate disclosure practices
Perceptions of financial analysts about the firm disclosure practices such as 
disclosure ratings from the Financial Analysts Federation (FAF) / the Association for 
Investment Management and Research6 (AIMR) have been used as proxies for 
disclosure quantity and quality in a number of prior studies (see, for example, Lang 
and Lundholm, 1996; Sengupta, 1998; Healy, Hutton and Palepu, 1999; and Botosan 
and Plumlee, 2002). The FAF/AIMR reports provide a comprehensive measure of 
the quality of corporate disclosure practices of publicly traded companies relative to 
their industry peers. This measure of the quality of disclosure reflects the evaluations 
(ratings) of a number of specialist financial analysts for companies’ aggregate 
disclosure within three categories: annual published and other required information, 
quarterly and other published not required information and other aspects of 
disclosure such as investor and analyst relations. The final disclosure score of a
5 Includes corporate reporting, private information acquisition and information dissemination (Lang, 
Lins and Miller: 2003).
6 ‘In 1989 the Financial Analysts Federation (FAF) combined with the Institute of Chartered Financial 
Analysts (ICFA) to form the Association for Investment Management and Research (AIMR). Thus 
from 1990 onwards, the corporate disclosure evaluations were published by the AIMR under the new 
title: Corporate Information Committee Report (CICR). The evaluations, however, are still prepared 
by a committee of FAF’ stated Sengupta (1998, footnote no.2: 460).
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particular company is calculated as a weighted average of the three categories’ 
ratings.
The FAF/AIMR scores enjoy two main advantages: firstly, the ratings cover all 
types of disclosures made by companies, including mandatory and voluntary 
disclosures via different disclosure vehicles such as: annual reports, interim reports, 
and investor relations. Secondly, ratings provided by leading specialist financial 
analysts could be more reliable than those constructed by researchers. This is 
because financial analysts are professionals and more able to assess the importance 
of information for investment decision making than researchers. However, disclosure 
scores reflect analysts’ perceptions of firms’ disclosure rather than the disclosure 
policies themselves and cover only a limited number of large firms, creating perhaps 
the possibility of sample bias. Moreover, Lang (1999) questioned the objectivity of 
these ratings giving that no one can know the incentives of analysts to report their 
ratings and what kind of biases could be included.
2.3.1.2 Other proxies for disclosure
Other proxies for disclosure quantity and/or quality, which are not necessarily based 
on examining the original disclosure vehicle(s) include, for example, management 
forecasts, American Depositary Receipts (ADR), attributes of analysts’ forecasts, 
and the number of analysts following the company. Management forecasts are 
typically either points or range estimates for earnings or revenues (Healy and Palepu, 
2001: 426). They can be verified through actual earnings realizations, and hence they 
enable researchers to measure variables such as management forecasts accuracy.
The ADR is used as a proxy for disclosure quality/quantity because firms listed on 
the US market are committed to an increased level of disclosure (Baek, Kang and
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Park, 2004). A  researcher typically uses a dummy variable that takes the value of 
one if the firm has an ADR and zero otherwise to proxy for disclosure quality. Prior 
studies, for example, Lang, Lins and Miller, 2003; and Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz, 
2004, provide a number of explanations for why cross listing on the US market 
improves the firm's information environment. Lang, Lins and Miller (2003: 318) 
stated that:
“Cross-listing firms (in a U.S. stock exchange) subject themselves to (1) increased enforcement by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), (2) a more demanding litigation environment, and (3) 
enhanced disclosure and reconciliation to U.S. generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). In 
addition, cross-listing firms may face more scrutiny from investors, more pressure to provide 
guidance than they did in their home markets, and increased scrutiny from their auditors. Firms that 
list in U.S. markets are, in effect, "bonding" themselves to an increased level of disclosure and 
scrutiny”
Attributes of analysts’ forecasts and the number of analysts following the company 
are also used as proxies for information environment (Ibid). Prior studies suggest 
that having more analysts following with more accurate forecasts indicates a firm 
with a better information environment. For example, Lang and Lundholm (1993) 
found that firms with more informative disclosures have larger analyst following, 
less dispersion in analysts forecasts, and less volatility in forecast revisions. In 
addition, Lang and Lundholm (1996) found that analysts' forecasts are more accurate 
for firms that disclose more. This is because expanded disclosure enables financial 
analysts to create valuable new information, such as superior forecasts and buy/sell 
recommendations, thereby increasing demand on their services (Healy and Palepu, 
2001: 430).
2.3.2 Second approach: based on examining the original disclosure vehicle
This approach provides some techniques to measure the extent of disclosure by 
inspecting the original disclosure vehicle(s) such as the content analysis and the 
disclosure index.
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2.3.2.1 Content analysis
Content analysis is a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences 
from data to their context (Krippendorff, 1980: 21). Using the content analysis 
technique, the amount of information disclosed can be measured per category or per 
company by counting the data items, i.e. the number of words and numbers shown in 
the accounts, the number of sentences, and the number of pages (see, for example, 
Marston and Shrives, 1991; and Hackston and Milne, 1996).
There are two main types of content analysis: conceptual content analysis and 
relational content analysis. The conceptual content analysis is a research tool used to 
determine the existence or the frequency of certain key words or concepts within 
texts or sets of texts. In contrast, relational content analysis goes one step further by 
examining the relationships among concepts in a text7. The former is frequently used 
in the disclosure literature. Content analysis can be partial or comprehensive. Partial 
content analysis covers part of the document or selected items of information or key 
words. Comprehensive content analysis, also called holistic content analysis 
(Beattie, Mclnnes and Feamley, 2001), covers the whole document. Content analysis 
can be conducted either manually or automatically. Because of the limitations of 
manual content analysis in the disclosure literature in terms of time, money and 
effort consuming, an electronic content analysis has recently emerged as a research 
tool (see, for example, Hussainey, Schleicher and Walker, 2003; Kothari and Short, 
2003; and Hussainey, 2004). The main advantages of electronic content analysis are:
7 W riting center N A V IG A T O R , http ://w riting.colostate.edu/referen ces/research /content/pop2b .cfm ,
last accessed  in 08 /07 /2004
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ease of use, an economic technique in terms of time, effort and money, and it can be 
easily used to conduct a comprehensive content analysis.
2.3.2.2 Disclosure index
Disclosure indices are extensive lists of selected items, which may be disclosed in 
company report (Marston and Shrives, 1991: 195). A  disclosure index could include 
mandatory items of information and/or voluntary items of information. It can cover 
information reported in one or more disclosure vehicles such as corporate annual 
reports, interim reports, investor relations...etc. It can also cover the information 
reported by the company itself and/or others such as financial analysts reports. 
Hence, a disclosure index is a research instrument to measure the extent of 
information reported in a particular disclosure vehicle(s) by a particular entity(s) 
according to a list of selected items of information.
Disclosure indices are widely used in the accounting literature to examine various 
aspects of corporate disclosure such as determinants of disclosure quantity and 
quality, benefits of increased disclosure and compliance with regulations or 
accounting standards. Its first use was in 1961 by Cerf and it has been used ever 
since. During 1970s [see, for example, Singhvi and Desai, 1971; Choi, 1973; Buzby, 
1974; Busby, 1975; and Firth, 1979]; 1980s [see, for example, Chow and Wong- 
Boren, 1987; and Firth, 1984]; 1990s [see, for example, Coke, 1992; Wallace, Naser 
and Mora, 1994; Meek, Roberts and Gray, 1995; Inchausti, 1997; and Botosan,
1997] and 2000s [see, for example, Depoers, 2000; Hope, 2003a; Hope, 2003b; Abd- 
Elsalam and Weetman, 2003; Naser and Nuseibeh, 2003; Ali, Ahmed and Henry, 
2004; and Coy and Dixon, 2004].
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2.3.2.2.1 Disclosure indices in prior studies----a review
A  review of prior studies shows a great variation in constructing the disclosure 
index. Prior studies using the disclosure index do vary in terms of the degree of the 
researcher involvement in constructing the index, the type of information disclosure 
and the number of items of information to be included in the index, the measurement 
approach, the range of industries/countries covered by the index and others, which 
are subject to the research purpose(s), design, and context.
The degree o f the researcher involvement in constructing the index
The degree of the researcher involvement in constructing a disclosure index varies 
from full involvement to no involvement. Full involvement means that the researcher 
controls the entire process of constructing a disclosure index from selecting the items 
of information to be included in the index, to scoring these items. No involvement 
means that the researcher depends on available disclosure indices from prior studies 
or professional organisations. Between these two extremes, various degrees of the 
researcher involvement are observed (see, for example, Choi, 1973; Buzby, 1974; 
Busby, 1975; and Firth, 1979; Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987; Firth, 1984).
Using an existing index has an advantage in that direct comparisons with previous 
research work can be made (Marston and Shrives, 1991: 203). A  number of prior 
studies used existing disclosure indices provided by professional organisations (see, 
for example, Patel, Balic and Bwakira, 2002; Hope, 2003a; 2003b) as measures of 
disclosure level. For example, Patel, Balic and Bwakira (2002) depended on 
transparency and disclosure (T&D) scores provided by Standard and Poor’s as their 
measure of disclosure. The T&D scores evaluate the level of transparency in the 
latest available annual reports of a number of large and liquid companies in different
3 2
emerging and developed countries. Companies’ annual reports are searched for the 
inclusion of 98 items of information. This list of items of information is broadly 
divided into three categories: ownership structure and investor relations, financial 
transparency and information disclosure, and board and management structure and 
process. Each item of information is scored on a binary basis. Then, scores for the 
three broad categories and an overall score are developed.
Hope (2003a; 2003b) provides another example of using available disclosure indices 
provided by the Center for International Financial Analysis and Research (CIFAR). 
The CIFAR (1995) evaluates corporate annual report disclosures for 1000 leading 
industrial8 companies from 41 developed and emerging countries. This evaluation is 
based on a list of 85 financial and non-financial items of information extracted 
directly from the annual reports available in the CIFAR libraries. This list of items of 
information is divided into seven categories: general information, income statement, 
balance sheet, funds flow statement, accounting policies, stockholders’ information, 
and supplementary information. Each item of information is scored on a binary 
basis. The item of information takes one if it was disclosed and zero if not. Then, 
within each category, the percentage availability of the item of information in the 
annual report of the company was computed. If a particular item of information was 
not applicable, the CIFAR reduced the denominator for percentage purposes by one. 
The average of the sum of percentages of all seven categories was then calculated 
and all companies were ranked on this total index score. Moreover, two types of 
disclosure indices can be derived from the total index: the financial information
8 Financial reporting practices for banks, insurance companies and financial services companies are 
covered separately by the CIFAR.
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index and the supplementary information index. The financial information index 
includes items of information from the income statement, balance sheet and the 
funds flow statement. The supplementary information index includes items of 
information from general information, accounting standards, stockholder’ s 
information and supplementary information. The CIFAR scores (1993; 1995) covers 
the eighty-five items of information examined in companies’ annual reports for the 
fiscal years 1991 and 1993 respectively. A  minimum of five leading companies in 
terms of sales and assets were selected in each country. Countrywide proportions 
were based on some factors such as market capitalization, gross national product, 
and the importance and relative position of a country in the global economic 
scenario.
The type and number o f items o f information to be included in the index
Different disclosure indices have been used in previous studies since there is no 
agreed theory on either the type or the number of items of information to be included 
in the index. The number of items of information included in disclosure indices in 
prior studies ranges between 11 (Tai et al., 1990) to 289 items of information (Spero,
1979). In addition the type of information selected could cover mandatory disclosure 
and/or voluntary disclosure. Some indices focused on voluntary disclosure only, see 
for example, Firth, 1979; Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987; Firth, 1984; Botosan, 1997; 
Depoers, 2000; and Meek, Roberts and Gray, 1995. Other indices focused on 
mandatory disclosure only, see for example, Tai et al., 1990; Ahmed and Nicholls, 
1994; and Wallace, Naser and Mora, 1994. Others included both mandatory and 
voluntary items of information; see for example, Singhvi and Desai, 1971; Busby,
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1975; Cooke, 1992; Inchausti, 1997; Marston and Robson, 1997; and Naser and
Nuseibeh, 2003.
The measurement approach
Items of information included in the disclosure index could be weighted or 
unweighted. Weights are usually determined by seeking out the views of a user 
group regarding the relative importance of various items of information (Buzby, 
1975; and Firth, 1979). Alternatively, the unweighted approach gives equal weights 
to each item in the list of items of information according to its existence. An item 
takes the value of one if it exists in the investigated report and the value of zero if 
not (Cooke, 1992; Inchausti, 1997; Meek, Roberts and Gray, 1995; and Depoers,
2000). Some studies used the two approaches (Choi, 1973; Chow and Wong-Boren, 
1987; and Naser and Nuseibeh, 2003) and provided mixed results.
The range o f industries and countries covered by the index
Disclosure indices studies cover both emerging and developed capital markets. For 
example, a number of prior studies covered developed capital markets (see, for 
example, Cooke, 1992; Wallace, Naser and Mora, 1994; Botosan, 1997; and 
Depoers, 2000), and a number of prior studies covered emerging capital markets 
(see, for example, Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987; Wallace and Naser, 1995; Marston 
and Robson, 1997; Naser and Nuseibeh, 2003; and Abd-Elsalam and Weetman, 
2003).
In addition, some studies construct a disclosure index to test the level of information 
disclosure for one industry (Botosan, 1997), others construct a disclosure index to 
test the level of information disclosure for different industries (see, for example,
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Martikainen, 1998; Depoers, 2000; Hope, 2003a; 2003b; and Abd-Elsalam and 
Weetman, 2003).
Other differences
Other differences in constructing a disclosure index in prior studies include, for 
example, the sample size, the reporting year, and data analysis. Sample size ranges 
between 29 firms (Marston and Robson, 1997) to 354 firms (Patel, Balic and 
Bwakira, 2002). The reporting year goes back from early 1960s (Cerf, 1961) to 2000 
(see, for example, Patel, Balic and Bwakira, 2002; and Coy and Dixon, 2004). Most 
prior studies used cross-section analysis (see, for example, Botosan, 1997; Depoers, 
2000; Hope, 2003a; 2003b; Abd-Elsalam and Weetman, 2003; and Ali, Ahmed and 
Henry, 2004) but few studies used panel data analysis such as Inchausti (1997).
In brief, there is no generally agreed disclosure index among prior studies since its 
construction is markedly dependent on the research purpose(s), design, and context.
2.3.2.2.2 The process of constructing a disclosure index
The process of constructing a disclosure index generally involves two steps: 
selecting the items of information to be included in the index, and assigning a score 
for each item of information included in the index.
With respect to corporate disclosure, the number of items of information that could 
be disclosed by a company is huge; hence the selection of items of information to be 
included in a disclosure index is crucial. Therefore, some criterion is needed to make 
the choice. The relevant literature is usually reviewed to select the list of items of 
information to be included in the index in light of the research purpose and context. 
Then the initial list of items of information could be amended in light of what
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companies in the sample actually reported through reading a number of corporate 
reports (Wallace, Naser and Mora, 1994; and Depores, 2000). In addition, the 
selection of items of information to be included in the index could be linked to the 
informational needs of a relevant user group(s). Then the relevant user group might 
be subject to a survey (Buzby, 1975; and Firth 1979).
The second step is to assign a score for each item of information as a preliminary 
process to calculate the disclosure index. An important issue here is whether values 
are attached to each item in the index. A  large number of recent studies seemed to 
use an unweighted disclosure index for several reasons. Firstly, the main reason is to 
reduce subjectivity in determining weights. Secondly, Dhaliwal (1980: 387) argued 
that users, whose opinions are used in deciding the weights of some items of 
information, in general, lack self-insight regarding their own use of information. 
Thirdly, some studies that used both weighted and unweighted indices demonstrated 
similar conclusions (Choi, 1973; and Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987). Therefore, 
most researchers traditionally use the unweighted approach in constructing the 
disclosure index (Courtis, 1996).
On the other hand, weights could be assigned to different items of information either 
by the researcher (Botosan, 1997) or by a relevant user group(s) through a survey. 
Self-weighted indices depend on the degree of details provided and/or the type of 
information (quantitative or qualitative) in assigning weights to different items of 
information (see for example, Botosan, 1997; and Richardson and Welker, 2001).
On the other hand, a relevant user group(s) could be subject to a survey to seek their 
views regarding the usefulness of different items of information. This is because 
different items of information could be perceived as having different levels of
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importance for decision-making. In addition, the financial statements, general- 
purpose statements, are a major part of corporate annual reports, therefore, the 
usefulness of information disclosed for making a particular decision by a particular 
group of users might be reasonable to be investigated (Cooke and Wallace, 1989; 
Inchausti, 1997; and Beattie and Pratt, 2002). Moreover, Mear and Firth (1987) 
found that financial analysts have a relatively high degree of self-insight, which 
support seeking their views regarding their information needs. However, assigning 
scores for disclosed items of information depending on electing subjective opinions 
from a user group might be misleading. This is because the level of usefulness 
assigned to each item of information is not definite, rather it varies depends on the 
country, the user, the industry and the time of the study.
2.4 Reliability and validity assessment
A proxy of corporate disclosure, whatever the approach or scale used to develop it, is 
constructed to measure a theoretical concept that cannot be measured directly. 
Hence, it is necessary to assess whether this measure of disclosure is a relatively 
reliable and valid proxy for the extent of disclosure in order to provide useful 
inferences about it.
2.4.1 Reliability assessment
Reliability concerns the extent to which an experiment, test, or any measuring 
procedure yields the same results on repeated trials (Carmines and Zeller, 1991: 11). 
It concerns the ability of a measurement instrument to reproduce consistent results 
on repeated measurements. In terms of a disclosure index, for example, companies 
with the highest disclosure scores on a first measurement trial using a disclosure 
index will tend to be among the companies of the highest disclosure scores on 
repeated trials using the same disclosure index. The same will be true for the entire
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sample of companies whose disclosure level is being measured via the same 
disclosure index.
There are three common forms of reliability: test-retest, inter-coder reliability, and 
internal consistency. The test-retest measures the stability of the results obtained 
from a measurement instrument over time. In terms of content analysis, for example, 
stability can be determined when the same content is coded more than once by the 
same coder (Weber, 1990: 17). For example, Hussainey (2004) conducted this kind 
of test to assess the stability of coding using electronic content analysis. He coded all 
annual reports at one time using Nudist software. After a short period of time, 
samples of these reports are coded again using the same software. The resulting 
scores yielded from the second round matched exactly with those from the first 
round, which proves the stability of the results obtained form the measurement 
instrument over time. Although, the test-retest is easy to conduct using electronic 
content analysis as a research instrument to measure the extent of corporate 
disclosure, it might not be particularly relevant to manual content analysis. This is 
because of its general drawbacks9 in addition to economic factors in terms of time, 
money and effort consumed in repeated trials.
The correlation between the results produced by more than one coder can be used to 
assess reliability. Inter-coder reliability refers to the extent to which content 
classification produces the same results when the same text is coded by more than
9 Weber (1990:17) stated that: ‘inconsistencies in coding constitute unreliability. These 
inconsistencies may stem from a variety of factors, including ambiguities in the coding rules, 
ambiguities in the text, cognitive changes within the coder, or simple errors, such as recording the 
wrong numeric code for a category. Because only one person is coding, stability is the weakest form 
of reliability’.
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one coder (Weber, 1990:17). The higher the correlation coefficient obtained, the 
higher the reliability of the measurement instmment. Although this test could 
provide better estimation of reliability compared to the former one, it is obvious that 
this test for reliability needs more than one coder to provide comparable results. For 
example, Hackston and Milne (1996) performed three rounds of retesting to what 
constituted a corporate social disclosure sentence by three coders to assess the 
reliability of their measure of disclosure level. Another example is Hussainey, 
Schleicher and Walker (2003) who calculated the correlation between the automated 
disclosure scores obtained using an electronic content analysis and disclosure scores 
obtained via manual searching for a sample of annual reports. The result shows a 
high and significant correlation between the two measures (0 .96), which indicates 
the reliability of their measurement tool as a measure of the level of corporate 
disclosure.
The third form of reliability is internal consistency, which is considered to provide 
an excellent technique for assessing the reliability of a measurement instrument 
(Carmines and Zeller, 1991). Litwin (1995: 21) describes internal consistency as “an 
indicator of how well the different items measure the same issue. This is important 
because a group of items that purports to measure one variable should indeed be 
clearly focused on that variable” . The most popular test for internal consistency is 
Cronbach’s alpha. Cronbach’s alpha is a measure of inter-item correlation. It can 
take a value from zero to one. The higher the coefficient alpha obtained, the higher 
the internal consistency of the measurement instrument. For example, Botosan 
(1997) obtained a coefficient alpha of 0.64 for her self-constructed disclosure index 
as a measure of its internal consistency.
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2.4.2 Validity assessment
Validity is defined as ‘ the extent to which any measuring instrument measures what 
it is intended to measure’ (Carmines and Zeller, 1991: 17). There are three common 
types of validity: criterion validity, content validity and construct validity.
Criterion validity is a measure of how well one instrument stacks up against another 
instrument or predictor (Litwin, 1995: 37). Criterion validity is assessed if there is a 
significant correlation between a measure and an external criterion. The higher the 
magnitude of the correlation coefficient, the more valid is this instrument or measure 
for this particular criterion. There are two types of criterion validity: concurrent 
validity and predictive validity. The difference between them is the time horizon; the 
concurrent validity concerns the correlation between a measure and the criterion at 
the same time, whereas the predictive validity concerns the correlation between a 
future criterion and the relevant measure. However, criterion validity is less likely to 
be used in assessing the validity of social science measures. The reason is that most 
social science measures represent theoretical concepts for which there is no known 
criterion variables to be compared (Carmines and Zeller, 1991).
The second type of validity is content validity. Content validity is assessed through 
seeking subjective judgment from non-experts, hence some refer to it as face 
validity, and/ or professionals on how well the instrument measures what it is 
intended to measure. However, this type of validity is always seen as not sufficient 
to conclude the validity of a measure. This might be due to concerns about users’ 
perception regarding their own use of information (Dhaliwal, 1980).
In contrast to the others, construct validity “has generalized applicability in the 
social sciences. It focuses on the extent to which a measure performs in accordance
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with theoretical expectations. Specifically, if the performance of the measure is 
consistent with theoretically derived expectations, then it is concluded that the 
measure is construct valid” stated Carmines and Zeller (1991: 27). Therefore, testing 
for the construct validity of a measure of disclosure requires a pattern of consistent 
findings with prior studies. Prior studies on disclosure literature have examined the 
relationship between a measure of disclosure quantity or quality and a number of 
company characteristics: company size, listing/cross listing, profitability, gearing, 
and others (see, for example, Singhvi and Desai, 1971; Choi, 1973; Busby, 1975; 
Firth, 1979; Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987; Coke, 1992; Wallace, Naser and Mora, 
1994; Ahmed and Nicholls, 1994; Meek, Roberts and Gray, 1995; Inchausti, 1997; 
Depoers, 2000; Abd-Elsalam and Weetman, 2003; and Ali, Ahmed and Henry,
2004). While the results for firm size and listing/ cross listing are frequently constant 
among prior studies, other variables yield mixed results. Therefore, firm size is 
considered to be an important determinant of disclosure and eventually is used as a 
control variable in prior studies.
2.5 The current study
A  review of prior studies shows that a large number of prior studies used annual 
reports to investigate various issues relating to corporate disclosure. In the Egyptian 
context, Shohaieb (1990) investigated whether corporate annual reports have great 
influence in decision-making by seeking out the views of eight groups of users and 
preparers of financial reporting in Egypt. He found that annual reports ranks first 
between different sources of information. In addition, corporate annual report is the 
main formal vehicle of financial reporting by listed companies, which to some extent 
promises the availability of the required data for the current research for a large
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sample of companies. Therefore, this research is concerned with information 
disclosure in the annual reports and accounts.
In addition, a review of proxies for information disclosure in prior studies shows that 
there are generally two approaches to measure disclosure: the first approach includes 
proxies for disclosure, which are not necessarily directly based on examining the 
original disclosure vehicle(s). The second approach provides some techniques to 
measure the extent of disclosure by inspecting the original disclosure vehicle(s).
With respect to the first approach, the service giving financial analysts’ perceptions 
about corporate disclosure practices such as FAF/AIMR scores has not been 
introduced to the Egyptian market yet. In addition, there is no database that can 
provide information about analysts’ forecasts and the number of analysts following 
the company in the Egyptian context. Moreover, management forecasts are rarely 
revealed in general, and in companies’ annual reports in particular in the Egyptian 
setting. Furthermore, there is no single company in the Egyptian market to date, 
which has ADR. In brief, proxies for information disclosure provided from prior 
studies under the first approach are not available for Egyptian listed companies, 
which limits the available alternatives to measure the extent of disclosure in 
companies’ annual reports to the second approach.
With respect to the second approach, the disclosure index seems to be useful as a 
research tool to measure the extent of corporate disclosure since it has been used 
from 1960s to the present (Marston and Shrives, 1991). In addition, it possesses an 
advantage over the automated content analysis. This is due to the fact that the 
electronic content analysis software always searches a text file for a key word or 
words rather than the existence of the information itself, which could be easily
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identified via manual searching. For example, in the Egyptian setting, companies 
tend to disclose the taxation in the footnotes and give a note that the amount of 
deferred tax is not practical to measure. In this case, if deferred tax is one of the key 
words that the electronic content analysis software searches for its existence, it will 
recognize the existence of deferred tax in this statement when it is not. Moreover, as 
we will see in Chapter (5), the original annual reports available for this research are 
image files in Arabic language. This fact limits the ability to use electronic content 
analysis software originally designed for searching text files. Therefore, the 
disclosure index seems to be the most suitable tool to measure the extent of 
corporate disclosure in the Egyptian context.
Moreover, a review of prior studies in the disclosure index shows great variation 
among them in terms of the degree of the researcher involvement in constructing the 
index, the type of information disclosure and the number of items of information to 
be included in the index, the measurement approach, the range of 
industries/countries covered by the index, the sample size, the reporting year, and 
data analysis, which are subject to the research purposes, design and context. 
Therefore, a country relevant disclosure index is to be developed in light of the 
research purposes and design.
Furthermore, since this research will rely on a research instmment, a disclosure 
index, to measure the extent of corporate disclosure, which is not amenable to be 
measured directly, an assessment of the validity and reliability of the disclosure 
index as a measure of corporate disclosure is to be provided.
With respect to reliability assessment, there are three tests: the test-retest, inter-coder 
reliability and internal consistency using Cronbach’s alpha. The test-retest is not
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particularly an economic test in terms of time, money and effort since it needs a 
replication of the manual searching by the same researcher using the disclosure 
index tool. In addition, testing for the reliability of the disclosure index through the 
inter-coder test needs comparable results, which are not available for the current 
study since there is no another coder that could take part in the current research. 
Therefore, it seems reasonable to rely on Cronbach’s alpha to test for the reliability 
of the disclosure index in the current study giving that it has been described as an 
excellent technique for assessing the reliability of a measurement instrument 
(Carmines and Zeller, 1991).
With respect to validity assessment, there are three common forms of validity: 
criterion validity, content validity and construct validity. As discussed earlier, since 
criterion validity is less likely to be used in assessing the validity of social science 
measures, the current study will rely on the other two tests for assessing the validity 
of the disclosure index as a research tool to measure the extent of corporate 
disclosure in the Egyptian context.
In brief, the extent of corporate disclosure in the Egyptian listed companies’ annual 
reports will be measured using the disclosure index technique, which proved to be 
the most suitable tool to measure the disclosure level in the Egyptian market. In 
addition, an assessment of its reliability and validity will be provided. Reliability 
will be tested using Cronbach’s alpha as a measure for internal consistency. In 
addition, two types of the validity of the disclosure index will be assessed: content 
validity and construct validity.
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2.6 Concluding remarks
A  review of prior studies on corporate disclosure highlights the importance of annual 
reports as one of the most important corporate disclosure vehicles. In addition, a 
discussion of different proxies for information disclosure offered from prior studies 
shows that there are two main approaches: the first approach includes some proxies 
for disclosure, which are not necessarily directly based on examining the original 
disclosure vehicle(s), such as financial analysts’ perceptions about corporate 
disclosure practices, management forecasts, ADR, attributes of analysts’ forecasts, 
and the number of analysts following the company. The second approach provides 
some techniques to measure the extent of information disclosure by examining the 
original disclosure vehicle(s), such as the content analysis and the disclosure index. 
However, since information disclosure is a theoretical concept that is not amenable 
to be measured directly, an assessment of the reliability and validity of a measure of 
the extent of information disclosure should be provided. There are three common 
forms of reliability: test-retest, inter-coder reliability, and internal consistency. In 
addition, there are three common types of validity: criterion validity, content validity 
and construct validity.
The implications of this review on the measurement of the extent of corporate 
disclosure in the Egyptian market are then discussed. Corporate annual reports are 
most promising to get a reasonable sample size, since it is the main formal disclosure 
vehicle in the Egyptian market. In addition, the disclosure index technique proved to 
be the most suitable research instrument to measure the extent of corporate 
disclosure in the Egyptian market. Hence, an assessment of its reliability and validity 
as a measure of corporate disclosure is to be provided.
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Chapter (3)
The economic consequences of corporate disclosure -  a review
3.1 Overview
Information plays an important role in allocating resources in capital markets. 
Moreover, it is a core variable for measuring the efficiency of a capital market. 
Among sources of companies’ information, listed companies are considered to be the 
primary source of information to the market. However, providing information to the 
public is not a costless task. The decision of a company to disclose different types of 
information to the capital markets, like any other decision, has costs and benefits 
associated with it.
Among the costs of disclosure are the costs of information production and 
dissemination; for example the costs of adopting an information system to collect, 
process data and report information about the company and the costs of hiring 
accountants and audits, etc. Moreover, competitors may make use of available 
information about a company to their own advantages; for example information 
about product development by a small company may be used for the benefit of a 
larger one. Furthermore, lawsuit costs that may take place when a company is sued 
regarding its disclosure as in the case of errors.
Although the costs of disclosure could dominate a company’s disclosure policy, it is 
important not to ignore its potential benefits. Companies may benefit from providing 
more information to the public through reducing their cost of capital and/or 
increasing the pure cash flows accruing to their shareholders, consequently 
increasing their values. Thus, a decision to provide more information to the public 
should be based on a cost-benefit analysis (Healy and Palepu, 1993; and Botosan, 
2000).
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However, investigating the potential benefits of increased disclosure is not an easy 
task. This is due to the measurement difficulties of both disclosure and its benefits, 
for instance, disclosure is a theoretical concept that is difficult to measure directly 
(Cooke and Wallace, 1989). In addition, there is a difficulty in linking disclosure to 
the cost of capital since there is no generally accepted model of cost of capital that 
incorporates disclosure policy (Lang, 1999). Moreover, the size of these benefits 
might be too small to be observed and empirically tested (Botosan, 2000; Amihud 
and Mendelson, 2000). Recently, however, a number of empirical studies have tried 
to explore the benefits of providing more information to the capital markets (see, for 
example, Botosan, 1997; Sengupta, 1998; Barron, Kile and O’Keefe, 1999; Healy, 
Hutton and Palepu, 1999; Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000; Richardson and Welker, 2001; 
Botosan and Plumlee, 2002; Kothari and Short, 2003; Brown, Hillegeist and Lo, 
2004; and Bushee and Leuz, 2005).
This chapter provides a review of prior studies on the economic consequences10 of 
increased disclosure. The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section (3 .2) 
provides the theoretical framework of the economic consequences of corporate 
disclosure in terms of a lower cost of capital and higher firm value. Section (3 .3) 
classifies the empirical literature into four streams and provides some examples of 
studies under each stream. Section (3.4) sheds light upon some gaps in the literature 
and provides an overview of the current study. Section (3 .5) provides the concluding 
remarks.
10 Zeff (1978: 56) stated that: ‘By ‘economic consequences’ is meant the impact of accounting reports 
on the decision-making behavior of business, government, unions, investors and creditors. It is argued 
that the resulting behavior of these individuals and groups could be detrimental to the interests of 
other affected parties’ ’
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3.2 The theoretical framework
Finance theory provides a framework to explain the economic consequences of 
corporate disclosure in terms of a lower cost of capital and higher firm value. It is 
theoretically agreed that the value of a company is the cash flows that investors 
expect the company to generate in the future, discounted at the company’ s cost of 
capital. The cost of capital is the rate of return that a company has to offer finance 
providers to induce them to buy and hold a financial security (Arnold, 2005: 872). 
Hence, there are two factors determining firm value: future cash flows and the cost 
of capital. It is suggested that increased disclosure can increase firm value by either 
increasing pure cash flows that accrue to its shareholders or reducing its cost of 
capital or both.
It is argued that increased disclosure can influence firm value by increasing cash 
flows that accrue to its shareholders through reducing agency costs. Increased 
disclosure is expected to decrease the private benefits that management and 
controlling shareholders’ could get from control, and to reduce costs of monitoring 
them. Thus, increased disclosure can increase the pure cash flow shareholders can 
receive (Coffee, 1999; and Stulz, 1999).
In addition, finance theory suggests that more disclosure can reduce a company’s
cost of capital. An investor’s decision to buy, sell or hold a company share depends
on his or her expectations regarding its future cash flow or return distributions. In
constructing these expectations, he or she exploits all available information about the
stock. However, the level of information available to a particular investor could be
different from that available to another investor. In other words, investors (or more
broadly market participants) could be subject to different levels of information. This
problem is usually referred to as information asymmetry. Information asymmetry
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arises between outside investors and managers. For example, managers have more 
information about their firms’ performance and future prospects. In addition, 
information asymmetry arises among investors when some investors have access to 
private information about the shares. This information asymmetry problem is 
believed to influence the company’s cost of capital through two main factors: 
estimation risk and stock liquidity. Figure (3 .1) shows how information asymmetry 
could affect the company’s cost of capital and hence its value.
Estimation risk
Lewellen and Shanken (2000: 2) define the estimation risk as “ investor uncertainty 
about the parameters of the return- or cash flow- generating process” . Because the 
true parameters of the security ’s future cash flow or returns are unknown, investors 
must predict them using whatever information is available. The forecasting process 
always carries the risk of uncertainty. Part of this uncertainty arises because the 
amount of information available about alternative shares is different. For example, 
the amount of voluntary information that different companies could disclose is 
different. This kind of parameter uncertainty, caused by differential information 
available about alternative securities, is usually called asymmetric parameter 
uncertainty or asymmetric estimation risk.
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Figure (3.1) Information asymmetry and cost of capital.
51
Coles, Loewenstein and Suay (1995: 347) explain this element of risk as a result of 
information asymmetry as follows:
“The standard theoretical analysis of portfolio choice and equilibrium asset pricing assumes investors 
know the parameters that govern the distribution of payoffs or returns of the various assets. But the 
investor must, in any application, estimate these parameters. For example, the investor may need to 
estimate the vector of means and covariance matrix of asset returns or payoffs. For some securities, 
the investor may have the same number of sample observations (information asymmetry problem 
does not exist). In this case, parameter uncertainty is said to be symmetric. In other cases, estimation 
is complicated by missing data and unequal numbers of observations on assets (information 
asymmetry problem exists), hereafter, asymmetric or differential parameter uncertainty”
This asymmetric estimation risk is believed to have a systematic component and 
hence should be priced to some extent. Given that the systematic risk is common to 
all companies to a greater or lesser extent and cannot be eliminated by holding a 
sufficiently large portfolio (non-diversifiable), investors require higher returns for 
riskier securities in terms of systematic risk. This in turn means that this element of 
risk, the asymmetric estimation risk, increases the firm’s cost of capital.
The Capital Asset Pricing Model11 (CAPM) defines the systematic risk as market 
beta. Market beta (P) measures the relative volatility of returns. If stock returns 
move up and down more radically than do the market returns, the stock is considered 
to be relatively more risky and will have a higher market beta. Given that the 
asymmetric estimation risk has a systematic component and hence influences market 
beta as a measure of the systematic risk, prior theoretical studies suggested a
11 It is “an asset (e.g. share) pricing theory which assumes that financial assets, in equilibrium, will be 
priced to produce rates of return which compensate investors for systematic risk as measured by the 
covariance of the assets’ return with the market portfolio return (i.e. beta)” stated Arnold (2005, 
Glossary, G: 4). Hence, according to the CAPM, the expected rate of return required by an investor is
equal to the risk free rate plus the firm’s estimated beta (/?) times the expected market premium. 
Given that both the risk free rate and the market premium are constant for all securities, a variation in 
the cost of equity capital is driven entirely by a variation in beta. However, other studies such as Fama 
and French (1992) found that firm size and the book to market ratio were more powerful than beta in 
explaining average returns.
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n egative  relationsh ip  b etw een  the am ount o f  in form ation  availab le  about alternative
shares and m arket beta.
For example, Barry and Brown (1985) investigated the effect of investors’ 
uncertainty about the exact parameters of returns’ distributions of alternative shares 
on systematic risk (measured by market beta) when there are differences in the 
amount of information available about alternative securities. To illustrate how 
asymmetric estimation risk can affect the perceived systematic risk of a share or a 
portfolio Barry and Brown (1985: 408) provide the following scenario:
“Suppose there are two alternative securities available for investment, security A and security B. 
before observing any returns, the investor has identical information about the two securities. On the 
basis of available returns data, suppose that the usual maximum likelihood estimates of expected 
returns and variances of the two securities are identical and that their estimated covariances with a 
given reference portfolio are identical. However, estimates for security A are based on twenty 
quarterly observations, whereas only four quarterly observations are available for security B. which 
security would a risk-averse investor prefer?
(—), the investor would form a predictive distribution of future returns for the two securities. He 
would find that there is greater dispersion in his distribution for security B or for portfolio containing 
the reference portfolio and B, rather than the reference portfolio and A. Thus, he would opt for 
security A over B, or for a larger holding of A than B, if he contemplated holding both securities. If 
such behavior is consistent across the market, equilibrium would be affected”
Barry and Brown (1985) established that securities for which there is relatively little 
information have relatively higher systematic risk. Coles, Loewenstein and Suay
(1995) showed similar findings based on a payoff-model in which investors base 
their portfolio choice on the distribution of payoffs. They also establish that these 
results hold in a multi-period model.
Healy and Palepu (1993) provided another example. They showed how the 
information asymmetry between managers and outside investors could lead to 
misevaluation of the firm’s stock. This was clear for a particular company, Patten 
Corporation, which faced a higher cost of equity capital in the capital market as a 
result of the existence of information asymmetry between managers and outside
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investors. Among their recommendations to overcome this problem, for instance 
dividends increases, stock repurchases and hedging strategies, is expanding 
disclosure. They argued that greater disclosure could help investors understand 
managers’ business strategies, increase stock prices and reduce the firm’s cost of 
equity capital. They added, however, that the firm should make its decision on a 
cost-benefit base. It should take into considerations the cost associated with this 
expanded disclosure, for instance the potential harm to the company’s competitive 
position in the market.
Recently, Jorgensen and Kirschenheiter (2003) provided a theoretical framework to 
explain how the manager’s discretionary risk disclosure affects the company’s 
market beta and other companies’ market betas within the framework of the CAPM. 
They suggested that a company will have a lower market beta if its manager 
discloses risk information than if the manager does not disclose. In addition, they 
predict that disclosure by a company affects the market betas of other companies in 
the economy but does not affect the share price of those other companies, provided 
that the companies have positive market betas.
Stock liquidity
Amihud and Mendelson (2000: 9) define the liquidity of a stock as “ a measure of 
the ease with which cash can be converted to an investment in the stock or vice 
versa. Illiquidity is driven by the explicit and implicit costs of buying or selling the 
stock” . Liquidity costs include the direct costs of trading such as commissions and
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fees, the adverse selection costs such as the bid-ask spread12, and the opportunity 
costs. The higher the liquidity costs, the higher the rate of return required by an 
investor when buying and selling the stock.
Finance theory suggests that the information asymmetry among investors increases 
liquidity costs, hence reducing stock liquidity and increasing the rate of return 
required by investors to invest in a firm’s shares. In other words, an uninformed 
trader, who has no private information about the stock, requires a premium for the 
risk he bears as a result of trading with an informed trader, who has private 
information about the stock. This premium is argued to be an important component 
of the firm’s cost of equity capital.
Amihud and Mendelson (1986) investigated the effects of spreads on asset returns. 
Their results suggest that investors should require higher returns on less liquid stocks 
in order to compensate them for the liquidity costs they bear when buying and 
selling the firm’s shares. They later (Amihud and Mendelson, 2000) called it the 
liquidity premium and argued that it is an important determinant of the firm’s cost of 
capital. While they did not investigate the impact of disclosure upon liquidity costs 
in their 1986 study, they suggested voluntary disclosure as a financial policy that 
could be adopted by companies to reduce the adverse selection component of the 
bid-ask spread, thus enhancing stock liquidity, and reducing the firm’s cost of 
capital.
12 “The bid and ask prices quoted for a stock are the prices at which investors can trade a small order 
instantaneously; a small sell order can be instantaneously executed at the market bid price, and a 
small buy order can be executed instantaneously at the ask price. The difference between the highest 
bid (buying) price and the lowest ask (selling) price- the bid-ask spread- thus represents a liquidity 
cost. A liquid stock has a narrow bid-ask spread, which implies a lower cost for an instantaneous 
“round-trip” transaction” stated Amihud and Mendelson (2000: 9).
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In addition, Merton (1987) highlighted the important role of disclosure in increasing 
demand for securities. More and better information about the company can increase 
the familiarity of potential investors with the company and ease their purchase of its 
securities. Hence, more and better information can increase demand for securities. 
This in turn will increase the firm’s market value and reduce its cost of capital.
Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) developed a model of trade in an illiquid market by 
large traders with limited risk bearing capacity. The purpose was to examine the 
effects of disclosure on market liquidity and hence the firm’s cost of capital through 
reducing information asymmetry among market makers. They showed that revealing 
public information reduces information asymmetry among market makers and hence 
increases market liquidity. This increase in market liquidity is a result of reducing 
market makers’ risk premium (with a fixed number of market makers) or increased 
demand (by attracting more market makers). Furthermore, the increase in market 
liquidity diminishes the firm’s cost of capital, with a larger reduction in the cost of 
capital for larger firms.
In sum, increased disclosure is expected to mitigate the information asymmetry 
problem either between managers and outside investors or among investors and 
hence reduce the firm’s cost of capital. Since firm value is a negative function of its 
cost of capital, it is expected that, ceteris paribus, reducing the firm’s cost of capital 
(the required rate of return) will increase its value.
3.3 Empirical studies
This section reviews prior empirical studies on the economic consequences of 
corporate disclosure. Table (3 .1) provides a summary of these studies in 
chronological order.
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Table (3.1) Summary of prior studies on the economic consequences of corporate
disclosure
Reference Proxies for the 
economic 
consequences of 
corporate disclosure
Type of 
disclosure
The market 
of concern
Data analysis
Dhaliwal, Market beta and the 
Spicer and variance of stock 
Vickrey (1979) returns
Increased
disclosure
resulted from
the SEC’s
segmental
disclosure
requirement.
US Cross section
Garsombke
(1979)
Market beta, 
unsystematic 
(residual) returns 
variance, and total 
return variance
The quality of 
disclosure in 
annual reports 
using a
disclosure index 
consists of 34 
mandatory and 
voluntary items 
of information
US Cross section
Firth (1984) Market beta, 
unsystematic risk, 
and variance of return
Voluntary
disclosure
UK Cross section
Clarkson and
Thompson
(1990)
Market beta Period of listing US Cross section
Conover and 
Wallace (1995)
Stock returns Mandatory
geographic
segment
disclosure
US The analysis is 
limited to 
Spearman 
correlation test 
only
Welker (1995) The bid-ask spread Aggregate 
disclosure based 
on the AIMR 
scores
US Cross section
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Reference Proxies for the Type of The market Data analysis
economic disclosure of concern
consequences of 
corporate disclosure
Lang and The number of Aggregate US Cross section
Lundholm analysts following disclosure based
(1996) the firm and analysts’ on the FAF
earnings forecasts scores.
Botosan (1997) An overall measure Voluntary US Cross section
of cost of equity disclosure 
capital
Clarkson and 
Satterly (1997)
Market beta Period of listing Australia Cross section
Francis, Hanna The number of Voluntary US Pre and post
and Philbrick analysts following disclosure presentations
(1997) the firm, underpricing (corporate analysis and
and analysts’ presentations to cross-sectional
forecasts the New York 
Society of 
Security 
Analysts)
analysis
Sengupta Two measures of a Aggregate US Cross section
(1998) firm’s incremental 
borrowing cost are
disclosure based 
on the FAF
used: the yield to 
maturity and the 
effective interest cost 
to the issuer
scores
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Reference Proxies for the 
economic 
consequences of 
corporate disclosure
Type of 
disclosure
The market 
of concern
Data analysis
Barron, Kile 
and O’Keefe 
(1999)
Analysts’ earnings 
forecasts
Mandatory 
disclosure (the 
SEC ratings of 
companies’ 
compliance 
with the 
M D &A13)
US Cross section
Healy, Hutton, 
and Palepu 
(1999)
Stock returns, growth 
in institutional 
ownership, spread, 
and analyst coverage
Increased 
voluntary 
disclosure based 
on AIMR 
scores.
US Time series
Schleicher and 
Walker (1999)
Share prices 
anticipation of 
earnings changes
Voluntary 
disclosure 
companies 
make in their 
management 
discussions of 
operations and 
financing
UK Pooled
regression
Bushee and 
Noe (2000)
Number of analysts’ 
following the firm, 
institutional 
ownership and stock 
return volatility
Aggregate 
disclosure based 
on the AIMR 
scores
US Cross section
13 The SEC mandates that publicly traded companies provide a narrative called the Management 
Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) in their annual reports (their 10-Ks). The importance of the 
MD&A arises from its inclusion of forward-looking disclosures, which can assess in forecasting 
companies’ future performance.
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R e fe r en ce Proxies for the Type of The market Data analysis
economic disclosure of concern
consequences of 
corporate disclosure
Lang and Stock prices around A US Cross section
Lundholm equity offerings comprehensive
(2000) measure of
disclosure based 
on all available 
public
disclosure by or 
about each firm 
(they used 
disclosure 
frequency and 
changes in 
disclosure 
frequency to 
proxy for the 
level of 
disclosure)
Leuz and The bid-ask spread, Increased Germany Cross section
Verrecchia trading-volume, and disclosure based
(2000) share price volatility on a switch
from
Germany’ s 
GAAP to either 
IAS or US 
GAAP
Richardson An overall measure Quality and Canada Pooled
of cost of equity quantity of regression
and Welker capital financial
(2001) disclosure and 
social
disclosure in
companies’ 
annual reports 
provided by 
SMAC.
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Reference Proxies for the 
economic 
consequences of 
corporate disclosure
Type of 
disclosure
The market 
of concern
Data analysis
Walker and Analysts’ followings Voluntary UK Cross section
Tsalta (2001) (measured by the 
number of forecast 
revisions issued by 
analysts)
disclosure (the 
extent of 
forward-looking 
information in 
the annual 
reports of 
companies)
■|
Bailey, Price volatility and A  dummy Non-US Cross section
Karolyi, and 
Salva (2002)
trading volume variable takes 
the value of one 
for stocks from 
developed 
countries and 
the value of 
zero for stocks 
from emerging 
countries
companies 
(from over 
40 emerging 
and
developed 
markets) 
cross listed 
on the US 
market
Botosan and An overall measure 
Plumlee (2002) of cost of equity 
capital
Aggregate 
disclosure, 
annual reports 
disclosure, 
timely
disclosure and 
investor 
relations based 
on the AIMR 
scores
US Cross section
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Reference Proxies for the Type of The market
economic disclosure of concern
consequences of 
corporate disclosure
Bowen, Davis Analysts’ forecast 
and Matsumoto error and dispersion 
(2002)
Voluntary
disclosure
(conference
calls)
Hail (2002) An overall measure Voluntary
of cost of equity disclosure
capital defined as a 
fractional rank 
of a firm’s 
disclosure 
scores provided 
by the Swiss 
Banking 
Institute at the 
University of 
Zurich
Lundholm and Current annual stock Aggregate
Myers (2002) returns, disclosure based
contemporaneous on the AIMR
annual earnings and 
future earnings.
scores
Patel, Balic Ownership stmcture Transparency
and Bwakira and price-to-book and Disclosure
(2002) ratio (T&D) scores 
from Standard
and Poor’s 
dataset
US
Switzerland
US
19 large and 
liquid 
emerging 
markets
Data analysis
Cross section 
and within- 
firm analysis.
Cross section
Cross section 
and time-series 
analyses
The analysis is 
limited to a 
correlation 
analysis only.
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R e fe r en ce
Schadewitz 
and Kanto 
(2002)
Schrand and 
Verrecchia 
(2002)
Hope (2003a)
Proxies for the Type of The market
economic disclosure of concern
consequences of 
corporate disclosure
Share prices 
anticipation of 
interim earnings 
announcements
Two proxies for Finland 
the quality and 
quantity of 
disclosure in 
interim reports 
are used: full 
disclosure 
(mandatory and 
voluntary) and 
voluntary 
disclosure.
IPO under-pricing, Disclosure US
bid-ask spreads, frequency
analyst forecast defined as the
consensus Number of 
disclosures 
made by the 
firm during the 
90-day period 
preceding the 
IPO and the 90- 
day period 
following the 
IPO
The accuracy of The level of 22 emerging
analysts’ earnings annual reports and
forecasts disclosure developed
measured by the countries 
total CIFAR 
disclosure 
scores
D a ta  a n a ly s is
Pooled
regression
Cross section
Cross section
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Reference Proxies for the Type of The market Data analysis
economic disclosure of concern
consequences of 
corporate disclosure
Hope (2003b) Analysts’ forecast The extent of From 18-23 Cross section 
error and dispersion firms’ emerging and
disclosure of developed
their accounting countries.
policies using
the CIFAR
disclosure
scores
Hussainey, Price leading Voluntary UK Pooled
Schleicher and earnings disclosure in the regression
Walker (2003) annual report 
discussion
section
Kothari and An overall measure A US Cross section
Short (2003) of cost of capital, comprehensive
standard deviation of measure of
stock returns and disclosure from
standard deviation of different
analysts’ forecast sources
errors (management, 
analysts and 
news stories in 
financial press) 
and individual
measures of 
disclosures 
sorted by its 
source.
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Reference Proxies for the Type of The market Data analysis
economic disclosure of concern
consequences of 
corporate disclosure
Lang, Lins and Firm value measured The number of Non-US Time series
Miller (2003) by Tobin’s q ratio analysts firms cross
following the listed on the
firm and 
forecast 
accuracy are 
used as proxies 
for the 
information 
environment
US market
Lo (2003) Stock returns Mandatory
disclosure (a
regulatory
change
mandates
executive
compensation
disclosures)
US Cross section
Baek, Kang Firm value measured Disclosure Korea Cross section
and Park as the holding period quality
(2004) return around the date measured by a
of the economic dummy variable
shock (November that takes the
12,1997) value of one if 
the firm has an 
ADR and zero 
otherwise
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Reference Proxies for the Type of The market Data analysis
economic disclosure of concern
consequences of 
corporate disclosure
Brown, Probability of Voluntary US Cross section
Hillegeist and information based disclosure and time series
Lo (2004) trading (PIN)14 (conference
calls)
Lam and Du Market beta and the Voluntary and China Cross section
(2004) variance of returns mandatory
disclosures
Silva and Firm value measured Voluntary Argentina, Cross section
A lves(2004) by Tobin’s q ratio disclosure of Brazil, and
financial 
information on 
the internet
Mexico
Bushee and Stock returns and Mandatory US Test the
Leuz (2005) stock liquidity disclosure (a change in
(liquidity measured regulatory stock return
by spread, share change around the
turnover and the mandating regulatory
percentage of days Over-The- change and
traded) Counter cross section
Bulletin Board analysis for the
firms to comply effect of the
with reporting regulatory
requirements change upon
under the 1934 
Securities 
Exchange Act)
stock liquidity
14 Brown, Hillegeist and Lo (2004) stated that: “the PIN is a firm-specific estimate of the probability 
that a particular trade order originates from a privately informed investor, and hence, directly captures 
the extent of information asymmetry among investors in the secondary market”.
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Reference Proxies for the Type of The market Data analysis
economic disclosure of concern
consequences of 
corporate disclosure
Graham, Information Voluntary US Survey and
Harvey and asymmetry, increased disclosure interview
Rajgopal analyst coverage, : :
(2005) corporate control 
contests, stock 
compensation, 
management talent 
and limitations of 
mandatory disclosure
Krishnamurt, Bid-ask spreads, and Voluntary 
Sevic and market depth disclosure
Sevic (2005)
15 emerging Cross section 
markets cross 
listed on the 
US market
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The reason of introducing Table (3.1) is to demonstrate the main differences among 
prior studies in terms of the economic consequences proxies, type of disclosure, the 
market of concern and the analysis used. For the purpose of the current research, 
prior empirical studies on the economic consequences of corporate disclosure, in 
terms of a lower cost of capital and higher firm value, can be classified15 into four 
streams. The first stream of research attempts to explore the association between 
disclosure level and market beta. The second stream of research links disclosure with 
some measures of stock liquidity. The third stream of research investigates the direct 
association between disclosure and a measure of the cost of capital. The fourth 
stream of research tries to explore the direct link between disclosure and firm value.
3.3.1 First stream of research: disclosure and market beta
The first stream of research tries to explore how the amount of information available 
on shares affects the firm’s cost of capital through its effects on asymmetric 
estimation risk. It is argued that market beta is an increasing function of asymmetric 
estimation risk. Therefore, this stream of research suggests a negative association 
between the amount of information available about alternative shares and their 
market betas. However, empirical research in this area is still very limited.
15 It should be said that this classification is neither strict nor inclusive. Some overlap could exist 
between these four streams of research; for example, some studies investigate issues relating to stock 
liquidity and stock price (see for example: Healy, Hutton and Palepu, 1999; and Bloomfield and 
Wilks, 2000). Moreover, a number of prior studies investigate other proxies for the economic 
consequences of corporate disclosure such as the number of analysts following the firm, the attributes 
of analysts’ earnings forecasts and the return-earnings relation, see, for example, Hope (2003a; 
2003b) and Hussainey, Schleicher and Walker (2003).
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Garsombke (1979) replicated the Singhvi and Desai’ s (1971) study16 to test for a link 
between disclosure and three measures of risk; systematic risk, unsystematic 
(residual) returns variance, and total return variance for a sample of large US 
industrial companies. The results showed that disclosure is an insignificant variable 
in explaining company risk. With respect to the measure of risk of interest for the 
current research (systematic risk measured by market beta), the univariate analysis 
showed a significant negative correlation between disclosure and market beta. 
However, in a multiple regression model, this relationship became not significant 
after controlling for other accounting measures of risk such as firm size.
Dhaliwal, Spicer and Vickrey (1979) investigated the impact of SEC’s segmental 
disclosure requirement upon the cost of equity capital for a sample of 25 firms in the 
experimental group and 53 firms in the control groups. They used two proxies for 
the cost of equity capital: the return variance and market beta. While their results 
support a negative association between improvements in segmental disclosure and 
cost of equity capital measured by return variance, the evidence was weak for market 
beta. Their initial results, which are based on a non-parametric test (Mann-Whitney 
test), show a negative impact of segmental disclosure upon market beta. However, 
after controlling for other measures of risk such as firm size, liquidity ratio, payout 
ratio, and earnings variability in a multiple regression model this relationship did not 
hold.
16 Singhvi and Desai (1971) reported a negative relationship between the amount of disclosure and 
stock price dispersion as a measure of risk.
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Based on a sample of 100 large British manufacturing companies, Firth (1984) 
examined the association between disclosure level and three measures of risk: 
systematic risk (measured by market beta), unsystematic risk, and variance of return. 
While the results showed a negative association between disclosure level and the 
different measures of risk, none was significant after controlling for other accounting 
measures of risk such as firm size and gearing.
Clarkson and Thompson (1990) investigated the relationship between market beta 
and the amount of information available about a stock using a sample of 198 US 
initial public offerings (IPO). Assuming that the amount of information is increasing 
in time, they used the period of listing as a proxy for the amount of information 
available about the stock. The results show a negative association between market 
beta and the amount of information available on the shares. Replicating the analysis 
for a sample of 204 Australian IPOs, Clarkson and Satterly (1997) reported a similar 
result: a negative association between market beta and the amount of information 
available on the shares. However, time cannot be considered an effective proxy for 
the quantity of information since it cannot capture the difference in information 
environments among different companies (Barry and Brown, 1985).
Recently, Lam and Du (2004) examined the relationship between both voluntary and 
mandatory disclosures and two measures of estimation risk: market beta and the 
variance of returns in the Chinese market. They found preliminary evidence that 
firms that have higher compliance with mandatory disclosure tend to have lower 
market beta. However, the results from the regression analysis generally did not 
support the existence of a relationship between market beta and any measure of
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disclosure. However, they added that these results are hardly generalisable to other 
markets since their data were expected to be very noisy.
More recently, Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal (2005) investigated the motivations 
for corporate voluntary disclosure. They conducted a survey and a number of 
interviews with a large number of US financial executives. The results indicated that 
more than four-in-five respondents agree or strongly agree that firms use voluntary 
disclosure to reduce the information asymmetry between managers and outsiders. 
Moreover, many interviewers see that the most important motivation for making 
voluntary disclosures is to reduce uncertainty about the firms’ prospects.
3.3.2 Second stream of research: disclosure and stock liquidity
The second stream of studies investigates the relationship between increased 
disclosure and stock liquidity as a proxy for a firm’s cost of capital. The theory 
suggests that more information can enhance stock liquidity through reducing 
liquidity costs17 and increasing the demand on securities.
Conover and Wallace (1995) investigated the correlation between the extent of 
mandated geographic segment disclosure and stock returns for a sample of 230 US 
based multinational firms. They provided preliminary evidence of a positive 
correlation between the level of geographic segment information released and stock 
returns using the Spearman correlation test. This result suggests that firms benefit 
from releasing segment information to the public. However, they neither tested for 
other variables that can affect stock returns, nor did they test for the validity and
17 Liquidity costs are the sum of adverse selections costs, opportunity costs and direct cost (for more 
details see: Amihud and Mendelson, 2000).
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reliability of their measure of disclosure level. Hence, this result might be viewed as 
suggestive rather than conclusive.
Welker (1995) investigated the relationship between disclosure and stock liquidity. 
He used the annual corporate disclosure rankings provided by AIMR reports for the 
years 1983 through 1990 as his empirical proxy for the level of disclosure. The 
empirical proxy for stock liquidity used was the closing spread scaled by price (the 
relative spread), determined as of the last trading day of the calendar year for which 
the Corporate Information Committee (CIC) report is issued. Using a final sample of 
427 US firms in 28 industries, he found a significant negative relationship between 
disclosure level and spreads after controlling for the effects of return volatility, 
trading volume, and share price. However, his proxy for disclosure level has some 
disadvantages, which has been covered in Chapter (2).
Healy, Hutton and Palepu (1999) used a time-series approach to investigate whether 
increased disclosure improves stock performance (measured by stock returns for the 
12 months beginning three months into the fiscal year-end) and capital market 
intermediation. A  sample of 97 firms that made continuous and significant increases 
in disclosure rather than the disclosure level itself was selected using the full-time 
series of AIMR ratings from 1980-1991. They provided evidence that expanded 
disclosure is associated with increases in stock performance, growth in institutional 
ownership, increased stock liquidity (reflected in reduced relative bid-ask spreads), 
and higher analyst coverage. The results for the dispersion in analysts’ forecasts 
were insignificant. Moreover, the disclosure increases concurred with increased use 
of public financing, both debt and equity. Although this study follows the same 
approach as that of Welker (1995) and Lang and Lundholm (1996), it has the
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advantage of using a time-series approach, which reduces the problem of omitted 
correlated variables inherent in the cross-sectional approach (Lang, 1999). However, 
their proxy for disclosure level, the AIMR scores, has some disadvantages, which 
have been previously mentioned in Chapter (2).
Bloomfield and Wilks (2000) investigated directly the impact of disclosure quality 
upon stock prices and stock liquidity in an experimental study. They concluded that 
greater disclosure quality leads to higher prices and greater liquidity and these 
effects were stronger when investors faced the risk of unpredictable demand shocks. 
Also, disclosure had larger effects on prices and liquidity at greater market depths 
(large transactions). Given that these findings are based on an experimental study, 
they cannot be generalised to the real market without restrictions.
Lang and Lundholm (2000) examined the relationship between corporate disclosure 
activity and stock prices around equity offerings. They used a sample of 41 offering 
small firms and a control sample of 41 non-offering firms. They argued that small 
firms are more likely to have low analysts following; therefore they are more likely 
to use their disclosure policy to affect market participants. Based on all available 
public disclosure by or about each firm, they used disclosure frequency and changes 
in disclosure frequency to proxy for the level of disclosure. Beginning six months 
before the offering, they found a significant increase in disclosure activity for 
offering firms after controlling for the firm’s current and future earnings 
performance, and a price decline at the offering announcement. However, there is a 
difference between firms that practise sustained disclosure activity and those that 
practise a temporary increase in disclosure activity prior to the offering. The former 
experienced price increases prior to the offering and only minor price declines at the
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offering announcement relative to the control firms. The latter experienced price 
increases prior to the offering relative to the control firms, but suffer much larger 
price declines at the offering announcement. These results suggest that sustained 
disclosure practices may have reduced the information asymmetry and hence the 
adverse selection inherent in the offering.
Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) tested whether a commitment to increased disclosure 
enhances stock liquidity and hence reduces the cost of equity capital. They used the 
switch from Germany’s Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) to either 
the International Accounting Standards (IAS) or the United State’s Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles (US GAAP) as a proxy for the firm’s commitment 
to increased disclosure. They used three proxies for stock liquidity: the bid-ask 
spread, trading-volume, and share price volatility. Using a cross-sectional sample 
composed of 102 firms included in the D AX100 index during 1998, they found that 
firms electing either IAS or US GAAP showed measurable economic benefits in the 
form of a lower information asymmetry component of the cost of capital. This study 
extends the empirical disclosure literature by focusing on the German capital market 
setting, and by using a new proxy for disclosure level: the commitment to increased 
disclosure. However, there are some concerns regarding the presence of a self­
selection bias (related to the choice of the switch of reporting strategy as a proxy for 
increased disclosure), the potential correlated omitted variables in the study 
(variables correlated with the adoption of an international reporting strategy that 18
18 For more details about these concerns see Joos (2000).
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might be partially responsible for the observed results such as cross listing); and the 
measurement error encountered in the proxies for information asymmetry.
Bailey, Karolyi, and Salva (2002) investigated the benefits of the increased 
disclosure around cross listing in the US market by non-US firms. More precisely, 
they studied the price volatility and volume reactions to earnings announcements by 
non- US firms before and after their US listing. They used a sample of 2,695 
earnings announcement events for 427 firms from over 40 emerging and developed 
markets around the world. They assigned a dummy variable to take the value of one 
for stocks from developed countries (as they experience high quality accounting 
standards prior to listing in the US market), and the value of zero otherwise (as 
emerging countries or less developed countries experience poor quality accounting 
standards prior to listing in the US market). They hypothesized that firms listed on 
the US should benefit from price volatility decline around earnings announcements, 
and these price volatility declines should be greater for companies from emerging or 
less-developed countries. Moreover, they hypothesized that abnormal trading 
volume is positively associated with information asymmetry, and that relationship 
should be much stronger for less-developed countries. However, the results 
contradict their hypotheses and show that price volatility increases after listing in the 
US market, and this volatility increase was greater for firms from developed 
markets. Moreover, volume reactions were larger following a US listing, but it is 
primarily associated with developed-market firms. These results contradict the 
notion that firms listed on the US market are committed to an increased level of 
disclosure and hence benefit from a lower cost of capital. However, their distinction 
between developed countries and emerging countries, as the former have accounting 
standards of better quality than that of the latter, might not be completely right. This
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is because some emerging countries in their sample have disclosure indices, which 
are above the mean, for instance Hong Kong, Mexico, Malaysia, Philippines, 
Thailand and South Africa, and which are quite similar to those of developed 
countries. So, this distinction might not reflect the actual cross-sectional variation in 
disclosure level among these countries. Moreover, these surprising results may arise 
because of the incremental disclosure regime followed by companies in their sample. 
Furthermore, the use of price volatility and trading volume as proxies for 
information asymmetry attracts some criticisms. Trading volume around information 
events (e.g., earnings announcements) may relate to disagreement among market 
participants even if there is no information asymmetry among them. Price volatility 
is less reliable as a proxy for information asymmetry (Joos, 2000: 132-133).
Schrand and Verrecchia (2002) used a sample of 190 companies to investigate the 
relationship between disclosure and the cost of capital prior to and after IPO. They 
defined IPO under-pricing as the difference between the quoted offer price and the 
market price usually measured at the end of the first trading day, given that IPO is 
typically relying on some notion of asymmetric information. Their proxy for the 
level of disclosure was the disclosure frequency, being the number of disclosures 
made by the firm during the 90-day period preceding the IPO and the 90-day period 
following the IPO. The results indicate that pre-IPO disclosure is negatively related 
to under-pricing at the IPO date for non-internet firms. The results for the post-IPO 
period showed that more disclosure is negatively associated with bid-ask spreads, 
and positively associated with analyst forecast consensus. These results suggest that 
more disclosure reduces a firm’s cost of capital.
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3.3.3 Third stream of research: disclosure and cost of capital
The third stream of studies follows an approach that investigates directly the link 
between a proxy for disclosure and a proxy for the cost of capital. They depend on 
the theoretical arguments that more information to the public reduces asymmetric 
estimation risk and increases stock liquidity and hence reduces a firm’s cost of 
capital (Botosan and Harris, 2000). However, this approach does not attempt to 
investigate how disclosure empirically affects the firm’s cost of capital.
Botosan (1997) might be one of the first studies in this trend of research. In a cross- 
sectional study she examined the association between disclosure level and the cost of 
equity capital by regressing firm-specific estimates of the cost of equity capital on 
market beta, firm size and a self-constructed measure of disclosure level. Her 
measure of disclosure level is based on the amount of voluntary disclosure provided 
in the 1990 annual reports for a sample of 122 manufacturing firms. Although her 
measure of disclosure was subjective since she personally assigned different weights 
for different groups of information, she provided evidence that assesses its reliability 
and validity. She used the accounting based valuation formula to calculate the cost of 
equity capital for each company in her sample, and provided evidence that assesses 
the validity of her measure of cost of capital. For firms with low analysts following, 
she found a negative association between the cost of equity capital and the disclosure 
level after controlling for firm size and market beta. However, these results did not 
hold for firms with high analysts following.
An extension to this approach is Sengupta’s study (1998) in which he investigated 
the impact of disclosure quality upon the cost of debt capital. A  sample of 114 US 
firms was used. He used the disclosure scores provided by FAF reports (1987-1991)
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as a proxy for disclosure quality. Two alternative measures of a firm’s incremental 
borrowing cost are used, namely: the yield to maturity and the effective interest cost 
to the issuer. He found a statistically significant negative association between a 
measure of a firm’s overall disclosure quality and the two alternative measures of a 
firm’s incremental borrowing cost. These results suggested that benefits arising 
from increased disclosure are not limited to the cost of equity capital. However, his 
measure of disclosure quality, FAF/AIMR scores, faces some disadvantages, which 
are previously mentioned in Chapter (2).
Applying Botosan’s approach for the Canadian Capital Market, Richardson and 
Welker (2001) tested the relationship between financial and social disclosure and the 
cost of capital for the Canadian companies. Their sample consisted of 225 firm- year 
observations from 87 different firms for the period from 1990 to 1992. They used 
disclosure scores provided by the Joint Society of Management Accountants of 
Canada (SMAC) / University of Quebec at Montreal (UQAM) as their empirical 
measures of financial and social disclosures. These scores are disclosure ratings for 
both the quality and quantity of both financial and social disclosures contained in 
firms’ annual reports. These ratings are obtained from researchers at UQAM for a 
limited time period from 1990 to 1992. To regulate the scoring process researchers at 
UQAM depend on extensive checklists: one is that related to financial information 
includes 261 items of financial information, and the other is that related to socially 
responsible activities includes about 170 items of information. Researchers at 
UQAM assess the quality of disclosure by giving more points for quantitative and 
more detailed data. The cost of equity capital was estimated using an accounting 
based evaluation model. Richardson and Welker (2001) found a negative 
relationship between the quantity and quality of financial disclosure and the cost of
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equity capital for firms with low analyst following. However, this association does 
not hold for social disclosure. They found a significant positive relationship 
between social disclosure and the cost of equity capital. They argued that this 
positive relationship could be due to sample biases, since the time period for which 
data were collected for that research was an economic downturn. They found that the 
relationship between social disclosure and cost of capital is moderated by return on 
equity (ROE). If ROE is a good proxy for economic conditions, then these results for 
the relationship between social disclosure and cost of capital may be limited to 
periods of economic recession.
Applying the same approach for the Swiss Capital Market, Hail (2002) adopted a 
finite horizon version of the residual income model to provide direct evidence of the 
effect of a firm’s voluntary disclosure policy on its implied cost of capital. The 
residual income model is algebraically equivalent to the dividend discount model 
(Gebhardt, Lee and Swaminathan, 2001:140). A  fractional rank19 of a firm’s 
disclosure scores provided by the Swiss Banking Institute at the University of Zurich 
was used as his measure of disclosure quality. For a cross-sectional sample of 73 
non-financial companies he found a negative and highly significant association 
between the two variables after controlling for risk characteristics and firm size and 
provided the magnitude of this effect. These findings hold in general for firms with 
high or low analysts following.
19 Defined as rank of firm’s disclosure score divided by the number of firms in the sample (Hail, 
2002: 751)
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Botosan and Plumlee (2002) investigated the association between the cost of capital 
and levels of annual report and quarterly and other published reports disclosures 
(timely disclosure), and investor relation activities. Their sample consisted of 3618 
firm-year observations covering 43 different industries spanning an eleven-year 
period from 1986-1996 for large and heavily followed analysts firms. Their 
disclosure data were drawn from the 1985/86-1995/6 AIMR Reports. They estimated 
the cost of equity capital for each firm-year using the short horizon form of the 
classic dividend discount model. They tested their hypothesis by regressing the 
expected cost of equity capital on market beta, the natural log of market value, and 
fractional disclosure rank20. Using alternative specifications of a regression equation, 
they examined the impact of cross-sectional variation in total disclosure level and 
cross-sectional variation in disclosure level by type of disclosure: annual report 
disclosure, timely disclosure, and investor relation activities, on the cost of equity 
capital. The results suggested that firms with high analyst following benefited from 
providing greater annual report disclosure. Moreover, the type of disclosure was 
critical since they found negative, positive, and no association between disclosure 
level and the cost of equity capital depending on disclosure type.
3.3.4 Fourth stream of research: disclosure and firm value
The fourth stream of research attempts to explore directly the link between firm 
value and disclosure level. It is suggested that increased disclosure can increase firm 
value by either reducing its cost of capital or increasing pure cash flows that accrue
20 Botosan and Plumlee (2002:30) compute the fractional disclosure rank by ranking firms in their 
sample in ascending order, so that firms that have higher disclosure level receive higher ranks. Then 
the rank of a given firm’s disclosure score is divided by the number of observations having no 
missing values of the ranking variable.
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to its shareholders or both. However, there is a lack of direct empirical evidence of 
the relationship between disclosure and firm value.
Patel, Balic and Bwakira (2002) investigated disclosure practices for 354 companies 
in 19 large and liquid emerging markets over three years ending in 2000. Their proxy 
for disclosure is drawn from Standard and Poor’s dataset on Transparency and 
Disclosure (T&D) scores. Their results show positive and negative correlations 
between price-to-book ratio and T&D scores. After removing the outliers, their 
results show that for 5 out of 6 countries, the price- to- book ratio is positively 
related to T&D scores, suggesting that firms with higher transparency and disclosure 
are valued higher than firms with lower transparency and disclosure. However, they 
did not control for other variables influencing firm value, creating perhaps a problem 
of omitted variables.
Lang, Lins and Miller (2003) investigated whether changes in the information 
environment that occurs with cross listings are linked to firm value. They used 
Tobin’s q ratio as a measure of firm value. The number of analysts following the 
firm and forecast accuracy were used as proxies for the information environment 
rather than the disclosure level itself. Their sample derived from I/B/E/S21 analyst 
forecast data for the fiscal year 1996 includes 4859 firms from 28 countries. Of the 
4859 sample, 235 firms have exchange-listed American Depositary Receipts (ADR) 
as of the end of 1996. By regressing firm value on both forecast accuracy and the
21 The I/B/E/S databases provide global current and historical earnings information to the 
international investment community. I/B/E/S data is available for over 45 countries and over 12,000 
companies. Data is available back to 1976 for the US, and to 1987 for all other countries. 
http://www.rimes.com/ibes.xmp, last accessed on 30th of June 2005.
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number of analysts as well as controls such as asset size, profit, sales growth, and 
industry type, they found that firm value is increasing in both analysts following and 
forecast accuracy. These results suggest that firm value is a function of estimation 
risk. Therefore, the better the forecast accuracy, the lower the estimation risk and the 
higher the firm value. Moreover, these results suggest that as the number of analysts 
following the firm increases, the demand on firm’s share increases and hence firm 
value increases. However, this study links some attributes of the information 
environment to firm value rather than a direct measure of disclosure level.
Silva and Alves (2004) investigated the association between voluntary disclosure of 
financial information on the internet and firm value measured by Tobin’s q ratio for 
a sample of 150 companies in three Latin American countries: Argentina, Brazil, and 
Mexico. Their results support the existence of a significant positive association 
between voluntary disclosure of financial information and firm value after 
controlling for firm size and industry sector in a step-wise regression analysis.
Baek, Kang and Park (2004) examined the role of certain firm-level corporate 
governance characteristics: ownership concentration, disclosure quality, and source 
of finance, in determining changes in firm value during the Asian crisis for the 
Korean market. Assuming that firms with a listed ADR have higher disclosure 
quality, they used a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the firm has an 
ADR and zero otherwise to proxy for disclosure quality. The holding period return 
around the November 17, 1997 was used as a proxy for firm value. Using a sample 
of 644 non-financial firms quoted on the Korean Stock Exchange between 
November 1997 and December 1998, their results suggest that firms that had higher
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3.4 The current study
A careful review of prior empirical studies on the economic consequences of 
corporate disclosure summarized in Table (3.1) shows a number of gaps in the 
empirical literature. Firstly, most prior studies are conducted in developed capital 
markets, mainly the US market. This could be due to the availability of high quality 
data in the US market.
Secondly, there is a fairly limited empirical literature on the relationship between 
disclosure level and market beta. This could be partially due to the fact that market 
beta is the sole determinant of cost of capital according to the CAPM. Within the 
framework of the traditional CAPM information need not be considered as it is 
already incorporated in asset prices. Thus information has no role in the traditional 
CAPM. However, Easley, Hvidkjaer and O’Hara (2002) argued that this view is 
static and not dynamic, and stated that “If asset prices are continually revised to 
reflect new information then efficiency is a process, and how asset prices become 
efficient cannot be separated from asset returns at any point in time”. In other words, 
if asset pricing is a dynamic process, then asset prices will be updated with each 
piece of new information reaching the market.
Thirdly, although prior studies on the economic consequences of corporate 
disclosure emphasise that increased disclosure will reduce the firm’s cost of capital 
and increase its value; there is a lack of direct empirical evidence with respect to the 
relationship between disclosure level and firm value. This might be due to the fact 
that the positive relationship between disclosure quantity and / or quality and firm
d isclosu re quality  su ffered  less  from  the sh ock . T h is result su g g ests  a  p o s it iv e
associa tion  b etw een  d isclosu re quality  and firm  value.
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Fourthly, a fairly limited number of prior studies on the economic consequences of 
corporate disclosure focused on mandatory disclosure. Some of them tried to 
examine changes in disclosure regulation on cost of capital (see, for example, Lo, 
2003; and Bushee and Leuz, 2005). This could be due to an implicit assumption that 
mandatory disclosure would not differ among companies, although quality 
differences in the level of compliance with mandatory disclosure might exist not 
only among different companies but also for the same company from year to year 
(Coy and Dixon, 2004). Thus the current literature on mandatory disclosure is 
criticized as nearly non-existent (Healy and Palepu, 2001).
Finally, although a number of prior studies used pooled data (observations across 
companies and time), see for example: Welker (1995), Richardson and Welker
(2001) and Botosan and Plumlee (2002), panel data analysis is rarely used.
The current study contributes to the literature on disclosure and market based 
accounting research by filling in these marked gaps in the literature. It investigates 
the benefits of increased disclosure namely: lower market beta and higher firm value, 
which have not received much attention from prior studies.
In addition, the current literature on the economic consequences of corporate 
disclosure is based on results drawn from developed capital markets, so there is a 
lack of evidence on the existence of such relationships in emerging markets. This 
study contributes to the literature by investigating these issues for an emerging 
capital market (Egypt).
va lu e has b een  p erce iv ed  as a lo g ica l co n c lu sio n  rather than a h yp oth esis  to b e
tested .
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Moreover, as stated earlier, prior studies on the economic consequences of corporate 
mandatory disclosure are fairly limited. This study contributes to the literature by 
investigating the benefits of both increased mandatory disclosure and increased 
voluntary disclosure. Furthermore, this study contributes to the accounting literature 
by using panel data analysis, which enjoys advantages over the traditional cross 
section analysis and time series analysis such as diminishing the problem of 
collinearity among the explanatory variables; diminishing the effect of the problem 
of omitted variables that are correlated with the explanatory variables; and providing 
the researcher with a large number of observations.
3.5 Concluding remarks
A review of the theoretical literature on the benefits of increased disclosure shows 
that increased disclosure will reduce the firm’s cost of capital and/or increase the 
pure cash flow accruing to shareholders through reducing agency costs; ceteris 
paribus this will increase firm value. The empirical literature, however, shows some 
gaps.
Firstly, most prior empirical studies are conducted in developed capital markets,
mainly the US. This in turn means that the current literature suffers from a lack of
evidence from emerging markets. Secondly, although finance theory predicts that
shares for which there is relatively little amount of available information will be
perceived as more risky in terms of systematic risk (measured by market beta), little
has been done to investigate this association empirically in general, and in emerging
markets in particular. Thirdly, although finance theory suggests a link between
improved disclosure and firm value, little direct empirical evidence exists in general
and in emerging capital markets in particular. Fourthly, prior studies on the
economic consequences of corporate mandatory disclosure are very limited due to an
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implicit assumption that mandatory disclosure would not differ among companies. 
Finally, panel data analysis is rarely used in the accounting literature, although a 
number of prior studies used pooled data.
This research tries to fill these gaps in the literature by examining the relationships 
between disclosure levels (mandatory and voluntary) and both market beta and firm 
value for the Egyptian capital market using panel data analysis.
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Chapter (4) Egypt’s Stock Exchange
4.1 Overview
Egypt (Misr), officially the Arab Republic of Egypt, is an Arabian, Middle-eastern, 
and African country in the north east of Africa. This important geographical location 
contributes to the importance of this study, as the results could be applicable to a 
wide range of countries. Egypt has a total area of about one million square 
kilometers. Its principal physiographic feature is the Nile River, which flows the 
length of Egypt from south to north. Cairo is the capital. The official language in 
Egypt is Arabic. The total population estimate for July 2005 according to the US 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) report22 is 77,505,756. The religion of the 
majority is Islam 94%, Coptic Christian and other 6%. The unit of currency is the 
Egyptian pound, and is written L.E.
This study aims at exploring the benefits of increased disclosure in the Egyptian 
emerging market. Hence, this chapter outlines the broader business and economic 
environment in Egypt. In particular, this chapter discusses the characteristics of the 
capital market and financial reporting in Egypt throughout the period examined in 
this study. The purpose is to provide a background against which the remaining 
analysis in the other chapters can be evaluated. The rest of this chapter is organized 
as follows. Section (4 .2) provides an overview of the business and economic 
environment in Egypt, which affects Egypt’s Stock Exchange (ESE). In Section (4 .3) 
some reasons for why the ESE is considered an emerging capital market, although it 
is one of the oldest stock exchanges in the world, are provided. Market structure and
22Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), The World Factbook- Egypt, 
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/eg.html, last accessed on the 25th of October 2005.
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development are presented in sections (4 .4) and (4.5) respectively. Because listing 
rules have been changed recently, a brief discussion of the old and new listing rules 
is provided in Section (4 .6). Section (4 .7) provides a discussion of information 
disclosure requirements for listed companies, outlines the actual practice reported by 
prior studies. Section (4 .8) sheds light upon the current study. Finally some 
concluding remarks have been provided in Section (4 .9).
4.2 Business and economic environment in Egypt (an overview)
The ESE is one of the oldest stock exchanges in the world, and the first one to be
established in the Middle East. It has two locations: Cairo and Alexandria, hence it 
is also called Cairo & Alexandria Stock Exchanges (CASE)23. The same chairman 
and board of directors govern both. Historically, the ESE has reflected the political 
and economical changes that took place in modern Egypt’s history. From this point 
of view, four remarkable stages can be outlined: the pre-1956 period, 1956 to 1973, 
1974 to 1990, and from 1991 to date.
Prior to 1956
Egypt was ruled by the British Occupation from 1882 to 1952. During this period, 
Egypt was totally dependent upon the import of British manufactured goods and the 
export of its raw cotton. This period was characterized by the dominant role of the 
private sector and witnessed the establishment and the development of Egypt’s stock 
exchange. The Alexandria Stock Exchange was officially established in 1888 
followed by Cairo in 1903. The two exchanges were very active in the 1940s and the 
Egyptian Stock Exchange ranked the fifth largest market in the world (ROSC, 2004).
23 Both ESE and CASE will be used interchangeably in this research to refer to Egypt’s Stock 
Exchange.
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Following World War II, and as a result of the political, economic and social 
frustration, a Bloodless Revolution by an Army group, the Free Officers led by 
Gamal Abd el-Nasser, took place in 1952. In 1953, Egypt was declared a republic 
and Mohamad Naguib was appointed President, succeeded a year later by Gamal 
Abd el-Nasser. The Nasser government undertook various huge agricultural and 
industrial development projects such as the High Dam and the Egyptian Iron and 
Steel Company. The full evacuation of the British troops in 1954, however, made 
Western countries feel threatened about their benefits in the area and led to the 
suspension of financial support needed to complete the High Dam. Egyptian foreign 
policies switched toward the USSR and Eastern Europe seeking support, in 
particular financial support. On the 26th of July 1956 the president Gamal Abd el- 
Nasser announced the nationalistation of the Suez canal.
From 1956 to 1973
The Nasser government nationalized most foreign investments and committed itself 
to take the responsibility for industrial production and marketing decisions. The 
nationalization programme cut deeply the private sector in Egypt. It covered, for 
example24, all private banks, all insurance companies, and shipping companies, 
cotton factories and cotton exporting companies, pharmaceutical producers, glass 
factories, and the largest book publishing company in Egypt. Citizens were granted 
a number of economic rights such as social security and adequate employment, but 
this soon after led to an over employment problem in the public sector and state 
owned companies. As a result, the public sector and state owned companies have
24 L e x isN e x is  F or F acu lties &  A cadem ic L ibrarians,
h ttp ://w w w .lex isn exis.com /academ ic/2upa/Im es/sdC en tralE gyptl.asp , last acce ssed  on the 2 1 st o f
O ctober 2005.
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dominated the economy, and the private sector role was diminished. The activities of 
the CASE reduced dramatically.
From 1974 to 1990
The Arabian-Israeli conflict, which began in 1948, and three wars against the Israeli 
colonisation exhausted the Egyptian economy and drew attention away from its 
internal problems. Egyptian foreign policies oscillated between Western Europe and 
the US, and the USSR trying to get support to deal with the political and economical 
distress. After achieving some political progress with respect to the Arab-Israeli 
conflict, October 1973 victory against Israeli colonisation of the Egyptian land, the 
Sadat government adopted the Open door policy in 1974. It was a program of a 
gradual transition toward a market-based economy aimed at attracting Arabic and 
foreign investments. In practice, it was abused and distorted to a consumer importing 
policy due to the absence of core investment priorities. In addition, a number of new 
laws were issued to encourage and regulate the formation of private sector 
companies. The dominant role of the government in the economy, however, did not 
change. Among those Laws, the issuance of Tax Law 157 and Companies Law (CL) 
159 of 1981 had contributed to the number of listed closed companies in the ESE, 
since joint stock companies were obliged to be listed on the ESE, according to the 
original draft of CL, and offered a tax exemption25 (Abd-Elsalam, 1999: 72-76). This 
contributed to the continuation of the latent stage in the activities of the ESE.
25 ROSC (2004:1) stated that: “listed companies are eligible for a tax exemption equivalent to the 
three months’ deposit rate paid by the Central Bank on paid -up capital”.
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From 1991 to date
In 1991 the Mubarak government adopted a comprehensive economic reform 
program. The package of economic reform includes: liberalization of trade and 
capital flows, banking and financial sector reform, public enterprise reform and 
privatization. The issuance of the Public Business Sector Companies’ Law 203 of 
1991 was the primary step in the privatization program. According to this Law, 314 
public sector enterprises, established as “Affiliated Companies” , were removed from 
the control of their government ministries and were put under 17 state holding 
companies as a preliminary step for full privatization. Once state or public ownership 
in a listed public business sector company goes less than 51 percent, it is no longer 
subject to the provisions of Law 203 of 1991. About 60% from the original portfolio 
was privatized since the beginning of the program in 1994, till end of June 2002. 
Methods of privatization included: initial public offering (IPO), sale to employee 
shareholder association, liquidations, asset sale and leasing. In the meantime, 
Egypt’s foreign policy during the Gulf War allowed it to receive cancellation of half 
of its foreign debt. The economic indicators26 in 1995/1996 compared to that of 
1990/1991 show several achievements. The budget deficit remarkably decreased 
from 20.2 percent to 1.3 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP). The inflation 
rates declined from over 14.5 percent to 7.3 percent. Foreign debt declined from 107 
percent of GDP to 45.9 percent. Foreign debt service decreased from 25.8 percent of 
current account receipts to less than 11 percent.
26 Source: Arab Republic of Egypt, Ministry of Foreign Trade & Industry, Reports Archive, Egypt 
2004, http://www.economv.gov.eg/english/Download/Tocdownload.stm, last accessed on the 24th of 
October 2005.
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By the mid-Nineties, the Egyptian economy began to slow down due to a number of 
factors: the Asian crisis, a terrorist attack on a group of tourists in Luxor, the decline 
of international oil prices, and the government overspendings on huge infrastructure 
projects such as Toshka. The accumulated effect of these factors have contributed to 
a liquidity crisis in 2001 and deteriorated with the eleventh of September attack on 
the World Trade Center towers in Manhattan, New York.
4.3 Egypt’s Stock Exchange as an emerging market
The term “ emerging market”  implies a stock market that is developing from an 
initial stage toward a more mature stage. This could be reflected in changes in 
market activity, size and level of complexity. Because there is no clear-cut point 
between what is called an emerging market and a developed market, some criteria 
should be adopted. The International Finance Corporation (IFC) adopts two criteria 
to distinguish between emerging and developed stock markets: the gross national 
product (GNP) per capita27 and the investable market capitalization-to- GDP ratio. 
According to the IFC, an emerging market is a market with GNP per capita that 
places it in the World Bank’s lower or middle-income classification in at least one of 
the last three years. Moreover, the existence of any regulatory restraints on the 
market activity with respect to foreign investments is considered a feature of an 
emerging market.
27 The World Bank defines the GNP per capita as “ The dollar value of a country's final output of 
goods and services in a year (its GNP), divided by its population. It reflects the average income of a 
country's citizens.” For more information see: The World Bank,
http://www.worldbank.Org/depweb/english/modules/glossary.html#low-income, last accessed on the 
25th of October 2005.
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Prior studies28 have also considered other features of an emerging market such as:
• High potential growth and low correlation with developed markets,
• High volatility of emerging markets when compared with developed 
markets,
• Lack of reliable accounting and reporting standards,
• Illiquid nature of emerging stock markets, since trading in many of these 
markets is concentrated in a small number of stocks with higher trading 
costs associated,
• Poor credit ratings of both the countries and the companies within, high 
and variable inflation, limited market size, absence of solid regulatory 
and investor protection, inefficient country funds and limited number of 
internationally listed securities,
• Significant skewness and kurtosis in their returns.
Although the purpose of this study is not to test for the existence of such attributes in 
the ESE, some attributes could be easily applied to it, such as: GNP per capita of 
Egypt was $1290 in 1998, which classified Egypt as a middle-income country29.
28 For more details see: Azab (2002).
29 The World Bank defines a middle-income country as “ a country having an annual gross national 
product (GNP) per capita equivalent to more than $760 but less than $9,360 in 1998. The standard of 
living is higher than in low-income countries, and people have access to more goods and services, but 
many people still cannot meet their basic needs. In 2002, the cut off for middle-income countries was 
adjusted to more than $755, but less than $9,266.” For more information see: The World Bank,
http://www.worldbank.Org/depweb/english/modules/glossary.html#low-income, last access on 26th of 
October 2005.
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Also, trading is concentrated in a small number of stocks, where the absolute 
liquidity ratio30 of the 30 most heavily traded stocks in terms of value traded 
accounted for 85.81% of total value traded for the period January to June 2002 
(CASE Fact book, 2002: 68-69). This lead to a general classification of traded 
companies into heavily traded companies and less traded companies. However, there 
are no legislated restrictions preventing foreign participation in the market. Other 
features such as the regulatory framework of the market, investor protection and 
reliability of accounting standards and reporting with respect to Egypt have been 
revised by a number of reports on corporate governance over the period 2000 to 
2004. A  summary of the most recent report on the assessment of corporate 
governance principle at country level (ROSC, 2004) is provided in Appendix (4 .1).
4.4 Market structure
This section provides an overview of the Egyptian market in terms of its legal 
framework, its main constitutions, type of companies working in Egypt, and types of 
securities and investors.
The legal framework o f the Egyptian Capital Market
The legal framework of the Egyptian Capital Market consists of Company Law 159 
of 1981 (CL), has its origins in French civil law, and Capital Market and Central 
Depository Laws, influenced by the Anglo-American common law (Appendix 4 .2). 
At the top of the market is the Ministry of Foreign Trade, responsible for the general 
authority for capital market. The Capital Market Authority (CMA) is the securities 
market regulatory agency, reporting to the Minister of Foreign Trade. The CM A is
30 Traded value of the company to the traded value of the market.
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transactions, imposing monetary penalties and de-listings. Cairo and Alexandria 
Stock Exchange (CASE) is the securities market under the supervision of the CMA. 
Misr for Clearing, Settlement and Central Depository Company (MCSD) is the 
central clearing, registry and depository organization.
Type o f companies working in Egypt
The most common form of company working in Egypt is the Joint Stock Company. 
Other forms include: limited liability companies, limited by shares companies and 
partnerships. In December 2002 joint stock companies accounted for approximately 
75 percent of total working companies in Egypt, where limited liability companies 
accounted for 24 percent and limited by shares companies accounted for one percent 
(ROSC, 2004). According to the CL only joint stock companies and limited by 
shares companies can be listed on the ESE.
Types o f securities and investors
Generally there are two classes of shares in the Egyptian market: ordinary and 
preferred. Ordinary shares are either nominal (registered) or bearer. Preferred shares 
have priority in terms of receiving a fixed percentage of dividends before other 
shares and have priority in liquidation. They also have voting rights at two votes per 
share in most cases. However ordinary nominal shares are the most common class of 
shares in the Egyptian market31. Hence, the Egyptian market has been long
31 CASE Monthly Bulletin, July 2003.
resp on sib le  for ensuring the d evelop m en t o f  a transparent and secure m arket for
in vestors in  E gypt. It h as the p o w er  to  ex e r c ise  a w id e  range o f  adm inistrative
p en alties against n on -com p la in t com p an ies such as: w arn ings, ca n ce lin g
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characterized as an equity market dominated by private investors. Recently, a change 
in types of traded securities and types of investors has been observed. Over the first 
six months of 2001 compared to that of 2002, equity traded, as a percentage of total 
value traded, declined from 75 percent to 49 percent. Treasury bonds traded 
increased from 23 percent to 50 percent.
The Egyptian market has also witnessed a change in its structure from the dominant 
role of private investors to institutions during 2001 and the first six months of 2002. 
Private investors represented 42 percent of the market in 1998 and 53 percent in the 
period between January and June 1999 compared to 58 percent and 47 percent 
respectively for institutional investors. In 2001 and the first six months of 2002 
institutions represented 67 percent and 84 percent of value traded respectively. Bond 
trading and large privatization deals contributed to the increasing role of institutional 
investors in the Egyptian market in recent years.
4.5 Market development
Appendix (4 .3) shows the contribution of key sectors in the Egyptian economy to 
GDP over the period of study from 1995 to 2002. It shows that about 50 percent of 
GDP comes from the total commodity sector and the contribution of the industry and 
mining sector slightly exceeds that of the agricultural sector. With respect to the 
ESE, listed companies are divided into 20 sectors. However, more than 50 percent of 
total market capitalization in June 2002 comes from three sectors only: utilities, 
building materials and constmctions, and financial services (see Figure 4 .1). This 
might indicate that the largest firms in terms of market capitalization come from 
these sectors. It also reflects to some extent a misallocation of resources in the ESE,
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since the market capitalization of major sectors in the economy, in terms of their 
contributions to GDP, is marginal.
The Egyptian equity market capitalization was $ 26.1 billion in 2002. It was the 
second largest market in the Middle East and North African region in terms of 
absolute size after the Saudi Arabia market (ROSC, 2004). Market indicators over 
the period from 1992 to 2002 (Appendix 4 .4) refer to market growth in terms of 
number of listed companies, market capitalization, trading volume and value.
The number of listed companies increased from 656 in 1992 to 1136 in June 2002, 
an increase of 73 percent. The number of traded companies increased from 239 in 
1992 to 553 in June 2002, an increase of 131 percent.
Figure (4 .1) Market Capitalization by Sector (30 June 2002)
Source: CASE Fact book, 2002.
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However, the number of traded companies accounts for approximately half the 
number of listed companies in the first six months of 2002, and it did not exceed 65 
percent in the best case (1999). This might reflect that the main motivation for 
companies listed on the ESE is to exploit the tax exemption applied to listed 
companies.
Also, the total market capitalization increased more than 10 times from 1992 to 
2002, and was equal to 31.1 percent to Egypt GDP in 200232. However, the volume 
of trading for listed companies sharply decreased in the first six months of 2002 
compared to that of the same period of 2001, a decrease of approximately 37 
percent. This decrease in the market activity reflects the national and international 
economic slow down during 2001. Nonetheless, the value of trading and market 
capitalization increased in the first six months of 2002 compared to that of the same 
period of 2001 due to some privatization deals that took place during this period.
Furthermore, Egypt has nine companies that have their shares traded in the form of 
Global Depository Receipts (GDR) on the London Stock Exchange by the end of 
June 2002. These companies are: Commercial International Bank, Suez Cement 
Company, Misr International Bank, A 1 Ahram Beverages, Paints and Chemicals 
Industries, EFG-Hermes, El Ezz Steel Rebars, Lakkah Group, and Orascom Telecom 
Holding. Three of these companies are also listed on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange: 
EFG-Hermes, MIBank, and Suez Cement Company. Moreover, one of these 
companies is listed on the Luxembourg Stock Exchange: Lakah Group.
32 Arab Republic of Egypt, Ministry of Foreign Trade & Industry, Monthly Economic Digest (May 
2005), Capital Market Indicators (Annual Profile),
http://www.moft.gov.eg/English/Statistical_Annex/Monthly/7a_StockInd.stm, last accessed on the 
26* of October 2005.
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4.6 The listing rules
Prior to August 2002, ESE had three listing schedules: the official schedule and two 
unofficial schedules (1) and (2). Public sector companies were automatically listed 
on the official schedule, and foreign shares were only listed on the unofficial 
schedule (1). On 20 June 2002, the ESE set new listing rules, which were approved 
by the CMA. These rules cover three issues: listing, disclosure, corporate 
governance and penalties. The purpose is to organize the process of listing and de- 
listing and to enhance transparency. These rules were applied for new listed 
companies from August 2002. Listed companies at that time were provided a one- 
year grace period in order to conform to the new rules. Both the old and new rules 
are included in Appendix (4 .5) and (4 .6) respectively.
In contrast to the previous listing requirements, the new rules required four listing 
schedules: two official schedules (1) and (2) and two unofficial schedules (1) and
(2). However, there is no difference between listing on official schedules or on 
unofficial schedules with respect to listing advantages. All joint-stock companies 
listed on ESE benefit from tax exemption under both the previous and new rules. 
Nevertheless, the new listing requirements are generally more rigorous than those of 
the previous one. For example, according to the previous rules, public sector 
companies were listed on the official schedule regardless of the ratio of free float33 or 
the number of shareholders. However, according to the new rules, they are to be
33 Identified according to the CASE glossary index as ‘ the freely floated shares that are traded and 
held by the public at large. Strategic ownership by any individual or entity, whether private or public, 
is excluded from the free float’, http://www.egyptse.com/glossary.asp, last accessed on 07th of July 
2005.
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listed on the official schedule (2) if they meet the same requirements for listed 
companies in the official schedule (1).
There are a number of significant changes34 introduced by the new rules, including: 
new criteria for listing: free float, minimum number of shareholders, and 
profitability. These new criteria distinguish between listed companies in terms of 
size and legal form. Large companies are listed on Official schedules. Securities 
issued by the government and public sector companies are moved to Official 
schedule (2). In addition, the new rules distinguish between public and private issues 
in terms of disclosure requirements where the submission of quarterly audited 
reports is required from public offering companies only (ROSC, 2004).
Although listed companies must comply with the EAS which are in conformity with 
the IAS/1ERS under both the old and new rules, the new rules require companies to 
provide more details regarding corporate governance and disclosure such as 
ownership structure, insider trading, material events and to appoint a person to be 
responsible for relations with investors. Most important is the introduction of 
administrative penalties for non-compliant companies, which were virtually non­
existent under the previous rules.
Moreover, CASE issued new trading rules for over the counter OTC securities on 
July 02, 2002 (CASE Fact book, 2002, Appendix 14). The new rules divide the OTC 
market into two main tiers: the Orders Market and the Deals Market. The Orders 
Market is for companies that the Exchange approves trading on according to their
34 For more details see: (ROSC, 2004).
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liquidity, including de-listed shares. This market uses the CASE trading system for 
the execution of transactions and to disseminate trades and quotation information. 
The Deals Market is the market at which CASE, announces all information, related 
to the pre-arranged deals, after their execution. It is worth noting that OTC trading 
amounted to approximately 25 percent of total trading for the first six months in 
2002.
4.7 Information disclosure by listed companies
This section presents some potential sources of information about listed companies 
in the ESE. It discusses the disclosure requirements in the ESE in general, as well as 
the disclosure requirements according to the legal form of Egyptian listed 
companies. Then, it provides a review of internationally available prior studies that 
evaluate financial reporting practice by Egyptian listed companies over the period of 
interest for the current research.
4.7.1 Mandatory disclosure for listed companies
There are a number of sources of information about listed companies such as: the 
Companies Department35, the CMA, the CASE, the press, the companies and their 
websites, and Egypt for Information Dissemination Company (EGID). However, the 
type of information available from each source could be different.
The main official financial disclosure vehicle is the annual report, which is required 
from all listed companies with respect to both the old and new listing rules. 
Quarterly reports were required from all listed companies according to the old listing
35 The Associations of Capital Sector of the General Authority for Investment and Free Zones 
(GAFI).
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rules, but this requirement is limited to public offering companies only according to 
the new listing rules.
According to the CML and the listing mles (prior to August 2002) all listed 
companies are required to provide copies of their annual and semi-annual financial 
statements to both the CMA and the CASE. Mandatory financial disclosure includes 
the balance sheet, the income statement, the cash flow statement, the statement of 
changes in stockholder equity, the notes to accounts, the board of directors’ report 
and the external auditor’s report. Companies are required to comply with the 
Egyptian Accounting Standards (EAS) in preparing their financial statements and to 
publish a summary of their semi-annual and annual reports in two newspapers, at 
least one of which is in Arabic.
The CMA reviews financial statements of listed companies and auditors’ reports to 
ensure timely and full compliance with the Egyptian Accounting and Auditing 
Standards. In case of non-compliance, the CMA requests the non-compliant 
companies to fill in the missing or required information. If companies failed to 
comply with this request, the CMA would disclose its conclusions at these 
companies’ expense. Also, the CMA can suspend or de-list securities of non- 
compliant companies. Recently, the CMA publishes Guide Lines Manuals on its 
website to inform all dealers with all necessary documents and procedures followed 
by the CMA to ensure companies’ compliance with disclosure and transparency 
requirements according to the EAS.
With respect to non-financial disclosures, some non-financial disclosures are 
regulated, such as: share class voting rights, board remuneration, details of board 
members and senior management. However, it is up to the company to decide on the
1 0 2
level of details revealed to the public. A  qualified auditor opinion should be reported 
when there is serious doubt that the company is a going concern. Ethical and 
environmental disclosures are rare or non-existent (ROSC, 2004).
Foreign shares were only listed on unofficial schedule (1) according to the previous 
listing rules and had to comply with internationally accepted accounting and auditing 
standards in preparing and auditing its financial statements, which might not be 
necessary the International Accounting Standards (IAS) or International Standards of 
Auditing (ISA). However, the new listing rules were silent for foreign shares. A  
situation, which might imply that they should be equally treated with the Egyptian 
ones.
In addition, Egyptian public offering companies listed on the ESE could be classified 
according to their legal form into two types: private sector companies and public 
business sector companies. Private sector companies are companies incorporated 
under the Company Law of 1981 and companies incorporated under the Investment 
Law. Public business sector companies are companies incorporated under the Public 
Business Sector Law 203 of 1991, and are listed as a preliminary step for full 
privatization. When state ownership in a public business sector company falls below 
51 percent, it becomes a private sector company subject to the provisions of the 
Company Law 159 of 1981 or Investment Law as applicable. If state ownership in a 
private sector company exceeds 25%, it is subject to the Central Auditing 
Organization (CAO) auditing.
Public business sector companies must comply with the Uniform Accounting System 
(UAS) of 1966 and must be audited by the CAO. The UAS was mainly established 
for national planning and control, which required companies to prepare some
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accounts that are different from the traditional ones. Generally, according to the 
UAS public business sector companies are required to prepare: a balance sheet, a 
profit and loss account, a production and trading account, a current production 
account, a statement of changes in financial position, and a cash flow statement 
(Abd-Elsalam, 1999: 101). Moreover, public business sector companies listed on the 
ESE are joint stock subsidiary companies; hence they are obligated to comply with 
the disclosure requirement of Company Law (CL) of 1981. According to the CL, 
companies are required to prepare a balance sheet, a profit and loss account, and a 
board of directors’ report. The disclosure requirements for private sector companies 
are generally organized according to the CL, since the Investment Law has left the 
regulation of financial disclosure to the CL.
However, all companies if listed on the ESE must comply with disclosure rules 
assigned by the Capital Market Law (CML) 95 of 1992. According to the CML 
listed companies are required to comply with the EAS issued by the Ministry of 
Foreign Trade in conformity with the International Accounting Standards (IAS) / 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) with some minor exceptions 
regarding finance leases . In the absence of specific EAS regarding any accounting
on
treatment, the IAS must be applied . These disclosure rules are mandatory for all 
listed companies under both the old and new listing rules. Moreover, according to 
Article 16 of CML, listing in the ESE is upon company request, and hence it is no 
longer compulsory. Disclosure rules do not apply to unlisted securities (OTC). 367
36 All finance leases are treated as operating leases although this contradicts IAS; local standards 
allow this practice because it meets legal requirements regarding leasing (ROSC, 2002: 11)
37 Ministerial Decree No. 50311991.
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4.7.2 Financial reporting practice of the Egyptian listed companies— a review
Although in theory all listed companies are required to disclose information 
according to the IAS, in practice, prior to the new listing rules, prior studies or 
reports on the financial reporting practice of the Egyptian listed companies 
demonstrate the issue of non-compliance with the disclosure requirements and 
provide some potential reasons for this phenomenon (see, for example, Abd- 
Elsalam, 1999; PCSU, 2000; Dahawy, Merino and Conover, 2002; 
ROSC, 2002; and Fawzy, 2003).
Abd-Elsalam (1999)
Abd-Elsalam (1999) investigated the financial disclosure practice of listed 
companies in 1991 and 1995. The purpose was to measure the effect of the issuance 
of the CML, which mandated the IAS, on corporate disclosure level and to evaluate 
the effects of relative familiarity and language accessibility on the IAS disclosures 
when IAS were first introduced in Egypt. Abd-Elsalam created a mandatory 
disclosure index, which combines the disclosure requirements of the IAS and 
national regulations (CL and CML). Using a sample of 72 Egyptian listed companies 
in 1995, the results show that average compliance with the disclosure requirements 
of the CL, CML and IAS was 0 .93, 0.79 and 0.83 respectively. These results 
confirm a departure from full compliance with the disclosure requirements according 
to the different regulations. Using a sample of 20 matched pairs of annual reports in 
1991 and 1995, however, the results show that level of disclosure in the annual 
reports of Egyptian listed companies was significantly greater in 1995 than that of 
1991.The results also show a higher level of compliance with the disclosure 
requirements according to CL compared to that required by CML and IAS. This is 
explained in the context that the new regulations might be less familiar than the old
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established one. The results also show a higher compliance with the CML 
requirements, which were appended in an Arabic translation, compared to the IAS 
requirements, which were not available in an official Arabic translation. Abd- 
Elsalam (1999: 256) explained this result in terms of language barrier, which could 
be due to lack of availability of an official Arabic translation, lack of access to an 
official Arabic translation and lack of technical support.
PCSU (2000)
In a qualitative assessment of corporate governance in Egypt, PCSU (2000) 
highlighted the issues of non-filers, late filers and low compliance with the 
disclosure regulations from listed companies, which could be due to the lack of 
administrative penalties. PCSU (2000: 52) stated that:
“Many companies that are supposed to file apparently do not follow the law. While the exact 
percentage of non-filers or late filers is not publicly available, it is considered to be significant by 
market participants. According to the stock exchange, the reason is that there are no administrative 
penalties that can be applied to non-filers. The only current weapon is delisting. However, a large 
number of listings were seen as a measure of the success of the exchange, relative to its international 
competitors. Thus the delisting penalty has only been employed rarely, until recently”.
Dahawy, Merino and Conover (2002)
Dahawy, Merino and Conover (2002) evaluated the effects of socioeconomic factors 
upon the implementation of IAS in Egypt in 1997. They examined the financial 
statements of three Egyptian companies in the infrastructure sector two years prior to 
privatization and one year after. In addition, they conducted open-ended interviews 
with the Chief Executive Officers (CEO) and the heads of the accounting 
departments of the three companies. The results showed that non-compliance or the 
selective implementation of the IAS was the norm. They suggested that the deep- 
rooted tendency of secrecy in the Egyptian culture dominates the IAS requirements. 
In detail, Dahawy, Merino and Conover (2002: 221-222) stated that:
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“In the minds of the management of these companies, disclosures would reveal the secrets of the 
business. It would reveal secrets that they learned to guard for the past thirty years under the previous 
system (the UAS). In addition, it is important to note that prior to privatization financial statements 
were mainly prepared for tax purposes. Therefore, accountants and managers were trained to conceal 
as much information as possible. The accountants of the companies interviewed all recognized that 
disclosures were important for investors. But they also noted that the job of the accountant is to be 
“very selective” in his/her choice of what needs to be disclosed so as not to expose the company’s 
secrets”.
Dahawy, Merino and Conover, however, showed that there were two motives for 
companies to increase their disclosures: foreign investments and going public.
The Report on the Observance o f Standards and Codes (ROSC) -Accounting and 
Auditing (2002)
A review of the financial statements of the top 30 listed companies in 2001 and 
interviews with experienced corporate accountants, practicing auditors, finance 
executives, investment analysts, academics, and regulators showed non-compliance 
in many sections, for example38:
• Many companies did not provide a statement of changes in equity in many 
cases.
• Very few companies disclosed segmental information, however, they did not 
disclose key information such as revenues and expenses of segments.
• Disclosures on related-party transactions were rarely fully provided.
• Many companies failed to present their annual reports in a timely manner.
• Many companies failed to account for deferred tax.
38 For more details see: ROSC (2002: 10-12).
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• Companies usually do not disclose information on events after the balance- 
sheet date.
The ROSC (2002) report suggests that the lack of effective enforcement 
mechanisms, practical guidelines on the applicable standards, and knowledge among 
preparers have contributed to the phenomenon of non-compliance among listed 
companies.
Fawzy (2003)
Fawzy (2003) examined corporate governance standards according to the five OECD 
principles in Egypt, namely: shareholders' rights, equitable treatment of
shareholders, stakeholders' role in corporate governance, disclosure and 
transparency, and responsibilities of the board of directors. The analysis shows that 
corporate governance standards in Egypt have improved significantly in 2003 
compared to that of 2001, but the degree of improvement did vary from one principle 
to another. The study, however, revealed that Egyptian companies are still far from 
properly implementing corporate governance principles.
In sum, prior studies on the financial reporting practice of the Egyptian listed 
companies showed that prior to the new listing rules non-compliance with the 
disclosure requirements was the norm. The introduction of the new listing rules is 
expected to enhance compliance with the disclosure requirements. The new listing 
rules have introduced administrative penalties against non-compliant companies 
ranging from monetary penalties to delisting. The purpose is to ensure timely 
preparation and publication of financial statements and full compliance with the 
applicable accounting standards, listing rules and other legal requirements. It is 
worth mentioning that by the end of September 2003 the CASE witnessed the de-
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listing of 99 companies due to non-compliance with the new listing rules (ROSC, 
2004). Moreover, Fawzy (2003) showed some improvements with respect to 
disclosure and transparency in Egypt in 2003 compared to that of 2001, although she 
did not study directly the effects of the new listing rules upon compliance with the 
disclosure requirements of listed companies.
4.8 The current study
Prior studies on the financial reporting practice, prior to the issuance of the new 
listing rules in August 2002, of the Egyptian listed companies were mainly 
concerned with the issue of non-compliance with mandatory disclosure. They 
provided some potential explanations such as: the unfamiliarity and language barrier 
with respect to the adoption of the IAS, the deep-rooted tendency of secrecy in the 
Egyptian culture gained from the long application of the UAS, the lack of effective 
enforcement policy for non-compliant companies, the lack of practical guidelines on 
the applicable standards, and the lack of knowledge among preparers.
If non-compliance with mandatory disclosure is the norm in the Egyptian context 
over the period of study, then voluntary disclosure is expected to be limited. This in 
turn means that the market could be more able to observe any significant difference 
on the extent of financial disclosure provided to the public. Hence, the departure 
from full compliance with mandatory disclosure provides an opportunity to test for 
the benefits of compliance with mandatory disclosure in the Egyptian context. In 
addition, the benefits of providing more information voluntarily to the public will be 
investigated. In brief, the current study investigates the benefits of increased 
disclosures: mandatory and voluntary, in terms of lower market beta and higher firm 
value.
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4.9 Concluding remarks
The ESE has been a mirror reflecting the political and economic changes that have 
taken place in modem Egypt’s history. Egypt was ruled by the British for almost 70 
years of occupation from 1882 to 1952. A  bloodless revolution by an army group 
called the Free Officers took place in 1952. In 1953, Egypt was declared a republic 
and Mohamad Naguib was appointed as the first president of Egypt, succeeded a 
year later by Gamal Abd el-Nasser. The Nasser government (1954-1970) adopted 
Socialist policies, which resulting in the establishment and development of the 
public sector and the cutting of the private sector in Egypt. The Sadat government 
(1970-1981) adopted the Open Door policy as a primary step toward a market-based 
economy. In order to encourage both Arabic and foreign investments and to regulate 
the formation of private sector companies, a number of new laws had been issued. 
According to the Tax Law 157 and Companies Law 159 of 1981, joint stock 
companies were obliged to be listed on the ESE and offered a tax exemption. The 
Mubarak government (1981- to date) has focused on economic development by 
adopting a package of a comprehensive economic reform with the help of the World 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund in 1991.
The ESE reflected these changes: after being the fifth largest market in the world in 
the early 1940s, the ESE came to a dormant stage from the mid-Fifties to the late 
Eighties. Thanks to the tax exemption offered to listed companies and Company 
Law 159 of 1981, a large number of companies have been listed on the ESE; most of 
them are family closed companies, this in turn means that ownership is highly 
concentrated. It does mean also that trading is concentrated in a small number of 
stocks; hence listed companies are generally classified into traded and less traded 
companies.
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The revival process of ESE began with the adoption of a comprehensive economic 
reform program in 1991. With the beginning of the privatization program in 1994, 
the ESE witnessed the listing of two types of companies in terms of legal form: 
private sector companies and public business sector companies. Although these two 
types of companies are primarily subject to two different laws with different 
disclosure requirements, if listed they all must comply with the EAS, which are in 
conformity with the IAS (IFRS).
These two characteristics- stock activity and legal form- of listed companies are 
unique to the Egyptian market and will be considered as potential determinants of 
disclosure practices of listed companies in the current study.
Companies’ practices in the last decade raised some concerns about compliance with 
mandatory disclosure and the lack of effective enforcement mechanisms. Hence, 
new listing rules have been issued in June 2002 to enhance compliance with the 
disclosure and other legal requirements. However, due to. the time period covered by 
this research, the new listing rules effect upon compliance with disclosure 
requirements is not subject to further analysis by the current research. Low 
compliance with mandatory disclosure implies that voluntary disclosure by listed 
companies would not be high. The departure from full compliance with mandatory 
disclosure provides an opportunity to test for the benefits of compliance with 
mandatory disclosure in the Egyptian context, as well as the benefits of providing 
more information voluntarily to the public.
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Chapter (5) The research design
5.1 Overview
Finance theory predicts an association between disclosure level and both market beta 
and firm value. Prior studies attempted to test these predictions mainly in developed 
markets. This study’s primary purpose is to test for such relationships in a different 
setting, an emerging market, to enrich both the theory and practice. To do so, 
chapters (2) and (3) have reviewed in detail the current literature on the measurement 
of corporate disclosure and the economic consequences of increased disclosure 
respectively, which drives this study. Chapter (4) has outlined the main 
characteristics of the Egyptian market, the particular context in which this study is 
undertaken. Taken together, the three chapters contribute to the development of the 
research hypotheses and to the formulation of the research models in the current 
chapter. These research models help in identifying the types and the sources of data 
required to test the research hypotheses, the research method and methods of data 
analysis to be used. The previous scenario, the research design, describes in brief the 
procedures and methods followed by the current study. Although this type of 
research follows a positivist methodology and uses quantitative methods in testing 
its hypotheses, the researcher cannot argue that subjectivity is removed entirely. This 
is due in part to the involvement of the researcher in the process of creating the 
disclosure index, the research method used in the current study.
Leaving the discussion concerning the constmction of the current research 
instmment, the disclosure index, to chapters (6) and (7), the rest of this chapter is 
organized as follows. Section (5.2) highlights gaps in the current literature and 
develops the research hypotheses and models. Section (5.3) discusses in detail the 
process of identifying the required data, their sources and collection. Section (5.4)
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outlines methods of data analysis to be used to test the hypotheses of the current 
study. Finally, Section (5 .5) provides a brief conclusion.
5.2 Hypotheses development
A  review of the empirical literature shows that the vast majority of studies are 
conducted in developed capital markets, mainly the US. Most prior studies try to link 
disclosure to the cost of capital through its association with some external 
characteristics of the disclosure environment. In particular they used bid-ask spread, 
trading volume and price volatility as proxies for market liquidity, number of 
investors or analysts following the firm for demand on a firm’s shares, dispersion of 
analysts’ forecasts for information asymmetry, and forecast accuracy for estimation 
risk. However, Lang (1999) argued that while this approach has the advantage of 
associating disclosure to some attributes of the information environment that are 
more easily measured, their links to valuation are weak, given that indicating a link 
does not necessarily imply an effect on the cost of capital.
Moreover, studies that attempt to establish a relationship between the cost of capital 
and disclosure using a measure or a proxy for cost of capital (see, for example, 
Botosan, 1997; Richardson and Welker, 2001; Hail, 2002; and Botosan and Plumlee,
2002) do not demonstrate the mechanism by which disclosure affects the cost of 
capital (Lang, 1999: 522).
Furthermore, finance theory not only provides a framework to explain how 
information asymmetry increases asymmetric estimation risk, but it also supports the 
notion that market beta is an increasing function of it. Moreover, it predicts that in 
the presence of the information asymmetry problem between management and 
outside investors, ceteris paribus, securities for which there is relatively less
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information will have relatively higher systematic risk (Barry and Brown, 1985). 
However, little has been done to investigate this link empirically in general, and in 
emerging markets in particular.
Furthermore, previous research argues that more disclosure will boost firm value 
either through reducing the firm’s cost of capital and/or through maintaining scrutiny 
view over firms’ cash flows. However, little direct empirical evidence with respect 
to this link exists. So, in the following sections the main research hypotheses and 
models are developed.
5.2.1 Market beta
5.2.1.1 Disclosure level and market beta
It is argued that, ceteris paribus, in the presence of the information asymmetry 
problem between management and outside investors, securities for which there is 
relatively less information, whatever the measure of the amount of information is, 
are perceived as more risky; have relatively higher systematic risk, due to the greater 
uncertainty surrounding the true parameters of their return distributions (Barry and 
Brown, 1985). Hence, prior research suggests a negative association between the 
amount of information available about the stock and its estimated market beta (see, 
for example, Clarkson and Thompson, 1990; Coles, Loewenstein and Suay, 1995; 
Clarkson, Guedes and Thompson, 1996; Clarkson and Satterly, 1997; and Jorgensen 
and Kirschenheiter, 2003). However, the empirical research is still very limited and 
provides mixed results.
Empirical studies conducted in high informational environments generally could not 
support the previous expectations (see, for example, Garsombke, 1979; Dhaliwal, 
Spicer and Vickrey, 1979; and Firth, 1984). They show a negative association
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between market beta and disclosure level in the univariate analysis. But this result is 
no longer valid in the multivariate analysis when controlling for other accounting 
measures of risk such as operating firm size.
However, these three studies share some common aspects. Firstly, they did not test 
for potential collinearity problems among the explanatory variables, which might 
lead them to accept the null hypothesis of no relationship between disclosure level 
and market beta (due to the very low t-test coefficient), given that the accounting 
measures of risk, for example firm size, are expected to have relationships with 
disclosure level. Secondly, although these studies generally depend on a disclosure 
index technique to measure disclosure level, they did not assess the reliability and 
validity of their measures of disclosure level, and hence there is a possibility of 
measurement error. Thirdly, these studies are conducted on developed capital 
markets using data for large established firms; thereby the results might be due to the 
lack of quality differences in the amount of information disclosure available about 
the shares of these large firms. In other words, the richness of the informational 
environment in developed countries might contribute to these results. Effective 
enforcements upon firms to comply with mandatory disclosures, and the wide 
coverage of financial analysts and other information intermediaries of firms’ news, 
particularly large ones, play an important role in reducing the differences in the 
amount of information available about alternative shares. Hence, exploring a 
relationship between the amount of information available about alternative shares 
and asymmetric estimation risk might be difficult.
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Empirical studies conducted in low informational environments such as the primary 
market39 provide some evidence of a negative relationship between the amount of 
information and market beta (see, for example, Clarkson and Thompson, 1990; and 
Clarkson and Satterly, 1997). Assuming that the amount of information is increasing 
in time, they used period of listing as a proxy of the amount of information available 
about the stock. The results show a negative association between market beta and the 
amount of information available on the shares. However, time cannot be considered 
as an effective proxy for the quantity of information since it cannot capture the 
difference in information environment among different companies (Barry and 
Brown, 1985).
These ambiguous results from prior studies might be due to the fact that both 
variables, disclosure level and market beta, are theoretical concepts that cannot be 
measured directly in an objective way and hence they always carry the risk of 
incurring measurement error.
Moreover, most prior studies tend to use a sole estimate of market beta, although the 
values of the estimated market betas could vary according to data frequency (daily, 
weekly, monthly returns), the measurement period, the market index used, the model 
used for estimation and the estimation technique. Therefore, drawing a conclusion 
regarding a relationship between market beta and disclosure level based on a single 
measure of the estimated market beta might be misleading.
39 Lam and Du (2004: 317) stated that: “the primary market offers a lower information environment 
relative to its secondary market, even in developed capital markets because IPOs have no prior price 
data”.
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Furthermore, the characteristics of the information environment, whether the
informational environment is rich or poor in terms of the amount of available 
information about alternative stocks, could have contributed to these mixed results. 
If low amounts of released information are the general rule, the market can easily 
screen exceptions; the market can easily observe shares for which there is a 
relatively higher amount of information. Thus, low informational environments 
might be more appropriate to examine the relationship between the amount of 
information and market beta.
Finally, prior studies investigating benefits of increased disclosure usually limit the 
selection of items of information to be included in the index to voluntary information 
disclosure. This is because levels of voluntary disclosure are expected to vary among 
different companies, and hence supports the assumption of the existence of different 
levels of information about alternative shares. Moreover, most prior studies are 
conducted in developed countries that are characterized by strong enforcement 
policies and corporate governance environments, so that mandatory disclosure levels 
would be almost identical among companies (Firth, 1979). However, quality 
differences not only in level of compliance with mandatory disclosure among 
companies but also for the same company from year to year could exist (Coy and 
Dixon, 2004). The existence of quality differences in level of compliance with 
mandatory disclosure provides an opportunity to explore benefits of compliance with 
mandatory disclosure as well.
With respect to Egypt, in theory, listed companies must comply generally with IFRS 
(previously called IAS), usually considered as quality accounting standards. In 
practice companies did not fully comply with these requirements, since there were
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virtually no administrative penalties for non-disclosing firms before August 2002. 
Moreover, the role of information intermediaries is rather limited. In other words, it 
was up to the company to decide on the level of information to be released to the 
public. Hence, the amount of information, irrespective of its type, to be released by 
Egyptian listed companies is expected to differ among listed companies. So it is 
expected that shares for which there is a relatively high amount of information, 
irrespective of type of information disclosure, will be perceived as less risky in terms 
of systematic risk. Thus the research hypothesis is:
HI: disclosure level is negatively associated with market beta.
5.2.1.2 Market beta model
In this sub-section a description of the model used for estimating market beta is 
discussed. Different proxies of disclosure level as well as a number of control 
variables suggested from prior studies will be regressed on the estimated market 
betas (see, for example, Beaver, Kettler and Scholes, 1970; Dhaliwal, Spicer and 
Vickrey, 1979; Garsombke, 1979; and Firth, 1984). Beaver, Kettler and Scholes 
(1970) introduced a number of accounting measures of market risk: dividend payout, 
current ratio, asset size, asset growth, gearing, earnings variability and earnings 
covariability, which are used in prior studies hereafter with mixed results (see, for 
example, Bildersee, 1975; Belkaoui, 1978; Farrelly, Ferris and Reichenstein, 1985; 
and Capstaff, 1991; 1992). Although this list of variables might not be inclusive, 
they were described as “being traditionally and most frequently associated with risk” 
Capstaff (1992: 223). So this research depends on the same list of variables as 
control variables, except for earnings variability and covariability due to missing 
data.
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Dividend payout, ceteris paribus, is expected to have a negative relationship with 
risk. Assuming that companies will tend to rely on a stable dividend policy, then 
companies that exhibit greater uncertainty associated with their expected earnings 
will pay out a lower percentage of their earnings. Hence, dividend payout can be 
used as a proxy for earnings variability. However, there are two problems associated 
with the denominator of this ratio: in case that the company did not realize any 
profits (earnings equal to or close to zero) or realized losses. In the earlier case the 
ratio will become extremely large, and in the latter one the ratio will become 
negative. Nonetheless, for the sample of firms in this study companies with zero or 
negative earnings (losses) did not pay dividends, so these problems did not exist for 
this sample.
Growth: Beaver, Kettler and Scholes (1970: 660) stated that: “ initially it is not 
obvious that new investments (growth in assets) must on balance be more or less 
risky than the assets already held by the firm”. So the argument of a relationship 
between growth and risk is derived from an expectation that assets growth will result 
in excessive opportunities of earnings growth (abnormal profits). However, the 
abnormal profits gained from growth opportunities deteriorate as other competitive 
firms enter the marketplace. Consequently, these abnormal profits are more 
uncertain than normal profits, thereby generating a positive association between 
growth rates and risk. With respect to Egypt the case could be different, however: 
individual investors40 who are mostly not professionals, less rational and highly
40 The interview results in Dahawy, Merino and Conover (2002: 222) showed that: “as a matter of 
fact, two of the accountants and one CEO (interviewed) stated that Egyptian local investors follow the 
“herd strategy”, in which they track the foreign investors or large Egyptian investors moves and then 
they follow”.
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interested in profits figure, dominated the market at least for the time period covered 
by this research. Hence, it is expected that higher growth companies could be 
perceived as less risky. Two proxies for growth have been used: assets growth, and 
earnings growth. With respect to the earnings growth ratio the absolute value of 
earnings per share has been used in the denominator as some firms in the research 
sample realized losses.
Gearing: is a measure of the risk that the company faces when it uses debt as a 
source of finance. When debt is introduced to the capital structure of a company, it 
undertakes a commitment to meet fixed obligations (interest charges) irrespective of 
its realized profits. These fixed obligations increase the sensitivity of the earnings 
available for shareholders to any changes in the operating profits of the company. 
Consequently a positive association between gearing ratio and risk is expected.
Liquidity: highly liquid companies could be perceived as less risky than low liquid 
companies. However, Beaver, Kettler and Scholes (1970) argued that liquidity 
would not have a high association with market risk, as different levels of risk among 
companies are better explained by different levels of risk in their non-current assets. 
Hence, it is difficult to predict the liquidity sign.
Assets size: is generally expected to be negatively associated with market beta. 
Beaver, Kettler and Scholes (1970: 662) stated that: “in a portfolio theory context, 
larger firms are less risky than smaller firms only if the average p (market beta) of 
the assets in which they invest is lower than that of the smaller firms” . They 
expected a negative association between asset size and market beta relying on results 
from prior studies mainly conducted in the US. Bildersee (1975), Farrelly, Ferris and 
Reichenstein (1985) and Capstaff (1991) found no association between market beta
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and asset size. However, due to a lack of prior studies with respect to the Egyptian 
context, the researcher tests for general expectations about a negative association 
between asset size and market beta.
Taking into consideration the effect of other accounting measures of risk on market 
beta estimation as well as disclosure levels, the multiple regression models41 take the 
form shown below:
P=  f  (dividend payout (-), asset growth (-), gearing (+), liquidity (+/-), earnings 
growth (-), asset size (-), disclosure levels (-))
5.2.2 Firm value
5.2.2.1 Disclosure level and firm value
Finance theory predicts that increased disclosure can increase firm value by either 
reducing its cost of capital or increasing pure cash flows that accrue to its 
shareholders or both. More public information is expected to increase stock liquidity 
by reducing transaction costs and increasing the demand for shares. Moreover, it is 
expected that increased disclosure will reduce the asymmetric estimation risk. 
Ceteris paribus, the rate of return required by investors to buy the firm’s shares will 
decrease; hence the firm’s cost of equity capital will decrease and firm value will 
increase. Moreover, it is argued that increased disclosure can influence firm value by 
increasing cash flow that accrues to shareholders through reducing agency costs.
41 The signs (+ and -) in the model refer to the expected direction of the relationship between the 
explanatory variable and the dependent variable. The positive sign (+) refers to a positive relationship, 
and the negative sign (-) refers to a negative relationship. The sign (+/-) means that no expected 
direction is provided.
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A review of the literature shows that empirical research has focused either on 
investigating the link between disclosure level and stock liquidity (see, for example, 
Welker, 1995; and Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000), or testing the link between 
disclosure level and an overall proxy for the cost of equity capital (see, for example, 
Hail, 2002; and Botosan and Plumlee, 2002). Little empirical evidence exists with 
respect to the direct association between disclosure level and firm value in general, 
and in emerging capital markets in particular (see, for example, Patel, Balic and 
Bwakira, 2002; Lang, Lins and Miller, 2003; Silva and Alves, 2004; and Baek, Kang 
and Park, 2004).
Although these prior studies vary regarding the proxies used for the information 
disclosure, and firm value, they share the same expectation that more disclosure will 
enhance firm value. Given that a quality difference in the extent of mandatory 
disclosure is expected in the Egyptian context, it is expected that the extent of 
information disclosure is associated with firm value irrespective of type of 
disclosure. Hence the research hypothesis is:
H2 : disclosure level is positively associated with firm value.
5.2.2.2 Firm value model
In this sub-section, different proxies of disclosure level as well as a number of 
control variables suggested from prior studies have formed the research model for 
firm value (see, for example, Lang, Lins and Miller, 2003; Healy, Hutton, and 
Palepu, 1999; Silva and Alves, 2004; and Baek, Kang and Park, 2004). These 
controls are: asset size, profitability, gearing, growth, risk, and industry type. 
However, this list of variables is neither conclusive nor is there a criterion with 
respect to the number of control variables that should be used, and so yields mixed
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results. Hence a variance in the type and number of controls has been observed in 
prior studies.
Relatively bigger firms in terms of operating size (assets size) are expected to have 
higher firm value (Berk, 1995). With respect to profitability, it is expected that firm 
value would have a positive correlation with profitability level, since it is suggested 
that investors in Egypt pay much attention to profits figures. So, firms that report 
higher level of profits could be perceived as higher value firms since investors 
expect this level of profits to be maintained in the future (Chaney and Lewis, 1995).
With respect to gearing, Lins (2003: 169) stated that: ‘I control for debt to account 
for the possibility that creditors are able to lessen managerial agency problems’ . 
Since, creditors are expected to act as external monitors that could provide a 
beneficial governance role in reducing managerial agency problems, a positive 
correlation between gearing and firm value is expected. With respect to growth, the 
same argument exists that in the Egyptian context, individual investors who are 
mostly not professionals, less rational and highly interested in profits figures, 
dominated the market at least for the time period covered by this research. Hence, it 
is expected that higher growth companies could be perceived as less risky; hence a 
positive correlation between firm value and sales growth is expected.
With respect to industry type, although industry type is found to be significant in 
estimating firm value, the results for a relationship between disclosure level and firm 
value did not change after introducing an industry dummy. Since neither the 
magnitude nor the direction of the effect of industry type has any meaning, the 
original results have been revealed without including the industry dummy. With 
respect to risk, including market beta in the model causes a severe reduction in the
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number of observations, so that it has been decided not to include it in the model.
The rest of the variables are included in the multiple regression models42 as follows:
Firm value= /  (asset size (+), profitability (+), gearing (+), sales growth (+), 
disclosure level (+))
5.3 Data sources and collection
This section describes the process of collecting the relevant data used in this thesis. 
The types of data required for this kind of research could be readily available in 
developed capital markets such as the US, which facilitates to a greater extent 
empirical research in the economic consequences of increased disclosure. However, 
in emerging capital markets the case is different. The required data such as 
disclosure scores and market beta are not readily available. Moreover, problems in 
collecting the raw data were expected. With respect to Egypt, data collection is not 
an easy task. To illustrate, PCSU (2000: 52) stated that:
“All corporate information has traditionally been thought of as secret. As in many countries, financial 
managers can be assumed to have kept many different sets of books: one for the “owner”, one for the 
tax inspector, and one for the outside investors. As in many countries, public disclosure was the 
exception, not the rule”.
Thus, the collection and analysis of data required for this research might be viewed 
as one of its main contributions, given that this research uses a panel data set for an 
emerging capital market where data collection and processing are challenging tasks. 
Therefore it was decided to explain this process in detail.
42 The signs (+) in the model refers to an expected positive relationship between the explanatory 
variable and the dependent variable.
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The target was to collect a complete series of annual reports in their original format, 
and price information for as many traded non-financial companies as possible over 
the period 1995 to 200243. These data are identified in light of the research 
hypotheses. Annual reports in their original format are required to create a proxy for 
disclosure level, to estimate firm value using both Tobin’s q ratio and market-to- 
book ratio, and to measure most of the control variables such as firm size, gearing 
ratio, profitability, and legal form. Price information such as closing price, high 
price, low price, and number of trading days is required to estimate other variables 
such as market beta, market value of equity and stock activity.
Once the types of data required for this research were clarified, the potential sources 
of these data were then identified. They include listed non-financial companies that 
are the main subject of this research, the CASE, the CMA, Egypt for Information 
Dissemination Company44 (EGID) and Fiani and Partners Company. Companies 
themselves are the direct and straightforward source of this information. Listed 
companies are required to submit their annual reports to the CASE and the CMA, 
and at the same time the CASE and the CMA should keep records of price 
information of listed companies. EGID’s main purpose is to provide investors and 
dealers in the market in general with information about listed companies. Fiani and 
Partners Company provides a range of marketing activities including information 
about most actively traded companies in Egypt.
43 It was decided to get as much information as the researcher could from the revival date of the ESE 
in 1992 to the most recent date at the time this research is being done which is 2002. However, after 
contacting the CMA the researcher is informed that price information is just available from 1995.
44 Egypt For Information Dissemination (EGID) is a fully owned subsidiary of the Cairo and 
Alexandria Stock Exchange. It was established in June 1999, and started transmitting CASE data to 
all recipients from January 01,2002.. http://www.egidegypt.com/, last accessed on August 13, 2003.
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The first potential source of information was eliminated since it was not economical, 
in terms of time, effort and money, to contact companies themselves asking for this 
information. The reason is that the proposed size of the sample is large which means 
that contacting a large number of companies in a reasonable time is difficult. In 
addition, price information might not be available on daily basis from companies. 
Moreover, the perceived difficulties of getting information directly from companies 
that see information as being secret (PCSU, 2000) made the researcher avoid this 
source when possible.
As a primarily trial the researcher tried to contact the rest of the potential sources of 
information via electronic mails and with the help of family members. This trial was 
successful with the CMA, which provided some data on a posted CD. These data are 
the financial statements of listed companies and price information. However, the 
financial statements are presented in a uniform format, and not the original ones. 
When it seemed impossible to get the required data for this research through 
telecommunication, the researcher decided to go to Egypt in person to collect them.
In Egypt the researcher simultaneously contacted the four possible sources of the 
required data: CMA, CASE, EGID, and Fiani and Partners company. The researcher 
visited Fiani and Partners company and asked for the original annual reports for 
listed companies in the CASE, but unfortunately they were not available in their 
original format but on a uniform format for a limited number of companies. 
Therefore this fact reduced the number of possible sources of data to three.
EGID was visited asking for the original annual reports of listed companies. 
Eventually they referred the researcher to the disclosure department in the CASE. 
Going there, the researcher knew that companies’ annual reports are available on
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hard copies for exact fee: LE 15 per report per year. However, to get hard copies of 
companies’ annual reports for a large sample is a time, money and effort consuming 
process. Also it was not convenient to travel with a huge amount of paper from 
Egypt to the UK. The researcher decided to let this alternative aside as the last 
available solution to the problem of data collection.
After several contacts with the CMA the researcher knew that she could get an 
electronic version of the required data after paying the required fees. The electronic 
archive department, which is part of the information centre, does scan the original 
reports of listed companies. This process, from the researcher’s point of view, is a 
remarkable one for the CMA in Egypt, because it facilitates the access to these 
reports for a wide range of users including researchers and investors. However, the 
researcher was asked to identify the sample size of listed companies for which the 
annual reports are needed.
The first criterion applied for the sample here was to seek out the annual reports of 
traded companies because the premise of this research is that public offering 
companies may benefit from their disclosure policy in terms of lower cost of equity 
capital and higher firm value. Therefore closed companies (family or rarely traded 
companies) were excluded from the sample. The second criterion applied for the 
sample here was to seek out the annual reports of non-financial listed companies. 
Financial services companies such as banks and insurance companies were excluded 
because of their specific financial characteristics, which affect their information 
disclosure. The CMA provided the researcher with six CDs including the annual 
reports of a number of non-financial listed companies. However, there was no record 
of any details about the companies included in these CDs such as the number of
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these companies, their names, legal form, codes...etc. Hence, the researcher had to 
scan these CDs to identify the potential sample size. In addition, general information 
about all listed companies was requested from the CMA, such as their legal form, 
whether the company is a public offering company or a closed company, and 
industry sector.
On scanning the six CDs, the potential sample size of non-financial listed companies 
was found to be 178 companies. Eighteen companies were excluded because their 
annual reports were not available. Moreover, two extra companies were removed 
from the sample because they have a fiscal year-end neither in June nor in 
December. The remaining 158 companies form the initial sample size. Table (5 .1) 
provides details about this initial sample size.
Table (5.1) Initial sample size
Total number of non-financial available companies 178
Minus: number of companies that did not submit annual reports (18) 
Number of companies that have annual reports 160
Minus: number of companies of year-end 31/03 (2)
Total number of companies in the initial sample 158
The initial 158 non-financial listed companies sample covers 16 different industrial 
sectors. Annual reports are available for 158 companies from 1995 to 2002. 
However, this does not mean that there are 8 annual reports for each company in the 
sample. Also, the fiscal year-end for sampled firms is different. Some have fiscal 
year-ends in June and others have fiscal year-ends in December. Table (5 .2) provides 
details about the number of annual reports (disclosure level observations) available 
for the initial sample both by year (from 1995 to 2002) and by number of
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observations for fiscal year-end. The next mission was to check out the availability 
of price information for the initial sample firms.
Table (5 .2) Number of observations of the annual reports in the initial sample
Year Annual reports on year end 
30th of June
Annual reports on year end 
31st of December
Total
1995 42 30 72
1996 52 28 80
1997 58 34 92
1998 51 40 91
1999 49 50 99
2000 37 50 87
2001 40 68 108
2002 39 1 40
Total 368 301 669
The researcher checked the first CD she got from the CMA by post. The researcher 
discovered that price information was available from 1995 to the first six months of 
1998 besides price information for year 2000. This made a gap in the available 
information; besides it sacrificed the available data for annual reports for more than 
three years. Therefore, the researcher decided to re-contact the CMA requesting the 
missing data. After few months of follow-up, the researcher got the missing 
information from the CMA.
This price information includes daily prices and is available for all listed companies 
in the CASE from 1995 to 2002 including rarely traded companies. The CM A keeps 
daily files (excel files) for traded stocks. This in turn means that only stocks with 
trading volume not equal zero is included in these files (consequently in the research 
sample). Therefore, the next mission was to filter these files for the initial sample
firms (158 non-financial traded companies).
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After getting the price information files for the initial sample firms, the criterion 
applied then was the availability of price information for at least 24 days before and 
24 days after the fiscal year-end for each company in the initial sample. This 
criterion was applied to allow for computing market beta, as it is believed that 24 
observations is the minimum number of observations required to get statistically 
reliable results using ordinary least squares. Applying stiffer criterion, for example 
50 observations on both sides (before and after), would result in a sacrifice of a 
number of companies. Furthermore, Botosan (1997) used 24 monthly return 
observations over a five-year period of time to estimate market beta.
This process yielded a sample of 66 non-financial listed companies for which 
information is available. However, twelve of these companies have been privatized 
and changed their legal form from public business sector companies to private sector 
companies, and two other companies have merged. It was decided to treat these 
fourteen companies as new companies once the change had taken place, thereby 
avoiding any overlap of data from prior periods. This yielded 80 cross sections 
(companies). The number of observations per company ranges from one to eight 
observations over the period 1995 to 2002.
This process yielded a final sample of 80 companies over the period 1995 to 2002 
with 272 company-year observations. Compared to sample size in prior studies that 
varies from 73 cross-sections (Hail, 2002) to very large samples (for example 3618 
firm-year observations in Botosan and Plumlee’s study in 2002), this research 
sample size could be viewed as a reasonable one. Table (5 .3) provides more details 
about the number of observations on the final sample per year and per financial year- 
end.
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T able (5 .3 ) N u m ber o f  observations on  the fina l sam ple sorted b y  fin an cia l year-end
Year
Number of observations 
December year-end
for Number of observations for June 
year-end Total
1995 2 7 9
1996 3 19 22
1997 2 36 38
1998 9 40 49
1999 14 35 49
2000 14 26 40
2001 22 21 43
2002 0 22 22
Total 66 206 272
Table (5 .4) Number of observations on the final sample sorted by companies’ legal 
form
Year Private sector companies Public business sector companies Total
1995 2 7 9
1996 4 18 22
1997 18 20 38
1998 29 20 49
1999 31 18 49
2000 27 13 40
2001 30 13 43
2002 9 13 22
Total 150 122 272
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T able (5 .5 ) F inal sam ple firm s b y  industry sector
Industry sector N
Electrical Equipment and Engineering 3 
Housing and Real Estate 7
Food and Beverage 7
Agriculture and Fishing 3
Consumer and Household Goods 2
Health and Pharmaceuticals 9
Chemicals 9
Mills and Storage 8
Textiles and Clothing 7
Entertainment 2
Building Materials and Construction 20
Retailers 1
Paper, Packaging and Plastics 2
Total 80
N: number of companies in each sector
Table (5.4) provides number of observations on the final sample sorted by 
companies’ legal form. Finally, this final sample firms covers 13 industry sectors. 
Table (5.5) provides more details about the final sample firms classified by industry 
sector. It shows that a quarter of the sample firms come from the Building Materials 
and Constructions sector. This is not surprising since, for instance, more than 50 
percent of total market capitalization in June 2002 comes from three sectors only: 
utilities, building materials and constructions, and financial services as explained 
earlier in Chapter 4 .
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5.4 Data analysis
Appropriate statistical methods have been used in prior studies to investigate 
benefits of increased disclosure. These methods include both parametric and non- 
parametric tests, although a measurement of disclosure level might not have 
achieved the interval scale45. Marston and Shrives (1991: 200) stated that: “the 
arguments of statisticians seem to indicate that parametric methods are permissible 
despite the fact that measurement on an interval scale has probably not been 
achieved” . In this research both non-parametric and parametric tests are to be used as 
applicable.
In univariate analysis, bivariate correlations, where the focus is on the correlations 
between two variables, the distribution of the variables is critical. If the variables are 
normally distributed, the Pearson correlation coefficient test is usually used. If the 
variables are not normally distributed or have ordered categories, the Spearman’s rho 
is usually used. The correlation coefficients range in value from minus one to 
positive one. If the correlation coefficient is equal to (-1), it refers to a perfect 
negative association between the two variables. If the correlation coefficient is equal 
to (+1), it refers to a perfect positive association between the two variables. If the 
correlation coefficient is equal to zero, it indicates no correlation between the two 
variables. However, one cannot draw a cause and effect relationship from the 
bivariate correlations.
45 For unweighted disclosure index, an interval scale is not achieved unless a disclosure of one 
particular item in the index is exactly equivalent to the disclosure of another item (Marston and 
Shrives, 1991: 199).
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In the multivariate analysis, the multiple regression models, the case is different 
since the focus is whether the residuals rather than the individual variables meet 
certain assumptions46 when using traditional ordinary least squares. Given that 
different sizes of companies are included in this research sample heteroskedasticity 
is an issue. Hence, the method of estimation used in this research to test its 
hypotheses is pooled-generalized least squares (GLS), with White 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariance.
GLS is ordinary least squares (OLS) on the transformed variables that satisfy the 
standard least-squares assumptions. The GLS enables us to exploit all available 
information contained in the unequal variability of the dependent variable. GLS 
gives less weight for observations with greater variability and more weight for 
observations with smaller variability so it enables us to estimate the population 
regression function more accurately. The traditional OLS method does not follow 
this strategy and therefore does not make use of the “information” contained in the 
unequal variability of the dependent variable (Gujarati, 1995: 362-363).
EViews4 software was used to estimate the models. Using the White 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariance option, EViews4 
estimates covariances that are robust to general heteroskedasticity. This panel data 
form of heteroskedasticity is different from pure cross-section heteroskedasticity, 
since variances within a cross-section are allowed to differ over time.
46 Theses assumptions are: the residuals are normally distributed with mean zero and constant 
variance. Moreover, there are no serial correlations either among the residuals or between residuals 
and the explanatory variables.
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5.5 Concluding remarks
This chapter outlines the procedures and methods followed by the researcher to 
conduct this study. Theoretical literature on the benefits of increased disclosure 
predicts an association between disclosure level and market beta. Moreover, it 
predicts that more disclosure is associated with higher firm value. However, a review 
of the literature shows certain gaps. Little direct evidence exists with respect to those 
relationships in general and in emerging markets in particular. This study attempts to 
fill these gaps in the current literature through investigating these issues for different 
types of disclosure in the Egyptian emerging capital market using a panel data 
analysis. A  careful review of the literature helps to formulate the research hypotheses 
and models. Then the researcher identified the data required to test these hypotheses 
and their potential sources in the Egyptian market. She was successful in collecting 
the required data from the CM A  for a fairly large sample of companies: 80 non- 
financial traded companies over the period 1995 to 2002. This makes a sample of 
272 firm-year observations. Then the research method of estimation is identified as 
the pooled-generalized least squares (GLS), with White heteroskedasticity-consistent 
standard errors and covariance.
135
Chapter (6) Creating the disclosure index— the research method
6.1 Overview
This study attempts to explore the implications of increased corporate disclosure for 
market beta and firm value in the Egyptian emerging capital market. In order to 
provide useful inferences about these links, the researcher should depend on reliable 
and valid proxies for theses variables. This chapter discusses the measurement of the 
extent of corporate disclosure in companies’ annual reports, leaving the 
measurement of the other two variables: market beta and firm value, to chapters (8) 
and (9) respectively.
A  review of the literature on the disclosure measurement provided in Chapter (2) 
shows that prior studies offer two approaches: the first approach offers some proxies 
for disclosure which are not necessary based on examining the original disclosure 
vehicle(s), such as financial analysts’ perceptions about the firm disclosure practices, 
management forecasts, ADR, attributes of analysts’ forecasts and the number of 
analysts following the company. The second approach provides some techniques to 
measure information disclosure by examining the original disclosure vehicle(s) such 
as the content analysis and the disclosure index.
Unfortunately, proxies for disclosure provided under the first approach are not 
available for the Egyptian market yet, which limits the available alternatives to 
measure corporate disclosure to the second approach. Given that the original annual 
reports available for this research are images files in Arabic language, which could 
not be searched using electronic content analysis software originally designed for 
searching text files, in addition to the advantage of manual searching over the 
electronic content analysis, the disclosure index proved to be a more suitable tool to 
measure corporate disclosure in the Egyptian context.
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Hence, this chapter concerns the development of the disclosure indices from 
companies’ annual reports, leaving the assessment of their reliability and validity as 
measures of disclosure level to Chapter (7). Given that in the Egyptian context, the 
corporate annual report is the main formal vehicle of financial disclosure by listed 
companies, which to some extent promises the availability of the required data for a 
large sample of companies. This chapter contributes to the literature on financial 
reporting by measuring the extent of different types of disclosure for the Egyptian 
emerging capital market using panel data analysis, which is rarely used in the 
accounting literature.
A  review of prior studies presented in Chapter (2) shows that there is no commonly 
agreed disclosure index because the construction of an index depends on the research 
purpose(s), design, and context; hence it is generally subject to the researcher’ s 
judgment. Therefore, a relevant disclosure index to the Egyptian market is to be 
constructed in the current chapter. The process of constructing the disclosure indices 
involves four steps organized as follows. Section (6.2) discusses the selection of the 
initial list of items of information. Section (6 .3) explains the selection of the final list 
of items of information. Section (6 .4) concerns assigning a score for each item of 
information. Section (6.5) demonstrates the distinction between mandatory and 
voluntary disclosures indices guided by actual practice of Egyptian listed companies. 
Section (6.6) presents the concluding remarks.
6.2 Selecting an initial list of items of information
The amount of information that could be disclosed by a particular company is
enormous and ranges from none to complete. No information disclosure refers to the
company’s total right of confidentiality. Complete information disclosure refers to
the public’s total right to know everything about the company. The disclosure index,
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a research tool constructed to measure the extent of corporate disclosure, however, 
usually includes a relatively small number of items of information that a company 
could disclose. Hence its usefulness is critically dependent upon the selection of 
items of information to be included in the index (Marston and Shrives, 1991). 
Therefore, some criterion is needed to make the choice.
The theoretical framework of the potential benefits of increased disclosure depends 
on the existence of quality differences in the amount of information available about 
alternative shares irrespective of the type of information disclosure. Prior studies 
investigating the economic consequences of increased disclosure, however, usually 
limit the selection of items of information to be included in the index to voluntary 
disclosure, assuming that mandatory disclosure would not differ among companies. 
For example Firth (1984) excluded the mandatory information items from his list of 
information because companies would almost certainly disclose this information47. 
However, Coy and Dixon (2004: 84) stated that: “our experience is that quality 
differences do arise even among mandatory disclosures, not only between 
organizations but also in reports of the same organization from year to year” . If a 
quality difference in the level of compliance with mandatory disclosure exists, it 
would mean that prior studies have disregarded the potential impact of mandatory 
disclosure upon the firm’s cost of capital and its value.
In the Egyptian settings a departure from full compliance with mandatory disclosure 
was observed. For example, Abd-Elsalam (1999) indicated that the level of
47 However, he treated a few items of statutory information as voluntary information because many 
firms do not comply with these items (Firth, 1979, footnote no.l: 274).
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compliance with CML disclosure requirements by a sample of 72 Egyptian listed 
companies was 79% in 1995. In addition, a review of 2001 financial statements of 30 
top-listed companies revealed a number of missing disclosures (ROSC, 2004: 11).
This departure from full compliance with mandatory disclosure by Egyptian listed 
companies raises a question about compliance and non-compliance costs. From a 
company point of view, compliance costs include information production and 
dissemination costs, which include training preparers on the applicable standards. 
Non-compliance costs include market pressure and administrative penalties from the 
CM A  such as monetary penalties and delisting. With respect to non-compliance 
costs, many investors in Egypt are small investors who cannot form a pressure group 
on listed companies like their counterparts in developed markets (Abd-Elsalam,
1999). Strategic investors, on the other hand, should have easy access to information 
disclosure whenever required from their companies. Furthermore, in the Egyptian 
context, administrative penalties for non-filers or late filers were virtually non­
existent prior to August 2002 except for delisting. However, delisting was rarely 
used because the number of listed companies was seen as a measure of the success of 
the stock exchange relative to its international competitors. In addition, delisting was 
seen to be more harmful to corporate shareholders rather than its management 
(PCSU, 2000). This in turn means that prior to August 2002 non-compliance costs 
were almost non-existent, and compliance costs were relatively high. New 
administrative penalties were introduced in August 2002; hence they were not 
applicable during the time period covered by this study. This was confirmed from 
the ROSC report (2002), which indicated that lack of knowledge among preparers 
and auditors of financial statements, the unavailability of implementation guidelines
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In brief, it appears that compliance costs outweighed non-compliance costs for listed 
companies at least for the time period investigated here. This leads the researcher to 
expect a departure from full compliance with mandatory disclosure among listed 
companies over the period of study, which is not unique to the Egyptian companies 
as it has also been observed in other emerging markets: examples are Nigeria, Hong 
Kong, Bangladesh, Pakistan, India and Saudi Arabia (Ahmed and Nicholls, 1994; 
Ali, Ahmed and Henry, 2004; and Naser and Nuseibeh, 2003).
Therefore, to study the benefits of increased disclosure in an environment that could 
be characterized as a low informational environment, it is believed that mandatory 
disclosure could form the basis of this study. The researcher started with a list of 
items of information drawn from the checklist for the disclosure and transparency 
requirements of the CMA. This list provides Guidelines Manuals to inform 
companies issuing financial securities and their auditors of the procedures followed 
by the CMA to ensure their compliance with disclosure and transparency 
requirements according to the EAS that are in conformity with IAS.
A  careful review of the disclosure literature was undertaken to select items of 
information (not included in the checklist of the CMA) that Egyptian companies 
might disclose voluntarily. In a situation where full compliance with mandatory 
disclosure is not expected, this was a hard task.
It is believed that the checklist, used by the CIFAR (1995) to evaluate corporate
disclosure levels for leading non-financial companies in a number of emerging and
developed countries, was a reasonable one to start with. It includes some
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on  E A S  and IA S , and the lack  o f  authority for en forcin g  p en alties constrain  the
preparation o f  financia l statem ents in  com p lian ce  w ith  the ap p licab le  standards.
fundamental information that sometimes overlaps with the mandated one by the 
CML. Hence, they could be used as a basis for the potential voluntary information 
index in the Egyptian context. The CIFAR data have been used extensively in the 
accounting, finance and economics literature (see, for example, Salter, 1998; 
Sengupta, 1998; Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Hope, 2003a; 2003b; and Doidge, 
Karolyi and Stulz, 2004). Bushman, Piotroski and Smith (2001: 312) describe the 
CIFAR index as an “obvious candidate for the quality of the financial accounting 
regime” .
This process led to the inclusion of 115 items of information in the initial list: 70 
items from the CMA checklist and 45 items from the CIFAR checklist.
6.3 Selecting the final list of items of information
The inclusion of items of information drawn from the CIFAR checklist in the initial 
list, however, could be criticized as being outdated or irrelevant to the Egyptian 
context. Thus, this initial list of items of information was subject to a long process 
of refinements. The refinement process involves two stages: firstly, the initial list of 
items of information was subject to a survey to seek out the views of a number of 
professional users regarding the usefulness of these items of information for making 
investment decisions in the Egyptian context. Secondly, the list was filtered from 
non-applicable items of information.
6.3.1 Checking out the usefulness of items of information included in the initial 
list via a survey
The initial list of items of information was sent out to a sample of Egyptian 
professional users to request their views regarding the usefulness of items of 
information included in the initial list. They were asked to indicate their views 
regarding the usefulness of these items of information for making an investment
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decision in common shares. A  five-point scale is used, ranging from 1 (not useful) to 
5 (very useful). The results show that the minimum mean score assigned was 2 .5, 
which indicates at least a medium level of usefulness of the items of information 
included in the initial list for decision making in the Egyptian context. In this sub­
section a full discussion of the survey is presented. It includes creating the 
questionnaire and an analysis of the data collected from the questionnaire.
6.3.1.1 Creating the questionnaire
A  mail questionnaire was used despite of its limitations, i.e. its low response rate, 
because it was economic in terms of time and cost to contact a large number of 
professional users in Egypt. The creation of the questionnaire includes: the purpose 
of the questionnaire, the sample used and reasons for choosing this sample, the 
design of the questionnaire and the pilot testing of the questionnaire and sending it.
6.3.1.1.1 The purpose of the questionnaire, the sample used and reasons for 
choosing this sample
The purpose of the questionnaire is to explicitly seek out professional users’ views 
regarding the usefulness of the items of information included in the initial list for 
making investment decisions in common shares in the Egyptian market. The 
professional users’ sample consists of 200 brokers and investment analysts in banks 
and insurance companies. They were chosen rather than other user groups such as 
private shareholders, preparers and auditors, for several reasons: firstly, the major 
concern of this research is an investment decision making in common shares, so that 
investors are the most relevant group. Secondly, as Dhaliwal (1980: 385) stated that:
‘A great number of individual investors depend directly or indirectly, upon professional financial 
analysts for investment advice. Thus the financial disclosure needs of the financial analysts are 
extremely important from the investor’s point of view.’
1 4 2
Thirdly, it is easier to contact and get information about professional users than 
private shareholders in Egypt. Fourthly, Beattie and Partt (2002) found that the 
Pearson correlation between the usefulness scores assigned by the professional users 
and private shareholders was 0.86, which, from the researcher point of view, is high 
enough to conclude the similarity between mindsets of professional users and non­
expert users (private shareholders). Therefore, the researcher can follow prior 
studies that depended upon the financial analysts’ views regarding the usefulness of 
a number of items of information for making investment decisions as a guide for 
their usefulness from the investors’ point of view (Buzby, 1975; Benjamin and 
Stanga, 1977; and Firth, 1979).
6.3.1.1.2 The questionnaire design
The questionnaire consists of three sections (Appendix 6 .1). The first section 
includes a covering letter and a set of instructions. The second section deals with the 
content. The final section provides additional information about the user: the nature 
of employee, level of education, and experience.
The first section of the questionnaire includes a personally signed covering letter 
introduces the researcher, the research subject and its purpose. It was made clear that 
the questionnaire is related to financial reporting by listed companies only, and that 
it seeks out the views of a sample of professional users to induce the respondent’s 
cooperation. The respondent was asked to fill in the questionnaire and return it in the 
attached stamped addressed envelope. Confidentiality with respect to dealing with 
the provided information is assured. Moreover, it includes offers to request the 
results of the survey, and to acknowledge the contribution of the respondent 
company in the thesis and in any academic publications resulting from the use of the
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questionnaire. Thanks in advance and warmly welcome for any other information are 
finally mentioned. Moreover, a set of instructions is provided explain how the 
respondent can fill in the questionnaire. Also, the cost factor of providing voluntary 
disclosure by a reported company is highlighted.
In the content section, the research instrument was primarily the closed-end form, 
because closed questions are considered to be easy to answer, code and analyze, and 
time-saving for both the researcher and the respondents (see, for example, Shohaib, 
1990; Gillham, 2000; Frazer and Lawley, 2000; and Bourque and Fielder, 1995). 
Moreover it is considered to be more efficient and reliable than open-end questions 
for mail questionnaires (Fink, 1995; and Bourque and Fielder, 1995).
The content section of the questionnaire consists of two parts. The first part asked 
the respondents to indicate their views regarding the usefulness of a number of items 
of information for making an investment decision concerning a company’ s common 
shares. A  five-point scale is used, ranging from 1 (not useful) to 5 (very useful). A  
five-point scale is chosen because a five-to-seven point scale is considered to be 
suitable for most surveys that use ordered responses (Fink, 1995). Also, most 
professionals prefer the odd-number scale (Sudman, 1985). Moreover, the five-point 
scale is used by a number of prior studies in financial reporting (see, for example, 
Buzby, 1974; Benjamin and Stanga, 1977; Firth, 1979; and Beattie and Pratt, 2002). 
For answering this question, both words and numbers were used to avoid the 
weakness of using one of them rather than the other since: “one weakness of ranked 
responses is that numbers are used rather than words, it is tempting to think that you 
can average the ranks” (Gillham, 2000: 54). The researcher decided to put the 
negative end (not useful) of the scale first for the content question in this mail
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questionnaire, although deciding which end of the scale should be placed first is 
considered to be less important for mail questionnaire than face-to-face interviews 
(Fink, 1995), to not affect or guide their choices by putting the positive answer first.
The second part of the content section of the questionnaire asked the respondent to 
order the seven categories of information according to their relative importance from 
l(the most important) to seven (the least important) seeking for an overall view of 
the relative usefulness of them.
The third and final part of the questionnaire includes a question about the nature of 
employer to investigate whether there is a consensus within the professional users’ 
groups regarding the usefulness of items of information or not. Answers for this 
question is divided into two main categories: brokers, investment analysts in banks 
and insurance companies. However, the researcher could not test for this hypothesis, 
as 19 out of 23 of the respondents were brokers, which limit the ability to do the 
analysis. Moreover, two questions about the level of education and experience were 
included to explore whether there are some items of information that more 
experience respondents (and/ or higher educated respondents) find them more useful 
for investment decision-making. Answer for the experience question is numerical; it 
lets the respondent identify how many years he spent in analyzing investments in 
common shares. The answer to the level of education question is divided into six 
categories: pre- university level, university level, diploma, Master, PhD, and others 
(the respondent was asked to specify). Finally, the respondent was asked whether he 
or she would like to request a copy of the survey results and the postal address in 
case he or she answered yes.
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6.3.1.1.3 Pilot testing of the questionnaire and sending it
The questionnaire was pilot tested by a number of colleagues: 8 PhD students in 
Accounting and Finance, 2 PhD students in Psychology, 3 lecturers: two in 
Accountancy and one in Economics, and revised and improved accordingly to 
enhance the face validity of the questionnaire. All questionnaires were serially 
numbered in two places: the last page of the questionnaire and the return envelope. 
The researcher keeps a file shows the number assigned to each package (the covering 
letter, the questionnaire and the stamped addressed envelope), name (if possible) and 
address, and date of sending and receiving it, to allow non-respondents to be 
followed up. Reminder letters were sent after 21 days to the entire sample, as a kind 
regards and thanks for those who did respond and a reminder for those who did not. 
A  second request together with another complete questionnaire package was sent 
after a further 21 days ensuring the need for participation. The first mailing48 to all 
respondents took place in 31st of January 2003. The final cut-off date for accepting 
the completed questionnaire took place after two months from the initial mailing.
6.3.1.2 The questionnaire analysis
6.3.1.2.1 Coding
The usefulness of the items of information included in the questionnaire are ranked 
using numbers from one to five: one for not-useful, two for slightly useful, three for 
moderately useful, four for useful, and five for very useful. For the groups of 
information, they are coded from A  (general information) to G (supplementary 
information) in alphabetic order. The items of information are coded using sub­
48 Two versions of the questionnaire were sent out to each participant: one in English and one in 
Arabic. The participant was free to fill in the preferred one.
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numbers from one (for items included in the general information) to seven (for items 
included in the supplementary information). The seven categories of information are 
ranked according to their relative importance from one (the most important) to seven 
(the least important).
6.3.1.2.2 Test for non-response bias
23 responses out of 200 have been received, which makes a rate of response of 
11.5%. This low response rate calls for testing for non-response bias, which means 
that results obtained from the questionnaire may not be representative for the whole 
population. Buzby (1974; 1975) and Firth (1979; 1984) used a test recommended by 
Oppenheim (1966) based on late responses as substitute for non-respondents. The 
mean scores for each item in their information lists for the first received 
questionnaires were compared to that of the last received questionnaires. Because of 
the low response rate in the current research, which in turn refers to the small size of 
the sample, the Mann-Whitney U Test49 is used. The researcher tests whether chance 
alone is a reasonable explanation for the difference in scoring items of information 
between the two independent groups: a random sample of eight responses from the 
first received responses and the last received eight responses is used. The null 
hypothesis is that there is no difference in scoring items of information between the 
two groups. The alternative hypothesis is that there is a difference in scoring items of 
information between the two groups, which may indicate a non-response bias. The
49 The Mann-Whitney tests that two sampled populations are equivalent in location. The observations 
from both groups are combined and ranked, with the average rank assigned in the case of ties. The 
number of ties should be small relative to the total number of observations. If the populations are 
identical in location, the ranks should be randomly mixed between the two samples. The number of 
times a score from group 1 precedes a score from group 2 and the number of times a score from group 
2 precedes a score from group 1 are calculated. The Mann-Whitney U statistic revealed by SPSS 13 
software is the smaller of these two numbers.
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decision rule is to reject Ho if the obtained U is equal to or lower than the critical U. 
For the current study, the sample size of the first received responses is eight, and the 
sample size of the last received responses is eight, Alpha has been set at 0.052 tail, and 
the critical value of Mann-Whitney U test is 13.
The results revealed in Appendix (6.2) show that for 107 items of information out of 
115 in addition to the seven groups of items of information the obtained U is higher 
than the critical U. Hence, the researcher was able to retain Ho, that chance alone is a 
reasonable explanation for the difference in scoring items of information between the 
two independent groups. The researcher rejects Ho for five items of information 
(2/16, 3/19, 4/7 , 4/13, 6/9). These results indicate the lack of a material non-response 
bias.
6.3.1.2.3 Descriptive analysis of the data collected from the questionnaire
The descriptive analysis of the data collected from the questionnaire is presented in 
Appendix (6.3) using SPSS software package. The results indicate that operating 
income (item 2/6) takes the highest mean (4 .87) with a minimum awarded value of 
4 , followed by dividends per share (item 6/4) with mean of (4 .74) and net income 
(item 2/13) with mean of (4 .65). The lowest mean of 2.5 was given to item 5/4 
(policies for treating pension costs). Moreover, the lowest standard deviation and the 
highest minimum values are recorded to operating income (item 2/6), purpose of the 
company’s activity (item 1/5), and dividends per share (item 6/4) respectively. One 
may conclude from these results that investors in Egypt pay much attention to 
income and dividends figures when making investment decisions.
This result is confirmed from the results of the order of the groups of information 
according to their relative importance in decision-making gathered from section 2 of
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the questionnaire where income statement is ranked first (the lowest mean of the 
order), followed by balance sheet statement, cash flow statement, shareholders 
information, accounting policies, general information and supplementary 
information respectively. This result is consistent with prior studies, since Firth 
(1979: 275) has found that historical accounting data tended to receive fairly high 
importance weightings. Also, this result is consistent with a notice cited in Abd- 
Elsalam (1999: 37) about a previous study on Egyptian investors, where she stated 
that: “in one of the very few empirical studies on Egyptian investors, it was 
suggested that they are more interested in the profit figure than any of the other 
ratios”.
6.3.1.2.4 Tests for potential difference in scoring items of information according 
to the level of education and experience of the respondents
The 23 responses could be classified for respondents according to both their level of
education and experience to explore whether either the level of education or
experience of respondents or both affects their evaluation regarding the relative
usefulness of items of information included in the questionnaire. According to the
data obtained from the questionnaire, level of education among the respondents
could be classified into two main groups: University level (15 respondents) and
postgraduate level (7 respondents). The range of experiences among respondents
differs from 0 to 15 years of experience. The researcher classified the respondents
according to the median (5.5 years) of years of experiences into two groups: less
than or equal to 5.5 years of experience (13 respondents), and more than 5.5 years of
experience (10 respondents). Two hypotheses have been tested: firstly, there is no
significant difference in evaluating items of information among respondents
according to their level of education. Secondly, there is no significant difference in
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evaluating items of information among respondents according to their level of 
experience. The null hypotheses are drawn here since there is no specific relation or 
direction for the effects of these two variables upon evaluating items of information 
provided by prior research. To test these hypotheses a Mann-Whitney U test at 0.052 
tail level of significance is used. The researcher depended on this test rather than test 
for equality of means (T-test) because of the small size of the sample and the type of 
data (ordinal data). The decision rule is to reject Ho if the obtained U is equal to or 
lower than the critical U. Results are reported in Appendix (6 .4). Comparing the 
obtained values of U with the critical value of U (1950), the results show that there is 
no significant difference in evaluating items of information regarding their relative 
usefulness between investors of University level of education and above University 
level of education. Moreover, comparing the obtained values of U with the critical 
value of U (2651) The results indicate that there is no significant difference in 
evaluating items of information regarding their relative usefulness between investors 
of more than 5.5 years of experience and those of less or equal to 5.5 years of 
experience. Therefore, the researcher could conclude that chance alone is a 
reasonable explanation of the difference between the groups’ scores.
In brief, the results of the survey indicate the usefulness of items of information 
included in the initial list for investment decision-making in the Egyptian context. 
The results also show that different weights have been awarded to different items of 
information, with the highest scores being awarded to net income and dividends
50 This is critical value of U at 0.052 tail for samples sizes 6 and 15. Hence it is the lowest value of 
critical U that could be obtained.
51 This is critical value of U at 0.052 tail for samples sizes 9 and 12. Hence it is the lowest value of 
critical U that could be obtained.
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figures. In addition, the results show that investors in Egypt pay much attention to 
financial information included in the financial statements, with the priority being 
given to the income statement. Moreover, the results show that there are no 
differences among the professional users in Egypt in evaluating this list of items of 
information with respect to their level of education or experience.
6.3.2 Filtering the initial list of items of information from rarely or never 
disclosed items of information
The results obtained from the survey give some confidence with respect to the 
usefulness of the items of information included in the initial list for making 
investment decisions in the Egyptian context. However, some items of information, 
which are included in that list, might not be very important or irrelevant to Egyptian 
listed companies. Therefore, this list of items of information was revised in light of a 
sample of companies’ annual reports by checking out what companies did actually 
disclose. For example, while companies are required to disclose the unpaid amount 
of capital, companies tend to disclose the paid amount of capital. Another example is 
the deferred tax where companies tend to disclose the taxation in the notes to 
accounts and give a note that the amount of deferred tax is not practical to measure. 
Other examples include: the chairman’s or CEO’s statement; current assets separated 
from fixed assets; and appropriation of retained earnings, which are replaced by the 
board of directors’ report; classification of assets to long-term assets and current 
assets; and retained earnings, respectively.
The amended list of items of information was then applied to the entire sample of 
firms and filtered from items of information that were rarely disclosed or have never 
been disclosed by the sample firms over the research period of study. The researcher 
required that the item of information to be disclosed at least by 20% of the sampled
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firms over the period of study to be included in the final list. This process led to the 
elimination of 40 items of information from the original list (Appendix 6 .5). It is 
worth noting that this list of rarely disclosed items of information matches with 
results from prior reports (ROSC, 2002) such as changes in equity accounts during 
the year, and events after the balance sheet date. The remaining number of items of 
information (75 items) forms the final list with a minimum awarded usefulness of
3.2 from the survey (Appendix 6.6).
6.4 Assigning a score for each item of information
The next step is to assign a score for each item of information as a preliminary 
process to calculate the disclosure index. Most prior studies use the unweighted 
approach in constructing the disclosure index, mainly to reduce subjectivity in 
determining weights. In addition, this study is a longitudinal study and level of 
importance of each item of information could have been changed over time and 
among different industries52. Therefore, the researcher followed the unweighted 
approach in creating the three indices.
Depending on the final list of items of information, each item of information is 
scored according to its existence in the annual reports of the sampled firms. An item 
scores one if it is disclosed and zero if it is not. The total unweighted index is 
calculated as the total scores awarded to a particular company for a particular year 
divided by the maximum number of applicable items of information in order to not 
penalise companies for clearly non-applicable items of information. The entire 
annual report was read first to understand the nature of each company’s operations
52 Hence, it was decided not to reveal the weighted indices despite of their existence, given that in 
results not presented here both weighted and unweighted indices show similar results.
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and its circumstances in order to decide whether a particular item of information is 
applicable for a particular company in a particular year or not.
6.5 Distinction between mandatory and voluntary disclosures
Finally, given that a departure from full compliance with mandatory disclosure was
observed in the Egyptian context, and assuming that low compliance with mandatory 
disclosure could be treated as voluntary disclosure Firth (1979; 1984), as more 
discretion is believed to be exercised over disclosing these items of information, 
mandatory items of information that showed volatility over time are considered 
voluntary disclosure.
To lessen subjectivity in doing so, the compliance ratio for each item of information 
included in the final list is calculated for the whole sample (i.e. the proportion of 
companies disclosing the item over the sample period). The average score awarded 
to a particular item over the sample period measures the compliance ratio. For 
example, since company name is disclosed by every company every year, this item is 
awarded a compliance ratio of 1. Figure (6 .1) shows the compliance ratio for each 
item of information included in the final list for the whole sample.
From Figure (6.1) one can notice that mandatory items of information, which are 
presented by a continuous line from 0.20 to 1,exhibit different levels of compliance. 
Some mandatory items of information have high levels of compliance and others 
have low levels of compliance. Hence, as shown in Figure (6 .1) the researcher was 
able to identify a “cut-off’ point. It is the point at which low compliance with 
mandatory disclosure is treated as voluntary disclosure.
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Figure (6 .1) Disclosure indices
This in turn means that although these items of information are theoretically 
mandated by the CML, they practically are not. From Figure (6.1) the cut point is a 
compliance ratio of 78% as a gap between two groups of items of information is 
observed. Above this cut point are items of information that are perceived by 
companies as mandatory; hence they form the mandatory disclosure index. Under 
this cut point are mandatory items, which have low compliance ratios, and voluntary 
items of information, hence both form the voluntary disclosure index. It is worth 
noting that the first item under the cut point is a voluntary item of information, 
which indicates that this cut point is a reasonable one.
In brief, items that have a compliance ratio of 78% or above are considered to form 
the mandatory disclosure index (49 items of information), while the rest are 
classified as voluntary disclosure (26 items of information). Hence the three indices: 
mandatory disclosure index, voluntary disclosure index and aggregate disclosure
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index (which includes both mandatory and voluntary items of information) are 
created (see Appendix 6.6).
6.6 Concluding remarks
In this chapter the main explanatory variable, disclosure level in corporate annual 
reports, is measured via the disclosure index technique, which proved to be the most 
suitable method to measure corporate disclosure level for Egyptian listed companies.
The researcher constructed three disclosure indices: mandatory disclosure index, 
voluntary disclosure index, and aggregate disclosure index. The process of 
constructing these indices involves four main steps. The first step was to select an 
initial list of items of information that companies might disclose in their annual 
report. The selection of such list is guided by prior studies in the economic 
consequence of increased disclosure. Although the theoretical argument of potential 
benefits of increased disclosure is based on the existence of different levels of 
information about alternative shares, the empirical literature focuses on voluntary 
disclosure, assuming that mandatory disclosure would not differ among companies. 
Hence, the literature on the economic consequence of mandatory disclosure is very 
limited. Given that a departure from full compliance with mandatory disclosure is 
observed in the Egyptian context, mandatory disclosure forms the basis for this 
initial list. Mandatory items of information are drawn from the CM A checklist. In 
addition, potential voluntary items of information are drawn form the CIFAR 
checklist.
Since, the initial list of items of information includes some items of information 
from the CIFAR checklist, which might be outdated or irrelevant to the Egyptian 
market, this list was subject to a long process of refinements. This was done firstly
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through a survey to check out the usefulness of items of information included in the 
initial list for investment decision-making in Egypt. The results of the questionnaire 
indicate at least the moderate usefulness of items of information included the list. In 
addition, consistent with prior studies, the results indicate the priority of financial 
information in the Egyptian settings. Moreover, the superiority is given to net 
income and dividends figures. Then, the list of items of information was applied to a 
sample of annual reports and modified accordingly. Then it was filtered from items 
of information that were rarely or never been disclosed by the sample firms.
Once the final list of items of information is formed, the third step was to assign a 
score to each item included in the list. The researcher followed the unweighted 
approach by giving the item of information the value of one if disclosed and the 
value of zero if not. The total index is measured as the sum of scores awarded to a 
particular company in a particular year divided by the maximum number of 
applicable items.
Finally, the distinction between the mandatory disclosure index and the voluntary 
disclosure index is guided by companies’ actual practice. Assuming that low 
compliance with mandatory disclosure could be treated as voluntary disclosure, 
mandatory items of information that showed volatility over time are considered 
voluntary disclosure. Hence the three indices: mandatory disclosure index (49 items 
of information), voluntary disclosure index (26 items of information) and aggregate 
disclosure index (the 75 items of information) are formed.
Once the disclosure index is created, it is necessary to provide evidence on the 
reliability and validity of this disclosure index as a measure of corporate disclosure 
level. Hence, the purpose of the subsequent chapter is to provide this evidence.
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Chapter (7)
Assessing the reliability and validity of the disclosure indices
7.1 Overview
The disclosure index, whatever the approach or scale used to develop it, is a research 
tool constructed to measure a theoretical concept that cannot be measured directly. 
Hence, it is necessary to assess whether this disclosure index is a relatively reliable 
and valid proxy for the extent of disclosure in order to provide useful inferences 
about it. In other words it is important to provide evidence that this disclosure index 
yields consistent results on repeated measurements and reflects the theoretical 
concept of disclosure. Therefore, the researcher tests for the reliability and validity 
of the disclosure indices used in this research. Reliability is tested using the 
commonly used measure for internal consistency: Cronbach’s alpha in Section (7 .2). 
Validity is tested in Section (7.3) mainly by regressing proxies of disclosure level on 
determinants of disclosure levels provided by prior studies and those concerning the 
Egyptian market. Section (7 .4) provides concluding remarks.
7.2 Cronbach’s alpha for internal consistency
Carmines and Zeller (1991: 48) defines Cronbach’s alpha as ‘an estimate of the 
expected correlation between one test and a hypothetical alternative form containing 
the same number of items’ . It reflects the homogeneity among a number of items 
grouped together to form a particular scale. It shows how well the different items 
complement each other in their measurement of different aspects of the same 
variable (Litwin, 1995: 24). The formula for coefficient alpha (a) is given by the 
equation below:
Np
a=[l + p(N-l)]
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Where: N= number of items of information
p  = The mean inter-item correlation.
It can take a value from zero to one. It takes the maximum value of one when the 
correlation between each pair of items is one. The higher the coefficient alpha 
obtained, the higher the reliability of the scale. As a general rule, an alpha of 0.8 for 
widely used scales is believed to indicate that the correlations are attenuated very 
little by random measurement error (Carmines and Zellner, 1991). This test was run 
using SPSS software. The results for the reliability coefficient alpha are reported in 
Table (7 .1). Coefficient alpha is approximately 0.8 for both mandatory and voluntary 
disclosure indices and 0.85 for the aggregate disclosure index. These results are 
consistent with the theoretical range identified earlier and are better than the value of
0.64 obtained by Botosan (1997). Hence the results suggest the reliability of the 
three disclosure indices as measures of disclosure level of the sample of Egyptian 
listed companies used in the current research.
Table (7 .1) Reliability tests
Aggregate
index
Mandatory
index
Voluntary
index
Number of cases* 114 116 121
Number of items** 67 41 26
Alpha 0.845 0.781 0.767
*Number of cases depends on the availability of data. ** Number of items is 
reduced by items of information that have zero variance.
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7.3 Validity assessment
Assessing the validity of a disclosure index means to test whether the disclosure 
index measures the extent of information disclosure. Two main tests were conducted 
in the current study: content validity and construct validity.
7.3.1 Content validity assessment
Content validity is assessed through seeking subjective judgment from a sample of 
Egyptian professional users regarding the usefulness of the items of information 
included in the index for an investment decision-making as discussed in Chapter (6). 
The results of the survey show that the minimum awarded score is 3.2 for items of 
information included in the index, which refers to the relative usefulness of these 
items of information for investment decision-making in the Egyptian context. 
However, this type of validity is always seen as not sufficient to conclude the 
validity of a measure. This might be due to concerns about users’ perception 
regarding their own use of information (Dhaliwal, 1980). Moreover, this type of 
validity assessment concerns each item of information included in the index 
individually, which might limit the ability to conclude the validity of the disclosure 
index as a whole.
7.3.2 Construct validity assessment
Construct validity assessment of the disclosure indices requires a pattern of 
consistent findings with prior studies. Prior studies on disclosure have examined the 
relationship between a measure of disclosure quantity or quality and a number of 
company characteristics: company size, listing/cross listing, profitability, gearing, 
and others. While the results for firm size and listing/ cross listing are often constant 
among prior studies, other variables yield mixed results.
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Consequently, to test for the construct validity of the three disclosure indices the 
researcher regresses individual proxies of disclosure level on a number of firm 
characteristics: firm size, legal form, profitability, gearing and stock activity, which 
might affect disclosure levels in the Egyptian context. Expectations about the 
direction of the relationship between disclosure level and these variables are drawn 
from theories of disclosure provided by prior studies. For those variables where prior 
expectations about the direction of the relationship could be formed from the theory 
and empirical prior studies, the one- tail t-test is carried out. For other variables 
where relevant expectations do not provide a direction of the relationship, the two- 
tail t-test is performed.
7.3.2.1 Determinants of the extent of corporate disclosure
Expectations about determinants of the extent of corporate disclosure depend on a 
review of prior studies. Prior studies rely on a framework of agency theory and 
signalling theory to draw their hypotheses regarding determinants of disclosure 
levels. In the separation of ownership and control of resources in a firm, agency 
theory predicts conflicts between shareholders (principal) and management and 
controlling shareholders (agent), and between shareholders/management and 
controlling shareholders (agent) and debt holders (principal) to take place within the 
firm if individuals act self-interestedly. Two sets of agency costs are then incurred: 
the agency cost of equity or debt and the costs of monitoring and bonding managers, 
so that managers do pursue the principal’s interest (Morris, 1987). Depoers (2000: 
248) added ‘ given that these costs (monitoring costs) reduce their compensation, 
managers have an incentive to keep them low. Since accounting disclosure is a 
means by which their activity can be monitored, managers are thus encouraged to
160
disclose information voluntarily’ . Hence, more public information is argued to 
reduce agency costs.
Signalling theory is concerned with the information asymmetry problem between 
managers of the firm and the market. It is argued that the information gap between 
managers and outside investors could lead to devaluation of the firm’s stock, thus 
expanded disclosure is expected to reduce this gap and to revalue the stock upward. 
Abd-Elsalam (1999: 28) explain this argument in detail:
“ signalling theory, in the disclosure scenario, means that managers will disclose information which 
implies that the company has a share value which is larger than that assessed by the market, in order 
to encourage an upward revision of their stock prices. Managers will withhold information that 
implies values below the assessment of the market. These “ silent” companies are identified by 
investors as companies with less than average valuation and, accordingly their shares will be re­
valued downward. This downward price revision of non-disclosing companies will, in turn encourage 
those within the group holding good news, relative to the recently decreased average valuation, to 
screen (signal) themselves out of the group by disclosing their information. The disclosure process 
thus proceeds, until the positions of all companies in the valuation hierarchy are identified”.
7.3.2.1.1 Firm size
A  large number of prior studies investigated the relationship between disclosure 
level and firm size. Firm size is considered to be an important determinant of the 
corporate disclosure strategy and eventually is used as a control variable in the 
financial reporting empirical literature. Results frequently confirm a positive 
relationship between firm size and disclosure level. Prior studies provide a number 
of explanations of this positive effect of size upon disclosure level. It is argued that 
firm size is a comprehensive variable that could proxy for competitive advantages, 
information production costs and political costs (Abd-Elsalam, 1999: 43). Firstly, 
information production and dissemination is a costly process, and larger firms might 
be more able to afford these expenses. In addition, if the process of producing 
information includes a fixed component, the proportion of these fixed costs to firm 
size will be smaller for larger firms. Secondly, more disclosure might put smaller
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companies in a position of competitive disadvantages with their larger counterparts 
in the industry. Therefore, they might be reluctant to disclose more information than 
larger companies. Thirdly, larger companies are more likely to be in the public eye 
and attract news coverage and public interest and are more closely monitored by 
government agencies, hence they might disclose more information to reduce public 
criticism and/or government involvement in their affairs. Moreover, it is argued that 
the larger the company (in terms of number of shareholders), the larger the 
informational gap (information asymmetry) among investors on one hand and 
between investors and the management on the other hand, so more public disclosure 
might be used to reduce the information asymmetry problems.
While most prior studies support the hypothesis that larger firms disclose more 
information than smaller firms, Ahmed and Nicholls (1994) found a negative but not 
significant relationship between firm size and mandatory disclosure. Meek, Roberts 
and Gray (1995) found that size phenomenon did not hold for the voluntary 
disclosure of strategic information. Moreover, Abd-Elsalam and Weetman (AW) 
(2003) found no significant correlation between different measures of mandatory 
disclosure (IAS) for a sample of Egyptian listed companies and firm size at the 5% 
level of significance in a univariate analysis. As prior empirical studies in the 
Egyptian context are rare and AW could not support or dismiss a positive 
relationship between firm size and disclosure level, the researcher tests for the 
general expectation of a positive relationship between the extent of disclosure and 
firm size.
Although there are a number of measures of firm size, including number of 
shareholders, shareholders’ funds, total assets, total sales, and market value of
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equity, the disclosure literature does not provide a theory or criterion to choose 
among different proxies. However, total assets and sales were the most popular 
measures of firm size in prior studies. Therefore, this research uses the book value 
of total assets and sales respectively.
7.3.2.1.2 Legal form
This attribute is particularly relevant to the Egyptian listed companies as they could 
be classified according to their legal form into two types: private sector companies 
and public business sector companies. Public business sector companies are state 
owned companies, which have been listed on the ESE in preparation for full 
privatization.
Although both types of business mainly comply with different financial reporting 
requirements according to different laws as explained earlier in chapter 4 , if  they are 
listed on the ESE then they have to comply with the disclosure requirements of the 
CML. However, AW hypothesized that public sector companies are more likely to 
disclose more information than private sector companies. They were among the 
largest listed companies, so this variable could proxy for firm size. Public sector 
companies are listed for privatization purposes; they seek finance, so they might 
disclose more information than private sector companies. Moreover, public sector 
companies are subject to close observation by the government and the public, so they 
might disclose more information than private sector companies to reduce political 
costs. They found a significant positive association between legal form and two
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measures of mandatory disclosure level53 (IAS-CA, IAS-NA), but no significant 
association is found with IAS-CML.
However, if the hypothesis of the larger size of public sector companies was 
applicable in 1995, the researcher does not expect it to be applicable from 1995 to 
2002, as more public sector companies were privatized over this period of time and 
some large private sector companies were listed after 1995. Moreover, the 
hypothesis of seeking finance holds for both private sector companies and public 
business sector companies in the current research sample, as both are public offering 
companies, and family companies are excluded from the research sample. 
Furthermore, the hypothesis of political costs could hold for both types of 
companies. More attractive private companies especially for small investors, who 
lack experience, entered the market in particular communications sector companies. 
In brief, while the hypotheses of AW might hold for their sample period, they might 
be less applicable to the current research sample construction and period of study. 
From this discussion the researcher does not expect a significant difference in 
disclosure levels between these two types of companies to exist. Legal form is 
measured using a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the company is a 
public sector one and zero if not.
53 AW (2003) identify three proxies for disclosure level: the international accounting standards 
disclosure requirements which were already familiar through the CA of 1981 (IAS-CA), the 
international disclosure requirements which were appended to the CML of 1992 in Arabic language 
(IAS-CML), and the international accounting standards disclosure requirements which had not been 
available in an official Arabic translation (IAS-NA).
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7.3.2.1.3 Profitability
Prior studies predict a positive relationship between profitability and disclosure level 
and offer several explanations. First, managers of more profitable companies are 
motivated to disclose more information to distinguish their companies from less 
profitable ones (good news- signalling theory), to increase investors’ confidence and 
to obtain personal advantages such as continuance of their positions and boosting of 
their compensation. Second, according to political process theory more profitable 
companies will disclose more information than less profitable ones to justify their 
levels of profits (Inchausti, 1997).
However, signalling theory predicts that managers might choose to disclose bad 
news in a timely manner to reduce the risk of legal liability and/or loss of reputation 
(Skinner, 1994). It is obvious that while agency theory and political process theory 
predict a positive association between profitability and disclosure level, signalling 
theory provides a justification for a negative relationship.
Empirical studies as well provide contradicting results. Meek, Roberts and Gray, 
1995; Hackston and Milne, 1996; Inchausti, 1997; Wallace, Naser and Mora, 1994; 
and AW found positive and negative but not significant relationships. Ali, Ahmed 
and Henry (2004) found a significant positive relationship between compliance 
levels with mandatory disclosure and profitability performance.
In brief, both theoretical and empirical prior studies indicate the possibility of both 
positive and negative relationships between disclosure level and profitability. 
However, in the Egyptian context, it was suggested that investors are more interested
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in the profit figures54. Assuming that listed companies are aware of investors’ 
interest, the researcher expects that more profitable companies will disclose more 
information than less profitable ones to get the investors’ confidence. Profitability is 
measured as net income to book value of equity.
7.3.2.1.4 Gearing
Gearing is a measure of the ability of a company to meet its obligations either in 
terms of long-term debt or total debt. It is argued that the higher the gearing ratio, the 
higher the agency costs because larger gearing ratios allow for greater potential 
transfer of wealth from creditors to shareholders (Depoers, 2000: 249). Hence highly 
geared companies encounter more monitoring costs and have greater obligation to 
satisfy the information needs of debt holders, so they are likely to disclose more 
information than lowly geared companies. This in turns should reduce the 
monitoring costs (agency theory) of long-term debt holders.
Results from prior studies regarding the relationship between gearing and disclosure 
level are contradictory. Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987; Wallace, Naser and Mora, 
1994; and Depoers, 2000 found no significant effect. Meek, Roberts and Gray
(1995) found a significant negative association. AW found a significant negative 
relationship between gearing and their measure of mandatory disclosure level (IAS- 
CML), while no significant association has been found with their other measures of 
disclosure level (IAS-CA, IAS-NA).
54 The survey results show that investors in Egypt pay much attention to income and dividends figures 
when making investment decisions, where operating income is the most useful item of information 
followed by dividends per share and net income.
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However, the bond market in Egypt is very small compared to that of other emerging 
and developed capital markets. It represents around 15.5 percent of the total market 
capitalization as of the end of June 2002. The issuance of corporate bonds started in 
May 1994 by one company followed by another one in April 1995. In 1996 several 
banks and some companies entered the bond market. Bondholders associations have 
the right to inspect the financial statements and to send a representative to the annual 
general meeting.
In conclusion, the main borrowing facility by the Egyptian listed companies is still 
borrowing from banks and holding companies, especially for the sample firms where 
there was no single company that issued bonds. Since holding companies and banks 
are the main debt holders of the Egyptian listed companies, they should gain easy 
access to the information they need whenever required directly from the company. 
Thus the researcher does not expect information asymmetry between debt holders 
and management of the firm to be a serious problem, so that the gearing ratio is not 
expected to affect disclosure level in the annual reports of the Egyptian listed 
companies. Gearing is measured as total debt to total assets.
7.3.2.1.5 Stock Activity
Companies listed on the ESE can be classified into traded companies and rarely 
traded companies. Rarely traded companies are in most cases family companies, 
which are listed to exploit tax exemptions applied to listed companies. AW  
hypothesized that traded companies are likely to disclose more information than 
rarely traded companies as they are seeking finance. AW found a significant 
positive association between their measure of stock activity and two measures of
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mandatory disclosure (IAS-CA, IAS-CML) but no significant association was found 
with their third measure of mandatory disclosure (IAS-NA).
Although the current research sample consists of traded companies only, one can 
distinguish between heavily traded companies and less traded companies. Heavily 
traded companies are more in the public eye and news coverage than less traded 
companies (political process theory), so they might disclose more information than 
less traded companies. Moreover, if information asymmetry problems exist for 
heavily traded companies, they then might face a risk of undervaluation of their 
stocks in the market. Hence, managers of firms that perceive their firms’ share value 
as larger than that assessed by the market, are motivated to disclose more 
information to encourage an upward revision of their stock prices (signalling theory). 
Stock activity is measured as number of trading days during the six months prior to 
the financial year-end to total trading days during that period.
In sum, to test for the construct validity of the three indices, the researcher tests the 
following model:
Disclosure level= f  (firm size, legal form, profitability, gearing, stock activity)
7.3.2.2 Data analysis
7.3.2.2.1 Descriptive analysis
Table (7 .2) provides a descriptive analysis of each variable. The average size of 
firms measured by total assets is L.E 572 million, while the average size measured 
by sales is L.E 323 million. The sample consists of 123 public business sector 
observations and 141 private sector observations. Average profitability is 28%, and 
average gearing ratio is 58%. Companies in the sample are heavily traded
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Table (7 .2) Descriptive analysis -  common samples
Gearing: total debt/ total assets; profitability: net income/book value of equity; stock 
activity: share trading days for six months prior to the financial year-end divided by 
total trading days.
Mean Median Maximum Minimum Skewness Kurtosis
Aggregate disclosure 0.754 0.781 0.947 0.356 -1.24 4.295
Mandatory disclosure 0.898 0.938 1 0.438 -1.826 6.576
Voluntary disclosure 0.48 0.52 0.846 0 -0.468 2.425
Sales (LE) m 323 180 2300 4 2.738 12.324
Ln (Sales) 19.038 19.008 21.556 15.237 -0.49 3.259
Assets (LE) m 572 295 5990 18 3.725 21.175
Ln (Assets) 19.585 19.502 22.513 16.7 0.127 2.975
Gearing 0.584 0.588 0.947 0 -0.283 2.632
Profitability 0.281 0.26 1.399 -0.91 0.702 9.257
Stock activity 0.818 0.941 1 0.188 -1.16 3.014
M refers to million.
companies, since they are traded on average 82% of the days of trading. On average, 
listed non-financial Egyptian companies publish 75% of the overall list of 
information (75 items), 90% of the list of mandatory information items (49 items) 
and 48% of the list of the voluntary information items (26 items). These results are 
similar to those obtained in the Saudi market (Naser and Nuseibeh, 2003), where the 
average compliance with mandatory disclosure was 0 .93, but higher for the average 
of voluntary disclosure which was 0.28 in the Saudi market.
As almost all the variables are skewed, a logarithm transformation of variables was 
undertaken to bring the distributions of these variables close to normality (Maddala,
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2002). Using the natural logarithm of each variable, however, the transformation was 
successful with book value of total assets only, as can be seen from Table (7 .2). 
Hence the researcher uses the natural logarithm of total assets rather than sales as a 
measure of firm size in the subsequent analysis. Furthermore, the high levels of 
skewness and kurtosis indicate that outliers might be an issue. So, a retest of the 
multivariate analysis after dropping the outliers will be provided to test for the 
sensitivity of the results to the existence of outliers.
Figure (7 .1) shows trends in the level of the different types of information disclosure 
over time. It shows an increasing rate of compliance with mandatory disclosure. This 
higher level of compliance confirms the compulsory nature of this list of items of 
information over time. However, departing from full compliance might reflect that 
compliance costs for listed companies exceeded non-compliance costs over the 
sample period. Nonetheless, this should change after the introduction of the new 
listing rules, which took place in August 2002, as more non-compliance costs, which 
vary from monetary penalties to delisting, take place. The level of voluntary 
disclosure is increasing over time apart from the decline in 1997. This particular 
decline in voluntary disclosure will be tested later on. The level of aggregate 
disclosure increased over time as well.
7.3.2.2.2 Univariate analysis
The normality hypothesis is rejected for almost all the variables except ln(assets) and 
gearing, hence a nonparametric correlation test is used to calculate the correlation 
coefficients. The Spearman cross product correlation matrix is presented in Table
(7 .3). It shows the correlation between different proxies of disclosure level and their 
expected determinants as well as the correlations among the explanatory variables.
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Figure (7 .1) Median disclosure levels over eight years
Year from 1995 to 2002
Table (7 .3) Spearman’s correlation coefficients
Firm size: the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets; legal form: a dummy variable taking 
the value of one if the company is a public sector company and the value of zero otherwise; 
profitability: net income/book value of equity; gearing: is total debt/ total assets; stock activity: 
share’s trading days for six months prior to the financial year-end divided by total trading days; 
TINDEX: aggregate disclosure; VINDEX: voluntary disclosure; MINDEX: mandatory disclosure.
TINDEX MINDEX VINDEX Size Legal form Profit Gearing
MINDEX 0 .839**
(0.000)
VNDEX 0 .900** 0 .554**
(0.000) (0.000) •
Size 0.022 -0.121* 0.102
(0 .713) (0 .047) (0 .092) •
Legal form -0 .152* 0.006 -0 .265** 0.036
(0.012) (0 .921) (0.000) (0 .513)
Profitability 0.047 0.064 0.007 0.081 0.019
(0 .445) (0 .299) (0 .904) (0 .138) (0 .729)
Gearing 0.005 0.020 -0.029 0 .118* 0.100 0 .189**
(0 .938) (0 .748) (0 .636) (0 .027) (0 .067) (0.000)
Stock activity -0.049 - 0.001 -0.084 0.307** -0.082 0 .152* 0.079
(0 .419) (0 .984) (0 .167) (0.000) (0 .176) (0 .013) (0 .193)
Numbers in parentheses are probabilities of significance. ** Significant at 1% level (2-tailed). 
* Significant at 5% level (2-tailed).
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The correlation between aggregate disclosure and firm size is positive but not 
significant. The correlation between voluntary disclosure and firm size is positive 
and significant at the 5% level of significance (one tailed test) as expected. Contrary 
to prior expectations, the correlation between mandatory disclosure and firm size is 
negative and significant, which could be due to the effect of the outliers.
The correlation between legal form and mandatory disclosure comes in line with 
expectations since listed companies have to comply with mandatory disclosure 
irrespective of their legal form. However, the correlations between legal form and 
both aggregate disclosure and voluntary disclosure are significantly negative. This 
result indicates that public business sector companies are less likely to disclosure 
information on a voluntary basis. Nonetheless, one should be cautious in interpreting 
this result, as it is valid only to the extent of voluntary disclosure used in this 
research and its time period. The correlation between disclosure levels and the rest of 
the explanatory variables are not significant.
Moreover, while the results confirm some significant correlations among the 
explanatory variables, the magnitude of these correlation coefficients, which does 
not exceed 0 .370, does not indicate a serious collinearity problem55. As a robust 
check for the multi-collinearity problem the variance inflation factor (VIF) is 
computed for each explanatory variable in the multiple regression model. By 
regressing each explanatory variable on the rest of the explanatory variables in 
individual multiple regression models using SPSS software in results not presented
55 Chow and Wong-Boren (1987) stated that a statistically significant correlation of 0.34 does not 
suggest a serious collinearity problem.
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here, the VIF did not exceed 1.1 for any explanatory variable. It is considered that 
for a particular explanatory variable collinearity would not be a problem if the VIF 
for that variable were less than 5 (Groebner et al., 2005: 576). Hence collinearity is 
not a problem for the current research model. This is confirmed from the tolerance 
coefficients56, which did not fall below 0.905 for any explanatory variable. The 
correlation between the aggregate disclosure index and voluntary disclosure is 
significantly positive (0 .900) and with mandatory disclosure (0 .839). The correlation 
between the mandatory and voluntary index is significantly positive (0 .554).
7.3.2.2.3 Multivariate analysis
In the previous subsection a univariate analysis shows the individual correlations 
between disclosure level and each explanatory variable. In this subsection a 
multivariate analysis is used to explore determinants of disclosure levels specified 
according to the model developed in the previous section for all the explanatory 
variables.
The general multiple regression model(s) to be estimated is:
Disclosure level= f  (firm size, legal form, profitability, gearing, stock activity)
The researcher added a dummy variable for 1997 in the voluntary disclosure model 
because it is shown from the descriptive analysis that the voluntary disclosure level 
dropped in 1997. In 1997 Egypt witnessed three major events: a terrorist attack on
56 Tolerance is 1 - R2 for the regression of each explanatory variable on all the other explanatory 
variables. There will be as many tolerance coefficients as there are explanatory variables. The higher 
the inter-correlation of the explanatory variables, the more the tolerance will approach zero. As a rule 
of thumb, if tolerance is less than 0.20, then a problem with multi-collinearity is indicated. 
http://www2.chass.ncsu.edu/garson/pa765/regress.htm, last accessed on 09/11/2004.
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upper Egypt in November 1997, which affected the whole economy for some years; 
the issuance of the Egyptian Accounting Standards by the Ministry of Foreign Trade, 
which should facilitate the preparation of mandatory disclosure information; and 
finally the introduction of symmetric price limits (-5% to + 5%) on individual shares 
in February 24, which might be responsible for price distortions on the Stock 
Exchange. While the issuance of the EAS could enhance mandatory disclosures, as 
more guidelines will be available, the other two events could give contradictory 
expectations regarding the level of voluntary disclosure. However, the researcher 
will test for a negative effect guided by the descriptive analysis.
Separate multiple regression models are estimated for the three types of disclosure 
level: aggregate, voluntary and mandatory. The method of estimation used was 
pooled-generalized least squares (GLS), with White heteroskedasticity-consistent 
standard errors and covariance as explained in Chapter (5).
Regression results for the different disclosure levels are presented in Table (7 .4). All 
the explanatory variables in the mandatory index regression are highly significant, 
but an unexpected result is that firm size and mandatory disclosure are negatively 
related. A  significant negative relationship between all disclosure level indices and 
legal form is confirmed at the 1% level of significance. This result implies that 
public sector companies disclose less information than private sector companies. The 
results for profitability are mixed. While profitability and mandatory disclosure are 
significantly positively related, profitability has no significant relationship with 
voluntary and aggregate disclosures. It is worth noting that the relationship between 
the voluntary disclosure level and profitability was negative but not significant, 
however introducing the 1997 dummy variable into the model changes the sign to a
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Firm size: the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets; legal form: a 
dummy variable taking the value of one if the company is a public sector company 
and the value of zero otherwise; profitability: net income/book value of equity; 
gearing: is total debt/ total assets; stock activity: share’s trading days for six months 
prior to the financial year-end divided by total trading days; d l997: a dummy 
variable for year 1997; TINDEX: aggregate disclosure; VINDEX: voluntary 
disclosure; MINDEX: mandatory disclosure.
T ab le  (7 .4 ) M u ltip le  regression  m o d els  b efore  dropping the outliers
D ep en d en t variable: d isc losu re  le v e ls
Variable name TINDEX VINDEX MINDEX
Constant 0.628
(18.830)**
0.002
(0 .023)
1.107
(59.437)**
Size 0.007
(4 .349)**
0.032
(8.331)**
-0.013
(-12.922)**
Legal form -0.040
(-10.194)**
-0.105
(-10.159)**
-0.013
(-5.411)**
Profitability -0.017
(-1.647)
0.004
(0.110)
0.039
(6 .852)**
Gearing 0.020
(2.775)**
-0.025
(-1.064)
0.051
(9.984)**
Stock activity 0.002
(0.418)
-0.073
(-3.631)**
0.020
(4 .139)**
D 1997 -0.061
(3.677)**
R 2 0.994 0.886 0.998
S. E. of regression 0.117 0.183 0.101
No. of observations 264 264 264
Notes: t-values in parentheses. White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariance and
GLS (cross-section weights). ** Significant at 1 % level ; * Significant at 5 % level. R 2: adjusted R 
squared.
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positive but not significant one. Moreover, the introduction of the 1997 dummy did 
not affect the significance or the direction of the relationships with the other 
explanatory variables.
The results for gearing are significantly positive at 1% level of significance for 
aggregate and mandatory disclosures, but negative and not significant for voluntary 
disclosure. So, while higher gearing ratios are motivating companies to comply with 
mandatory disclosure, they do not affect voluntary disclosure. The results for stock 
activity are also mixed. While heavily traded companies are more likely to comply 
with mandatory disclosure, they are less likely to disclose information voluntarily. 
The dummy variable is significantly negative, implying that the events of 1997 
significantly reduced voluntary disclosure.
The adjusted R squared of each model is very high57 compared to prior studies. The 
lowest adjusted R squared obtained was for the voluntary disclosure model (0 .886), 
but this is still very high compared with prior studies. However, the high value of the 
adjusted R squared might not be sufficient to indicate how good the model is. 
Therefore, the standard error of each model58 is also reported. The standard error of
57 This research data set is a panel data, which is a cross- sectional and time series data set. Given that 
R squared will tend to be large for time series data sets than cross-section data sets because there is 
much more random variation across individual units at a point in time than across time for the same 
unit. Furthermore, using GLS will tend to lower the error sum of squares. Given that, mathematically, 
R2 = (1 - (SSE/SST)), where SSE = error sum of squares and SST = total sum of squares, then 
reducing the error sum of squares will increase R squared, which in turn will increase the adjusted R 
squared.
58 Groebner at al. (2005: 564-565) state that: ‘The standard deviation of the regression model 
measures the dispersion of observed dependent variable around values predicted by the regression 
model. It is the square root of the mean square error of the residuals. (— ). Sometimes, even though a 
model has a high R2, the estimate of the standard deviation of the model error will be too large to 
provide adequate precision for confidence and prediction intervals. A rule of thumb that we have 
found useful is to examine the range ± 2Se. If this range is acceptable from a practical viewpoint, the 
estimate of the standard deviation of the model error might be considered acceptable’.
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each regression model is within an acceptable range, although the researcher does 
not use the models for prediction in this study.
7.3.2.2.4 Discussion
While using GLS should reduce the impact of outliers, it might not remove the 
problem entirely. The existence of apparently contradictory results in Table (7.4) 
might be due to the influence of outliers, defined here as observations with large 
standardized residuals (equal to or more than 3 standard deviation), and/or 
observations whose values give them large influence59. In this section the researcher 
identifies the outliers for each model and drops them from the sample, then she 
applies GLS, with White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and 
covariance to the modified data for each model.
The results are presented in Table (7 .5). They show that dropping the outliers does 
not affect the relationships between the three disclosure indices and firm size, legal 
form, stock activity and the 1997 dummy in terms of the sign and significance of the 
coefficients, but it does affect the magnitude of the coefficients to some extent. 
Hence the negative sign of mandatory disclosure with size remains unexplained. 
Furthermore, the results show that public business sector companies disclose less 
information than private sector companies, irrespective of the type of disclosure. 
This could be due to the fact that public sector business companies mostly release
59 Leverage values provide information about whether an observation has unusual predictor values 
compared to the rest of the data. Observations with large leverage may exert considerable influence 
on the fitted value, and thus the regression model. Leverage values fall between 0 and 1. A leverage 
value greater than 2p/n or 3p/n, where p is the number of predictors plus the constant and n is the 
number of observations, is considered large and should be examined. Minitab identifies observations 
with leverage over 3p/n or 0.99; whichever is smaller, with an X in the table of unusual observations.
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Firm size: the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets; legal form: a 
dummy variable taking the value of one if the company is a public sector company 
and the value of zero otherwise; profitability: net income/book value of equity; 
gearing: total debt/ total assets; stock activity: measured by share’s trading days for 
six months prior to the financial year-end divided by total trading days; d l997: a 
dummy variable for year 1997; TINDEX: aggregate disclosure; VINDEX: voluntary 
disclosure; MINDEX: mandatory disclosure.
T able (7 .5 ) M ultip le regression  m o d els  after dropping the outliers
D ep en d en t variable: d isc losu re le v e ls
Variable name TINDEX VINDEX MINDEX
Constant 0.518
(25.556)**
-0.040
(-0 .522)
1.018
(27 .828)**
Size 0.014
(12.575)**
0.034
(8.432)**
-0.007
(-3 .370)**
Legal form -0.046
(-16.710)**
-0.107
(-10.482)**
-0.008
(-2 .445)*
Profitability 0.042
(3.901)**
0.107
(3.484)**
0.057
(4 .787)**
Gearing -0.002
(-0 .303)
-0.072
(-3.484)**
0.013
(1.496)
Stock activity 0.003
(0 .705)
-0.067
(-2.951)**
0.018
(2 .719)**
D 1997 -0.085
(-5.318)**
R 2 0.999 0.863 0.993
S. E. of regression 0.094 0.182 0.072
Observations 245 257 244
Notes: t-values in parentheses. White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariance and
GLS (cross-section weights). ** Significant at 1% level; * Significant at 5 % level. R 2: adjusted R 
squared.
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information in the fulfillment of the UAS rather than the CL or the CML that form
the disclosure index checklist of this research.
However, dropping the outliers does cause all the profitability coefficients to become 
significant and positive as previously expected. Moreover, dropping the outliers 
completely changes the results for the gearing ratio. Gearing now has no relationship 
with mandatory and aggregate disclosures as previously expected, but has a 
significant negative relationship with voluntary disclosures. So the higher the 
gearing ratio, the less likely the company is to disclose information voluntarily.
In brief, not surprisingly, the results show that the effect of firm characteristics on 
disclosure level depends on the type of disclosure. The results for legal form and 
stock activity are unique to the ESE as they are country related characteristics. 
Given the limited number of empirical disclosure studies conducted in the Egyptian 
market, these results could be seen as exploratory rather than definitive. The results 
for the remaining variables generally come in line with prior expectations except for 
the relationship between mandatory disclosure and firm size, which remains 
unexplained. Hence these results show some evidence on the validity of various 
disclosure indices used in the current research.
7.4 Concluding remarks
This chapter provides evidence on the reliability and validity of the three disclosure 
indices created to measure corporate disclosure level in the Egyptian context. 
Reliability is assessed via Cronbach’s alpha test for internal consistency. Coefficient 
alpha is calculated for each of the three indices: the mandatory disclosure index, the 
voluntary disclosure index and the aggregate disclosure index, which falls within the
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theoretical range of at least 0 .80. Hence the results suggest the reliability of the three 
disclosure indices as measures of corporate disclosure level.
The form of validity mainly assessed in the current study is construct validity. 
Construct validity is tested by regressing the proxies of disclosure level on some 
suggested determinants of disclosure levels with respect to the Egyptian settings. 
The results generally provide evidence on the validity of the three measures of 
disclosure level. In addition, results for the extent of financial disclosure show 
gradual increases in disclosure levels for listed non-financial companies over the 
period 1995 to 2002.
Once measures of disclosure level are created, the next job is to estimate both market 
beta and firm value in order to proceed in testing the current research hypotheses, 
which are covered in the chapters (8) and (9) respectively.
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Chapter (8) Disclosure level and market beta
8.1 Overview
This chapter contributes to the accounting literature by exploring the link between 
the extent of different types of disclosure and market beta in the Egyptian emerging 
capital market using panel data analysis.
A  review of the current literature shows a lack of empirical research with regard to 
the relationship between systematic risk and disclosure levels in general, and in 
emerging markets in particular. In addition, the conclusions drawn by the existing 
empirical literature generally rely on one set of estimated market betas, although the 
estimation of market beta could vary depending on a choice of various factors: data 
frequency (daily, weekly, monthly returns), measurement period, the market index 
used, the model used for estimation and the estimation technique. Therefore, 
drawing a conclusion regarding a relationship between market beta and disclosure 
level based on a sole measure of the estimated market beta might be misleading. To 
remove this potential problem, a contribution of this research is that market betas 
were estimated by using alternative approaches.
Market beta estimations were initially obtained by using daily returns over six 
months after the financial year-ends for the sample firms using the ordinary least 
squares market model and two alternative proxies for the market. Market betas were 
then obtained by using weekly returns over a moving five-year period of time using 
a more reliable proxy for the market via the pooled generalized least squares market 
model.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section (8.2) discusses market beta 
estimation. Data analysis including descriptive analysis, univariate analysis and
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multivariate analysis is covered in Section (8.3). Section (8.4) provides the 
concluding remarks and limitations of the analysis.
8.2 Market beta estimation
Market beta is a measure of the relative volatility of returns. If a stock returns moves 
up and down more radically than do the market returns, the stock is considered to be 
relatively more risky and will have a higher market beta. Within the framework of 
the capital asset pricing model, market beta is the sole variable that entirely affects 
the firm cost of capital, and hence its estimation must be accurate. However, in order 
to estimate a historical market beta60, one must make choices for some factors: data 
frequency, measurement period, market proxy, and the market model form and the 
estimation technique. Using different combinations of these factors could yield 
different market betas (see, for example, Harrington, 1983; and Arnold 2005). The 
current literature does not provide an optimal and definitive choice. Therefore, in 
order to get some confidence in the results, it was decided to estimate market beta 
using different combinations of these factors: different proxies for the market, 
different time intervals, different measurement periods, and different techniques. 
Given that missing data is a general problem in empirical studies conducted in
60 To estimate the market beta coefficient for each firm for each time period, the researcher computed 
both market returns and stock returns using the following equations:
Mrt = (Mt-MtJ/Mt.,
R  it =  (Pjt -  Pj(t-i))/ Pj(t-i)
Where,
Mrt . market return at time t,
Mt : market index at time t,
R jt. stock j return at time t
Pjt: closing price of stock j at time t,
182
emerging markets and in order to make use of all available information market betas 
have been estimated using two intervals: daily and weekly; two measurement 
periods: six months and five years; and different proxies for the market: total market 
index, public offering companies’ index, and case30 index. Moreover, two different 
techniques to estimate market beta using the simple market model61 are used: the 
ordinary least squares (OLS) market model and the pooled generalized least squares 
(GLS) market model. Hence two different estimations of market beta have been 
provided.
8.2.1 First estimation of market beta (using daily returns)
Daily returns over a measurement period of six months have been used to estimate 
market beta using two different proxies for the market: the public offering 
companies’ index (PBETA) and the total market index (TBETA). While using daily 
returns for estimating market beta is not an optimal choice of frequency, it has been 
used in order to exploit all the available information about the sample firms. Hence, 
results obtained using this proxy can be seen as suggestive or preliminary rather than 
conclusive, given that stricter criteria will be applied to the data in the subsequent 
subsection in order to get better estimation, which substantially reduces the sample 
size.
The criterion applied here to estimate market beta was the availability of at least 24 
trading days over the six months before and 24 trading days over the six months 
after the financial year-end. The six months period after the financial year-end is
61 The risk-premium version of the market model could not be used in this research, (Rjt_Rf t) = Oj + pj 
(Rmt - Rft) + ej , due to difficulties in obtaining a full range of data on the risk free rate (Rft) for the 
Egyptian market.
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believed to capture changes in stock prices in response to the revealed accounting 
information. Listed companies are required to reveal their annual reports within three 
months after the financial year-end. Actual practice, however, shows that companies 
did not strictly comply with this rule.
Organizing the data sets in the form of panel data using strict dates (the exact starting 
and ending dates for all shares in the final sample) to estimate market beta using 
daily returns results in an inability to run the analysis due to missing data. In other 
words, because the researcher was unable to estimate historical market betas using 
panel data sets in this case, she had to organize the data sets individually. More 
precisely, the researcher had to organize individual stocks’ returns and their 
contemporaneous market returns in individual Excel files. Then, using the equation 
insertion facility available from Microsoft Excel, she was able to estimate ex-ante 
and ex-post market beta coefficients for each stock for each period in the final 
sample via the OLS market model . Both ex-ante and ex-post market betas have 
been estimated in order to compute the relative change in market betas, which will 
be used in a separate model. This process required 1088 market beta estimations62 3.
62 The simple ordinary least squares market model:
Rjt = ajt + Pjt Rmt + Ujt
Where,
ajt, Pjt ; the intercept and slope of stock j (beta coefficient) at time t, respectively, of the linear 
relationship between Rjt and Rmt. Rjt: stock j return at time t; Rmt: market return at time t;
Ujt: the residual component of Rjt (the error term)
63 272 observations *2 (ex-ante and ex-post betas)*2 market proxies.
184
8.2.2 Second estimation of market beta (using weekly returns)
The previous estimation of market beta could lead to some problems. Firstly, using 
daily security prices in estimating market betas may have yielded unreliable market 
betas, since low price changes could yield return values that are equal to or close to 
zero, resulting in insignificant market beta estimations. Moreover, Fama (1970) 
found that daily security price changes exhibited positive autocorrelation, thereby 
violating ordinary least squares for the estimation of systematic risk.
Secondly, although prior studies do not provide a definitive measurement period, a 
five-year period of time is usually accepted as an appropriate measurement period 
(McLaney, 2003), hence the six-month period could be questioned.
Thirdly, the market index used to estimate market beta in the previous subsection 
might not be a good proxy for the market as it includes all public offering stocks 
weighted in relation to their issuance volume, although trading is concentrated on a 
considerably smaller number of shares. Since both the total market index and the 
public offering companies index face the same disadvantages, replacing one by the 
other will not solve the problem. More recently the CASE issued a new market index 
called ‘case 30 ’ , which is weighted by market capitalization adjusted by the free 
float (minimum 10%) and includes the top 30 companies in terms of liquidity and 
activity. Its starting date was January 1st 1998 with a value of 1000 on that day. 
Hence, this index might provide a better proxy for the market.
Therefore, in this subsection a different estimation of market beta is performed. The 
researcher estimates market beta using weekly prices over a five-year period of time 
using the case30 index as the proxy for the market. Weekly prices are used rather 
than monthly prices to incorporate as many observations as possible in order to get
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more reliable results. Moreover, mid-week prices (Tuesday prices) have been used to 
avoid any abnormal returns associated with the beginning or the end of the week 
(day of the week effect). The criterion applied here was the availability of at least 
100 observations over a moving five-year period of time (1995-1999, 1996-2000, 
1997-2001, and 1998-2002). The five-year measurement period takes into 
consideration six months after the financial year-end for each company included in 
the sample when estimating market betas. For example if the company has a 
December financial year-end, estimating market beta for 1999 will cover the period 
from 1st of January 1995 to 30th of June 2000.
Since stocks’ returns in this case have the same starting and ending date, and the 
minimum number of observations for estimating market betas in this case was quite 
large (100 observations), hence organizing the data sets (returns across shares and 
time) in the form of panel data was applicable. The method of estimation used was 
the pooled generalized least squares market model64. This particular model corrects 
for both heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation, hence yields more 
reliable estimations. EViews software estimates a feasible GLS specification 
correcting for both cross-section heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous 
correlation. Moreover, market betas that were significant at least at the 10% level of 
significance at least have been elicited and introduced to the subsequent analysis in 
order to ensure using reliable market betas.
64 Seemingly Unrelated Regression-GLS using estimated cross-section residual covariance matrix.
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Table (8.1) shows how market beta and the control variables are measured under the 
two specifications of the model. Tables (8.2.1 and 8 .2 .2) provide common sample 
descriptive analysis under the different specifications of the model. Market beta, 
measured using the total market index, is on average equal to one, which implies a 
diversifiable sample. However, this suggestion is no longer valid under the other 
indices: public offering companies’ index (PBETA) and case30 index (CASE), 
where market betas are on average less than one. The tables (8.2.1 and 8 .2.2) also 
cover the descriptive analysis of the control variables measured over a one- year 
period of time and as a moving average over a five -year period of time.
The descriptive analysis for both explanatory and dependent variables under the 
different specifications of the model shows superior results for the second 
specification of the model, which includes case30, in terms of minimum trading 
volume, skewness and kurtosis of the variables. It is worth noting that the second 
specification of the model also limits the analysis to heavily traded shares (average 
trading days 90%) with a minimum trading volume of 4780 (2595) shares during the 
six months after (before) publishing the annual reports. This in turn means that while 
thin trading might affect the results for the Erst specification of the model, this 
problem is removed under the second specification of the model. Thereby the results 
to be obtained under the second specification of the model should be more reliable 
than that to be obtained under the first specification of the model.
8.3 Data analysis
8.3.1 Descriptive analysis
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T able (8 .1 ) V ariab les m easurem ent
Variable name Measurement over six months Measurement over five-year
Market beta The OLS market model based 
on daily returns
The pooled GLS market model 
based on weekly returns
Payout Dividends per share divided by 
earnings per share
The moving average of total 
dividends divided by the 
moving average of net income
Asset growth In (assets/assets(-l)) ln(moving average of total 
assets/moving average of total 
assets (-1))
Gearing Long-term debt divided by 
book value of equity at 
financial year-end
The moving average of long­
term debt divided by the 
moving average of book value 
of equity at year-end
Liquidity Current assets divided by 
current liabilities.
The moving average of current 
assets divided by the moving 
average of current liabilities.
Earnings growth (EPS -EPS (-1 ))/|EPS (-1)| (e p s <5)-e p s (1))/|e p s (I)|
Asset size The natural logarithm of book 
value of total assets at the 
financial year-end
The natural logarithm of the 
moving average of book value 
of total assets for five years 
period of time
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Number of observations: 220
VOLAF: trading volume for six months after the financial year-end. VOLMBE: 
trading volume for six months before the financial year-end. Note that share trading 
volume is measured as the median trading volume over six months. NOTDA: stock 
activity for six month after the financial year-end. NOTDB: stock activity for six 
months before the financial year-end. Stock activity is measured as the ratio of the 
number of trading days for a share to total trading days over six months; TINDEX: 
aggregate disclosure; VINDEX: voluntary disclosure; MINDEX: mandatory 
disclosure.
T able (8 .2 .1 ) D escr ip tiv e  an a lysis- com m on  sam ple for the first sp ecifica tion  o f  the
m od el
Variable name Mean Med. Max. Min. Skewness Kurtosis
VOLAF 402557 42858 33886717 569 14 193
VOLMBE 305061 47599 11496998 289 9 104
NOTDA 0.813 0.937 1.000 0.186 -1.124 3.013
NOTDB 0.820 0.941 1.000 0.228 -1.138 2.958
Payout 2.796 0.665 398.671 0.000 13.915 199.882
Asset growth 0.042 0.026 0.814 -0.709 1.317 11.522
Gearing 0.416 0.095 14.187 0.000 7.864 71.737
Liquidity 1.498 1.250 32.600 0.577 13.616 195.923
Earnings growth 0.247 0.015 18.479 -2.500 7.367 60.119
Asset size 19.670 19.541 22.525 16.976 0.232 2.885
TINDEX 0.764 0.787 0.947 0.356 -1.282 4.646
MINDEX 0.910 0.939 1.000 0.542 -1.862 7.038
VINDEX 0.486 0.520 0.846 0.000 -0.525 2.574
Market beta (traded-daily) 0.550 0.675 4.525 -25.307 -11.294 154.272
Market beta (total-daily) 1.131 1.297 8.229 -37.184 -10.256 136.808
A Market beta (traded) 0.455 0.012 69.291 -24.256 5.619 56.683
A Market beta (total) 0.459 0.049 24.585 -20.728 1.983 32.508
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Number of observation: 43
VOLAF: trading volume for six months after the financial year-end. VOLMBE: 
trading volume for six months before the financial year-end. Note that share trading 
volume is measured as the median trading volume over six months. NOTDA: stock 
activity for six month after the financial year-end. NOTDB: stock activity for six 
months before the financial year-end. Stock activity is measured as the ratio of the 
number of trading days for a share to total trading days over six months; TINDEX: 
aggregate disclosure; VINDEX: voluntary disclosure; MINDEX: mandatory 
disclosure.
T able (8 .2 .2 )  D escr ip tiv e  analysis- co m m o n  sam ple for the secon d  sp ec ifica tio n  o f
the m od el
Variable name Mean Med. Max. Min. Skewness Kurtosis
VOLAF 221626 37908 3980728 4780 4.777 26.011
VOLBE 218623 35777 2829886 2595 3.673 17.599
NOTDA 0.908 0.961 1.000 0.378 -2.325 9.369
NOTDB 0.892 0.959 1.000 0.437 -1.719 4.922
Payout 0.630 0.685 0.863 0.057 -1.670 6.240
Asset growth 0.036 0.014 0.335 -0.148 1.066 5.043
Gearing 0.285 0.127 0.852 0.000 0.772 1.983
Liquidity 1.260 1.159 2.591 0.715 1.640 5.486
Earnings growth -0.122 -0.268 0.914 -0.969 0.525 2.221
Asset size 19.751 19.531 22.045 17.894 0.452 2.746
TINDEX 0.808 0.827 0.907 0.562 -1.323 5.020
MINDEX 0.944 0.958 1.000 0.771 -1.232 4.433
VINDEX 0.549 0.560 0.769 0.160 -0.629 2.946
Market beta (case30-weekly) 0.505 0.518 1.052 0.162 0.492 3.122
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The normality hypothesis is rejected for almost all the variables; therefore, a 
nonparametric correlation test is used to calculate the correlation coefficients. The 
Spearman cross- product correlation matrix for the correlations among different 
proxies of disclosure level and market betas is presented in Table (8.3).
The correlation between mandatory disclosure and any proxy of estimated market 
beta is negative as expected, but significant only with estimated market betas using 
weekly returns. Voluntary disclosure shows negative and positive correlations with 
different measures of market beta, however they are not significant. The correlations 
between aggregate disclosure level and estimated market betas are positive but not 
significant using daily returns. However the correlations between aggregate 
disclosure level and estimated market betas are significantly negative using weekly 
returns except for Market beta (total). In brief mandatory disclosure shows superior 
correlation with market beta over that of both voluntary disclosure and aggregate 
disclosure. This preliminary result shows that both type of disclosure and market 
beta estimation are critical to the implication of disclosure level for market beta, 
which support the arguments of this research.
The correlations among different proxies of disclosure level are significantly 
positive, with the highest correlation being between aggregate disclosure level and 
voluntary disclosure level (0.90), and (0.84) with mandatory disclosure level. This 
result will not affect the analysis, as the aggregate disclosure variable will not be 
incorporated with any other measure of disclosure level in a single model. The
8.3.2 Univariate analysis
191
T able (8 .3 ) T he Spearm an cross-product correlation m atrix
Beta Beta A beta Abeta Beta Beta
TINDEX MINDEX VINDEX (Total-daily) (Traded-daily) (Total) (Traded) (Case30) (Total-weekly)
MINDEX 0.839**
(0.000)
VINDEX 0.900** 0.554**
(0.000) (0.000)
Beta (total-daily) 0.040 -0.038 0.079
(0.254) (0.268) (0.098)
Beta (traded-daily) 0.018 -0.054 0.058 0.944**
(0.387) (0.187) (0.172) (0.000)
A beta (total) -0.044 -0.066 0.001 0.441**
(0.237) (0.138) (0.492) (0.000) (0.000)
A beta (traded) -0.051 -0.067 -0.014 0.415** 0.450** 0.776**
(0.201) (0.137) (0.410) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Beta (case30-weekly) -0.205* -0.352** - 0.111 0.568** 0.183 0.125
(0.036) (0.001) (0.166) (0.000) (0.000) (0.054) (0.138)
Beta (total-weekly) -0.118 -0.210* -0.065 0.479** 0.461** 0.021 0.124 0.803**
(0.105) (0.012) (0.244) (0.000) (0.000) (0.412) (0.093) (0.000)
Beta (traded- weekly) -0.154* -0.260** -0.087 0.492** 0.486** - 0.011 0.109 0.830** 0.954**
(0.053) (0.003) (0.181) (0.000) (0.000) (0.453) (0.127) (0.000) (0.000)
Numbers in parentheses are probabilities of significance. **Correlation is significant at the 1% level (1-tailed); *Correlation is significant at the 5 %  level (1-tailed).
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Estimated market betas using daily returns are highly correlated, and estimated 
market betas using weekly returns are highly correlated as well. However, estimated 
market betas using daily returns and estimated market betas using weekly returns are 
less correlated in terms of the magnitude of the correlation coefficients, which could 
indicate that both groups of market beta estimations (daily and weekly) capture 
different factors. The results of significant correlations among estimated market 
betas using different approaches could provide evidence of the reliability of 
estimated market betas.
To test for potential collinearity problems among explanatory variables, the variance 
inflation factor (VIF) and tolerance coefficients are computed for each explanatory 
variable for the different multiple regression models used in this research. The 
highest VIF value was 1.9 and the lowest tolerance coefficient was 0.53 in models 
including both mandatory and voluntary disclosures, which means that collinearity is 
not a problem in these models.
8.3.3 Multivariate analysis
The results for the multiple regression models are estimated using the pooled- 
generalized least squares (GLS) model, with White heteroskedasticity-consistent 
standard errors and covariance.
Each model is estimated with four different sets of control variables, depending on
the inclusion or exclusion of mandatory or voluntary disclosure levels in the model
specification: set (1) excludes both mandatory and voluntary disclosure levels; set
(2) includes both mandatory and voluntary disclosure levels; set (3) includes the
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correlation b etw een  voluntary d isclosu re le v e l and m andatory d isc lo su re  le v e l is
(0 .5 5 ), h en ce  potentia l co llinearity  am on g the explanatory variables w ill  b e  tested .
mandatory disclosure level but not the voluntary disclosure level; and set (4) 
includes the voluntary disclosure level but not the mandatory disclosure level.
Contrary to general expectations, the results for asset size are found to be positive 
and highly significant in all models (Tables (8.4), (8.5) and (8.6)). Prior studies such 
as Bildersee (1975), Farrelly, Ferris and Reichenstein (1985) and Capstaff (1991; 
1992) found no association between market beta and asset size. Beaver, Kettler and 
Scholes (1970) found no association between market beta and asset size in the 
regression equation, and eventually they excluded it along with other variables 
(gearing and liquidity) from the regression analysis because including them had led 
the standard error of the estimation to increase. Within the context of the Egyptian 
market, one possible explanation for this result is that asset size might be a surrogate 
of financial gearing since a significant positive correlation between asset size and 
gearing has been confirmed at less than the 1% level of significance. Moreover, asset 
size could proxy for operating gearing, since a significant positive correlation 
(0.412) between asset size and the ratio of fixed assets to total book value of assets is 
confirmed at the 1% level of significance in results not presented here. Large 
companies in terms of asset size might have a higher burden of fixed costs compared 
to variable costs (for example depreciation and maintenance expenses) that should be 
met irrespective of their level of sales, which in turn would cause returns to 
shareholders to be sensitive to changes in companies’ level of sales.
The results for the multiple regression models are presented in Table (8.4). They 
show a significant negative relationship between estimated market beta (using daily 
returns) and individual measures of disclosure level. When incorporating both 
mandatory and voluntary disclosures in the same model, the relationship between
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T ab le  (8 .4 ) T he im pact o f  d isc losu re le v e l upon  estim ated  m arket betas.
D ep en d en t variable: m arket betas (d a ily  prices); Sam ple: 2 2 0  ob servation s.
f i : estimated market beta using the simple OLS market model; payout: dividends 
per share divided by earnings per share; asset growth: In (assets/assets(-l)); gearing: 
long-term debt divided by book value of equity at financial year-end; liquidity: 
current assets divided by current liabilities; earnings growth: the relative change in 
EPS, and is equal to (EPS -EPS (-1))/|EPS (-1)|; asset size: the natural logarithm of 
book value of total assets at the financial year-end; disclosure levels: aggregate 
disclosure level; mandatory disclosure level; and voluntary disclosure level 
respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant -3.743** -3.539** -3.586** -3.432** -3.899**
(-52.030) (-36.476) (-15.954) (-20.289) (-58.258)
Payout -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
(-0.320) (-0.300) (-0.302) (-0.282) (-0.324)
Asset growth -2.517** -3.051** -2.886** -3.057** -2.858**
(-30.564) (-52.640) (-38.322) (-47.262) (-42.440)
Gearing 0.021 -0.028* 0.025* 0.030** 0.021*
(1.572) (-2.361) (2.001) (2.493) (1.704)
Liquidity 0.047** 0.049** 0.047** 0.043** 0.046**
(5.295) (5.479) (5.450) (5.243) (5.564)
Earnings growth 0.001 - 0.001 0.000 -0.002 0.002
(0.145) (-0.180) (0.045) (-0.311) (0.339)
Assets size 0.220** 0.227** 0.227** 0.223** 0.233**
(54.998) (59.550) (33.297) (47.654) (53.478)
Aggregate disclosure -0.395*
(-4.323)
Mandatory disclosure -0.217 -0.352**
(-1.550) (-2.974)
Voluntary disclosure -0.121 -0.172**
(-1.640) (-3.104)
Weighted statistics: R 2 0.999 0.765 0.815 0.755 0.894
S. E. of regression 1.679 1.726 1.716 1.729 1.708
Un-weighted St. R 2 0.089 0.092 0.087 0.091 0.092
S. E. of regression 1.821 1.818 1.823 1.819 1.818
Notes: t-values in parentheses. White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariance and
G L S  (cross-section  w eights); * *  S ign ifican t at 1% level; S ign ifican t at 5 % level. R  2 : adjusted  R
squared.
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disclosure levels and estimated market beta are negative but not significant. The sign 
of the control variables are in the expected directions. Liquidity is found to have 
significant positive associations with estimated market beta. Earnings growth has no 
relationship with estimated market beta.
Replicating the analysis (results not reported here) using an estimation of market 
beta based on another market index (total index) generally yields similar results for 
the voluntary disclosure model. However the results for the rest of the disclosure 
models are different. The relationship between mandatory disclosure and estimated 
market beta is significantly positive, which contradicts the research hypothesis. 
Consequently the relationship between estimated market beta and aggregate 
disclosure is negative but not significant. The results for some explanatory variables 
have changed as well. The payout ratio has no relationship with estimated market 
beta in all models. Gearing has a significant negative association with estimated 
market beta in all models. Earnings growth has a significant negative association 
with estimated market beta in all models as expected. These results could be due to 
the fact that the proxy for the market used this time is less reliable because it 
includes all listed stocks (public offering and closed companies) weighted in relation 
to their issuance volume, although trading is concentrated in a considerably smaller 
number of shares (Mecagni and Sourial, 1999: 7-8), while the original index (public 
offering companies index) is limited to public offering companies only.
To test for the sensitivity of these results the analysis is replicated using the relative 
change in market betas as the dependent variable. The relative change in market 
betas is measured as (ex-post market beta (ji)- ex-ante market beta Qi))/(ex-ante market 
beta (ji)). The results for the new multiple regression models are presented in Table
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(8.5). The results show that almost all the controls are in the expected direction 
except for gearing, which has significant and not significant negative associations 
with the relative changes in estimated market betas. The results hold for voluntary 
disclosure level, where significant negative relationships with relative change in 
market betas are confirmed. Contrary to our expectations, the results for both 
aggregate and mandatory disclosures are significantly positive.
Replicating the analysis (results not reported here) using an estimation of a firm’s 
market beta based on the total market index shows significant negative associations 
between the relative change in estimated market beta and individual measures of 
disclosure levels. The association between the relative change in estimated market 
beta and voluntary disclosure level is positive but not significant in the model 
incorporating both mandatory and voluntary disclosures. The results for the 
explanatory variables are significant and are in the expected direction. Asset size has 
significant negative associations with relative change in estimated market beta. 
Payout ratio has no association with the relative change in estimated market beta.
The results so far show a negative relationship between voluntary disclosure level 
and estimated market beta using daily returns. The results for mandatory disclosure 
and aggregate disclosure depend on the proxy of the market used to estimate market 
beta. These results could be seen as more descriptive since market beta estimation 
faces some potential problems as explained earlier. Therefore, new multiple 
regression models were run using the alternative estimation of market betas (using 
weekly returns) using the case30 as a proxy for the market. The results are presented 
in Table (8.6).
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Dependent variable: relative changes in market betas (daily prices); Sample: 220 
observations
T ab le  (8 .5 ) T h e im pact o f  d isc losu re le v e l upon  relative ch an ges in  estim ated  m arket
betas.
A f t : relative change in estimated market beta using the simple OLS market model ; 
dividend payout: dividends per share divided by earnings per share; asset growth: In 
(assets/assets(-l); gearing: long-term debt divided by book value of equity at 
financial year-end; liquidity: current assets divided by current liabilities; earnings 
growth: the relative change in EPS, and is equal to (EPS -EPS (-1))/|EPS (-1)|; asset 
size: the natural logarithm of book value of total assets at the financial year-end; 
disclosure levels: aggregate disclosure level; mandatory disclosure level; and 
voluntary disclosure level respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant -11.576** -12.255** -9.102** -12.433** -9.784**
(-93.874) (-102.623) (-51.270) (-117.534) (-70.332)
Payout -0.005* -0.006** -0.006** -0.006** -0.006**
(-2.107) (-2.379) (-2.493) (-2.589) (-2.352)
Asset growth -1.176** -0.939** -0.397* -0.540** -0.974**
(-6.773) (-5.104) (-2.213) (-2.848) (-5.671)
Gearing -0.025* -0.018 -0.019 - 0.011 -0.031**
(-1.732) (-1.250) (-1.661) (-0.799) (-2.404)
Liquidity -0.014** -0.024** -0.026** -0.027** -0.013**
(-2.717) (-7.212) (-13.836) (-14.319) (-3.533)
Earnings growth -0.046** -0.037* 0.11 -0.016 -0.020
(2.719) (-2.247) (0.837) (-1.018) (-1.350)
Assets size 0.602** 0.595** 0.439** 0.531** 0.533**
(84.478) (74.185) (48.979) (61.160) (70.568)
Aggregate disclosure 1.011* *
(7.123)
Mandatory disclosure 1.130** 2.338**
(11.371) (24.355)
Voluntary disclosure -0.898** -0.965**
(-11.171) (-11.336)
Weighted st. R 2 0.754 0.800 0.710 0.800 0.599
S. E. of regression 6.117 6.103 5.763 5.916 5.973
Un-weighted st. R 2 -0.013 -0.020 -0.029 -0.023 -0.020
S. E. of regression 6.982 7.003 7.033 7.016 7.003
Notes: t-values in parentheses. White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariance and
G L S  (cross-section  w eights); * *  S ign ifican t at 1%  level; S ign ifican t at 5%  level. R 2 : ad ju sted  R
squared.
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T ab le  (8 .6 ) T he im pact o f  d isc losu re le v e ls  up on  estim ated  m arket betas.
D ep en d en t variable: m arket betas (w eek ly  p rices)
f t : estimated market beta using the pooled GLS market model based on weekly 
returns; payout: the moving average of total dividends divided by the moving 
average of net income; asset growth: ln(moving average of total assets/moving 
average of total assets (-1)), gearing: the moving average of long-term debt divided 
by the moving average of book value of equity at year-end, liquidity: the moving 
average of current assets divided by the moving average of current liabilities; 
earnings growth: the relative change in EPS, and is equal to (EPS (5)-EPS (i))/|EPS
(i)|; asset size: the natural logarithm of the moving average of book value of total 
assets for five years period of time; disclosure levels: aggregate disclosure level; 
mandatory disclosure level; and voluntary disclosure level respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant -0.411* -0.628** 0.172 -0.037 -0.868**
(-1.760) (-4.118) (0.766) (-0.222) (-6.313)
Payout -0.154** -0.189** -0.192** -0.195** -0.206**
(-8.754) (-7.515) (-7.457) (-8.083) (-7.122)
Asset growth -0.289* -0.460** -0.502** -0.475** -0.502**
(-2.370) (-3.100) (-3.720) (-3.500) (-3.714)
Gearing -0.047 -0.042 -0.050* -0.083* -0.033
(-1.167) (-1.370) (-1.791) (-1.938) (-0.953)
Liquidity -0.112** -0.121** -0.131** -0.126** -0.125**
(-8.669) (-20.962) (-18.209) (-22.921) (-16.356)
Earnings growth -0.190** -0.182** -0.142** -0.152** -0.191**
(-13.638) (-10.967) (-9.687) (-10.154) (-11.155)
Assets size 0.059** 0.085** 0.071** 0.074** 0.086**
(4.840) (12.354) (10.638) (11.793) (12.591)
Aggregate disclosure -0.320**
(-6.702)
Mandatory disclosure -0.848** -0.650**
(-5.392) (-8.684)
Voluntary disclosure 0.086 -0.063*
(1.491) (-1.705)
Weighted st. R 2 0.951 0.993 0.999 0.999 0.989
S. E. of regression 0.141 0.127 0.121 0.121 0.132
Un-weighted st. R 2 0.406 0.514 0.484 0.508 0.517
S. E. of regression 0.169 0.148 0.153 0.149 0.148
N 48 43 43 43 43
Notes: t-values in parentheses. White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariance and
G L S  (cross-section  w eights); * *  S ign ifican t at 1% level ; *S ig n ifican t at 5%  level. R  2 \ ad justed  R
squared.
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Using the case30 index as the market proxy in the analysis yields negative and 
significant relationships between estimated market betas and individual measures of 
disclosure level. The model, which includes both mandatory and voluntary 
disclosure levels, shows a significant negative association between estimated market 
beta and mandatory disclosure and a positive but not significant association between 
estimated market beta and voluntary disclosure. The results for the controls are all 
significant and in line with expectations except for gearing where significant and not 
significant negative associations with estimated market beta are shown.
The improved coefficients of adjusted R2 and the standard error of the regression for 
both weighted and un-weighted statistics after introducing a proxy (s) of disclosure 
level into the multiple regression models confirm the superiority of these models 
over those discussed earlier, and the incremental effect of disclosure level upon 
estimated market beta. These results show general support for the research 
hypothesis of a negative association between disclosure level and estimated market 
beta.
Replicating the analysis (results not reported here) using the public offering 
companies index as a proxy for the market yields significant positive relationships 
between estimated market beta and different measures of disclosure level, which 
contradict the stated hypothesis. Moreover, replicating the analysis (results not 
reported here) using the total market index as a proxy for the market shows a 
significant positive association between estimated market betas and both aggregate 
and mandatory disclosures, and no relationship with voluntary disclosure. The 
results for the other explanatory variables are similar to those obtained earlier.
2 0 0
In conclusion, the results so far show some evidence of negative associations 
between different measures of disclosure level and estimated market betas, which 
confirm prior expectations that companies with higher levels of disclosure are 
perceived as less risky in terms of systematic risk. However, the results also show 
that the relationship between disclosure level and estimated market beta is sensitive 
to the proxy for the market used in estimating market beta, since different signs of 
such relationship are confirmed using different proxies for the market under the 
same technique of estimating market beta and model specification. Furthermore the 
results are also sensitive to the specification of the model since contradictory results 
are confirmed using the same proxy for the market (public offering companies index 
or the total market index) under different specifications of the model. Table (8.7) 
provides a summary of the relationships between the extent of different types of 
disclosure and different estimations of market beta.
Finally, as the sample consists of firms with different fiscal year-ends: firms with 
June fiscal year-ends (206 observations) and firms with December fiscal year-ends 
(66 observations), a retest of the multiple-regression models using the smaller 
sample of firms (Fama and French, 1992) is carried out. The results (not reported) 
show negative relationships between disclosure levels and estimated market betas 
using the case30 index as a proxy for the market. However, the researcher was only 
able to control for firm size as the inclusion of more than one control variable led to 
a serious reduction in the number of observations (8 observations), which limited 
any further analysis.
Moreover, prior studies such as Debreceny, Gray and Rahman (2002) and Marston 
and Polei (2004) investigate the possibility that risky firms in terms of higher market
2 0 1
Table (8.7) Summary of the results
Market index used Voluntary disclosure Mandatory disclosure Aggregate
disclosure
First specification of the model
Market beta 
(traded-daily)
Market beta (total- 
daily)
+* No
A Market beta 
(traded)
A Market beta 
(total)
_* _**
Second specification of the model
Market beta 
(traded- weekly)
Market beta (total­
weekly)
No +* +*
Market beta 
(case30-weekly)
_*
-/+ The relationship between disclosure level and estimated market beta 
** Significant at 1% level 
* Significant at 5% level
2 0 2
beta would increase (decrease) the amount of financial information released to the 
public on the Internet. In other words, they investigate the impact of estimated 
market beta on disclosure. Although, both of them found that market beta does not 
affect financial reporting practice on the Internet, these studies raise a question about 
the direction of the relationship between market beta and disclosure quantity or 
quality (potential endogenity). The researcher has tried to test whether market beta 
and disclosure level are endogenous variables, but due to missing data she was 
unable to do so. Therefore, this issue should be addressed in future research.
8.4 Concluding remarks
In this chapter the relationship between disclosure levels and market beta as a proxy 
of estimation risk for the Egyptian emerging capital market has been investigated. 
Because market beta estimation is subject to a choice of some factors: data 
frequency, measurement period, the proxy of the market, and the form of the market 
model used for estimation, it was decided to estimate market betas using different 
combinations of these factors as a robustness check. The criterion was that if 
approximately similar results are obtained, then one could have some confidence in 
these results. Moreover two techniques to estimate market beta have been used: the 
traditional OLS market model and pooled GLS market model (returns across time 
and securities).
Results based on two different specifications of the model and two different market 
indexes65: market beta (traded-daily) and market beta (case30-weekly) generally 
show a significant negative association between individual measures of disclosure
65 Because the analysis here suggests that these two market indexes could be seen as more reliable 
than their alternatives under each specification of the models.
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levels and estimated market betas, which mean that companies with higher levels of 
disclosure are perceived as less risky. However, these results are sensitive to the 
proxy of the market used to estimate market beta and the specification of the model. 
Even though using a panel data set should provide a large number of observations, 
few observations were available, particularly when estimating market beta over a 
five- year period of time (48 observations), which could limit the ability to 
generalize these results.
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Chapter (9) Disclosure level and firm value
9.1 Overview
This chapter contributes to the literature in financial reporting and capital markets by 
investigating the direct association between different types of disclosure level and 
firm value in the Egyptian emerging capital market using panel data analysis.
A  review of the literature shows that more disclosure will increase firm value by 
reducing the firm cost of capital and/or increasing pure cash flow accruing to 
shareholders by reducing agency costs. However there is lack of direct empirical 
evidence of such a relationship between disclosure level and firm value in general, 
and in emerging capital markets in particular. Hence, the research hypothesis has 
been stated to test for such a relationship in the Egyptian market. Two proxies for 
firm value, namely: Tobin’s q ratio and market to book ratio, derived from the 
literature have been used in order to check the robustness of the results.
The rest of this chapter is stmctured as follows. Section (9.2) discusses firm value 
estimation. Section (9.3) provides data analysis. Finally, the main results are 
highlighted in Section (9.4).
9.2 Firm value estimation
In this study, two proxies for firm value are used in order to check the robustness of 
the results. These proxies are Tobin’s q ratio and market equity to book equity ratio. 
Lewellen and Badrinath (1997: 77-78) define the q ratio for a firm as “ the ratio of 
the market value of the outstanding financial claims on the firm to the current 
replacement cost of the firm’s assets. The notion is that replacement cost is a logical 
measure of the alternative-use value of the assets. Hence, unless assets are used by a 
firm so as to create at least as much market value as the cost of reproducing them the
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Tobin’s q ratio is widely used as a proxy for firm value in prior studies (see, for 
example, Lang, Lins and Miller, 2003; Lins, 2003; and Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz, 
2004). In this research, the q ratio for a firm is measured as the book value of total 
assets less the book value of equity plus the market value of equity in the numerator, 
and the book value of total assets in the denominator, following the approach used 
by Lang, Lins and Miller (2003) and Lins (2003). The reason for not using 
replacement cost is that it is not readily available in Egyptian companies’ annual 
reports and calculating it is not straightforward and will carry the possibility of 
measurement biases66.
The market value of equity is measured as the number of outstanding shares derived 
from companies’ annual reports times the average share price for six months after 
the financial year-end. The six months period after the financial year-end is believed 
to capture changes in stock prices in response to the revealed accounting 
information.
However, this measurement of q ratio could carry the possibility of measurement 
errors, since it depends on the book value of total assets in the denominator, which 
could be significantly different from its current values, in particular for inventory 
and fixed assets, in case of significant inflation. Moreover, given that different 
accounting policies could be adopted among different companies to account for book
66 For more detail about different approaches in estimating replacement costs to calculate q ratio and 
possible measurement biases see Lewellen and Badrinath (1997).
assets w o u ld  b e  better em p lo y ed  e lsew h ere ’. I f  q ratio is  larger than on e, it im p lie s
that the com p an y  u ses its resources e ffe c tiv e ly .
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value of total assets, this could distort the comparison among different companies. 
These deficiencies should be taken into considerations when drawing conclusions 
using the q ratio.
The market to book ratio (MTBR) is used as a measure of firm value in recent 
studies (Lins, 2003). Fama and French (1992) find that the logarithm of book-to- 
market ratio (which is mathematically equal to -ln(MTBR) and give similar 
regression results but with negative signs) is more powerful in terms of the 
magnitude and the significance of the relationship than the logarithm of market value 
of equity (as a measure of firm size) in explaining average returns. Moreover, Berk 
(1995:284) stated that: “The logarithm of the ratio of book equity to market equity 
is, in principle, a better measure of the continuously compounded expected return 
than is the logarithm of market equity alone” . Hence, this research uses market to 
book ratio as a proxy of firm value for a robustness check. It is measured as the 
market value of equity to the book value of equity at year-end
9.3 Data analysis
9.3.1 Descriptive analysis
Table (9.1) provides the descriptive analysis for all variables included in the research 
model. The market value of equity is measured as the number of outstanding shares 
at the financial year-end derived from companies’ annual reports times average and 
median share prices for six months after the financial year-end to ensure that these 
prices capture accounting information revealed at the financial year-end. Hence two 
measures for both Tobin’s q ratio and the market to book ratio are revealed. Firm 67
67 Since the average of share prices for six months could be affected by extreme prices (for example 
very high or very low prices), the median of share prices for six months is used as well.
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AMTBR (MMTBR): the ratio of the market value of equity to book value of equity 
at year-end, where market value of equity: number of outstanding shares times the 
average (median) of closing prices for six months after the fiscal year-end; ATQR 
(MTQR): Tobin’s Q ratio, measured as total assets less book value of equity plus 
market value of equity in the numerator and total assets in the denominator, where 
market value of equity: number of outstanding shares times the average (median) of 
closing prices for six months after the fiscal year-end; Size: natural logarithm of 
market value of equity at year-end, profit: the ratio of net income to book value of 
equity; gearing: the natural logarithm of the ratio long-term debt to book value of 
equity; growth: the natural logarithm of the ratio of sales in the current year divided 
by sales in the previous year (In (sales/sales(-l)); MINDEX: the mandatory 
disclosure level; VINDEX: voluntary disclosure level; TINDEX: aggregate 
disclosure level.
T able (9 .1 ) D escr ip tive  an alysis- in d ivid ual sam ples
Mean Med. Max. Min. Skewness Kurtosis N
AMTBR 2.606 1.562 34.665 0.094 4.777 33.128 272
MMTBR 2.645 1.534 35.198 0.094 4.898 33.382 272
ATQR 1.473 1.202 13.897 0.337 6.479 62.200 272
MTQR 1.495 1.192 16.561 0.338 7.489 76.008 272
Ln(TQR) 0.256 0.184 2.632 -1.086 1.206 6.608 272
Ln(MTBR) 0.487 0.446 3.546 -2.362 0.312 3.505 272
Size 19.641 19.541 22.525 16.839 0.175 2.966 351
Profit 0.270 0.255 1.399 -0.910 0.111 10.249 337
Gearing -1.885 -1.649 4.026 -7.335 -0.474 3.416 289
Growth -0.008 0.027 2.361 -2.964 -1.146 18.837 258
MINDEX 0.897 0.918 1.000 0.438 -1.823 6.651 272
VINDEX 0.482 0.520 0.846 0.000 -0.493 2.498 272
TINDEX 0.754 0.781 0.947 0.356 -1.251 4.405 272
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All measures of firm values show high skweness and kurtosis. Therefore a logarithm 
transformation was undertaken to lessen the influence of extreme values and to bring 
the distributions of these variables as well as other variables such as size and gearing 
close to normality. It is worth noting that the logarithm transformation did not work 
for the proxy for profitability. Furthermore, since the descriptive analysis shown in 
Table (9.1) does not indicate a big difference for both measures of firm value under 
the different measures of shares’ prices (average prices or median prices), the 
subsequent analysis will use average prices only.
9.3.2 Univariate analysis
Since the normality hypothesis is rejected for the majority of variables, a non- 
parametric correlation test is used to test for the correlation between firm value and 
disclosure levels and to check whether collinearity is a potential problem. The 
Spearman cross-product correlation matrix is presented in Table (9.2). It shows the 
correlation between different proxies for firm value and disclosure level as well as 
the correlations among the explanatory variables. Different measures of firm value 
are highly correlated which might indicate the reliability of these measures. Contrary 
to expectations, different types of disclosure have no association with different 
measures of firm value. Consistent with prior expectations, the rest of the 
explanatory variables are significantly positively correlated with different measures 
of firm value except for gearing where no correlations with firm value are shown.
va lu e is on  average equal to 2 .6  and 1.5 m easured b y  m arket to b o o k  ratio and
T o b in ’s q ratio resp ective ly . B oth  are m ore than unity, w h ich  th eoretica lly  m igh t
im p ly  that com p an y  resources h ave  b een  e ffe c tiv e ly  u sed  in  the E gyptian  m arket.
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MTBR: the natural logarithm the ratio of the market value of equity to book value 
of equity at year-end; TQR: the natural logarithm of Tobin’s Q ratio, measured as 
total assets less book value of equity plus market value of equity in the numerator 
and total assets in the denominator; Size: natural logarithm of market value of equity 
at year-end, profit: the ratio of net income to book value of equity; gearing: the 
natural logarithm of the ratio long-term debt to book value of equity; growth: the 
natural logarithm of the ratio of sales in the current year divided by sales in the 
previous year (In (sales/sales(-l)); MINDEX: the mandatory disclosure level; 
VINDEX: voluntary disclosure level; TINDEX: aggregate disclosure level.
T able (9 .2 ) Spearm an’s correlation co e ffic ien ts
TQR MTBR Size Profit Gearing Growth MINDEX VINDEX
MTBR 0.959**
(0.000)
Size 0.142* 0.181**
(0.019) (0.003)
Profit 0.702** 0.750** 0.095
(0.000) (0.000) (0.081)
Gearing -0.090 -0.056 0.245** -0.083
(0.184) (0.406) (0.000) (0.168)
Growth 0.228** 0.223** 0.067 0.199**-0.019
(0.000) (0.001) (0.287) (0.001) (0.780)
MINDEX -0.116 -0.091 -0.124* 0.055 -0.084 -0.167**
(0.056) (0.136) (0.041) (0.372) (0.211) (0.010)
VINDEX -0.081 -0.056 0.087 0.002 0.050 -0.200**0.554**
(0.183) (0.356) (0.151) (0.974) (0.462) (0.002) (0.000)
TINDEX -0.105 -0.072 0.011 0.041 -0.007 -0.218**0.839** 0.900**
(0.085) (0.235) (0.855) (0.511) (0.912) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Numbers in parentheses are probabilities of significance. ** Significant at 1% level (2-tailed). *
Significant at 5% level (2-tailed).
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The correlations among the explanatory variables did not indicate a serious 
collinearity problem as the higher correlations are between aggregate disclosure and 
both mandatory and voluntary disclosures, which will not be included in a single 
model. The variance inflation factor (VIF) and tolerance coefficients have been 
computed for each explanatory variable in the multiple regression models. By 
regressing each explanatory variable on the rest of the explanatory variables in 
individual multiple regression models using SPSS software in results not presented 
here, the highest VIF was 1.99 and the lowest tolerance coefficient was 0.502. These 
results confirm that collinearity is not a problem in the subsequent analysis.
9.3.3 Multivariate analysis
To provide a more comprehensive analysis of the relationship between disclosure 
level and firm value, a multivariate analysis has been conducted to control for other 
variables that are expected to influence firm value. A  number of control variables 
suggested from prior studies are used, namely: asset size, profitability, gearing and 
sales growth.
Each model is estimated with four different sets of control variables, depending on 
the inclusion or exclusion of mandatory or voluntary disclosure levels in the model 
specification: set (1) excludes both mandatory and voluntary disclosure levels; set
(2) includes both mandatory and voluntary disclosure levels; set (3) includes the 
mandatory disclosure level but not the voluntary disclosure level; and set (4) 
includes the voluntary disclosure level but not the mandatory disclosure level.
Table (9.3) shows the results for the relationships between firm value measured by 
Tobin’s q ratio and different proxies of disclosure level as well as the controls. It 
shows that size and profitability have significant positive associations with firm
211
Sample: 198 observations
Ln (TQR): the natural logarithm of Tobin’s Q ratio, measured as total assets less book value of equity 
plus market value of equity in the numerator and total assets in the denominator, where market value 
of equity: number of outstanding shares times the average of closing prices for six months after the 
fiscal year-end; Size: the natural logarithm of book value of total assets at the financial year-end; 
profit: the ratio of net income to book value of equity; gearing: the natural logarithm of the ratio of 
long-term debt to book value of equity; growth: the natural logarithm of the ratio of sales in the 
current year divided by sales in the previous year (ln (sales/sales(-l)); MINDEX: the mandatory 
disclosure level; VINDEX: voluntary disclosure level; TINDEX: aggregate disclosure levelBoth 
weighted and un-weighted statistics are reported. Both the adjusted R2 and the standard error of 
regression have been slightly improved after the introduction of a proxy(s) of disclosure level, which 
indicates the incremental effect of disclosure level upon firm value.
T able (9 .3 ) T he im pact o f  d isc losu re le v e l upon  T Q R  b efore dropping the outliers
D ep en d en t variable: In (T Q R )
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant -0.778** -0.160 0.072 0.074 -0.488**
(-5.464) (-0.740) (0.347) (0.375) (-3.529)
Size 0.040** 0.022** 0.022** 0.022** 0.029**
(5.400) (3.250) (2.722) (2.966) (4.258)
Profit 0.937** 1.083** 1.112** 1.107** 1.016**
(19.377) (22.257) (16.582) (18.428) (24.188)
Gearing 0.016* 0.012 0.010 0.009 0.017**
(2.237) (1.631) (1.279) (1.159) (2.330)
Growth 0.034 0.040 0.046 0.048 0.033
(9.16) (1.342) (1.455) (1.558) (1.024)
TINDEX -0.495**
(-6.608)
MINDEX -0.619** -0.645**
(-3.955) (-5.895)
VINDEX 0.001 -0.224**
(0.015) (-5.651)
Weighted
statistics
R 2
S. E. of
0.591 0.679 0.584 0.625 0.660
regression
Un-weighted
0.330 0.322 0.318 0.318 0.328
statistics
R 2
S. E. of
0.343 0.357 0.360 0.363 0.350
regression 0.337 0.333 0.333 0.332 0.335
Notes: t-values in parentheses. White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariance and
G L S  (cross-section  w eights); * *  S ign ifican t at 1% level; *S ig n ifican t at 5%  level. R 2 : ad ju sted  R
squared.
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value with a superior effect for profitability. Gearing has mixed results. Sales growth 
has no relationship with firm value measured by Tobin’s q ratio. Contrary to 
theoretical expectations, individual measures of disclosure level reduces firm value, 
with the sole exception of the voluntary disclosure level when included with 
mandatory disclosure in the same model where no association is found.
To check whether the results are sensitive to the existence of outliers, a retest was 
undertaken after removing the outliers, defined as observations with large 
standardized residuals (equal to or more than 3 standard deviations), and/or 
observations whose values give them a large influence. The results are presented in 
Table (9.4) and show that dropping the outliers led to a loss of 32 observations. 
However dropping the outliers does not affect the significance or the direction of the 
relationships with size, profitability and the individual measures of disclosure level, 
but it does affect the magnitude of the coefficients of these relationships to some 
extent. Gearing has no relationship with firm value. Sales growth has a significant 
positive relationship with firm value as expected. These results confirm that outliers 
are not responsible for the unexpected signs of disclosure level.
As a robustness check of the results obtained using Tobin’s q ratio as a measure of 
firm value, the relationship was re-estimated using the market to book ratio as a 
proxy for firm value. The results for the new multiple regression models are 
presented in Table (9.5). The results are generally consistent with those obtained 
earlier. They show that the control variables have significant positive relationships 
with firm value as expected. Individual proxies for disclosure level have significant 
negative relationships with firm value, except for the voluntary disclosure level 
when included with mandatory disclosure level in the same model. Both weighted
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Ln (TQR): the natural logarithm of Tobin’s Q ratio, measured as total assets less book value of equity 
plus market value of equity in the numerator and total assets in the denominator, where market value 
of equity: number of outstanding shares times the average of closing prices for six months after the 
fiscal year-end; Size: the natural logarithm of book value of total assets at the financial year-end; 
profit: the ratio of net income to book value of equity; gearing: the natural logarithm of the ratio of 
long-term debt to book value of equity; growth: the natural logarithm of the ratio of sales in the 
current year divided by sales in the previous year (ln (sales/sales(-l)); MINDEX: the mandatory 
disclosure level; VINDEX: voluntary disclosure level; TINDEX: aggregate disclosure level.
T able (9 .4 ) T he im pact o f  d isc losu re le v e l upon T Q R  after dropping the outliers
D ep en d en t variable: In (T Q R ); Sam ple: 166 observations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant -0.872** - 0.011 0.451* 0.202 -0.643**
(-7.932) (-0.102) (2.239) (1.461) (-5.972)
Size 0.042** 0.023** 0.027** 0.031** 0.036**
(7.039) (6.314) (4.467) (8.638) (6.933)
Profit 1.162** 1.238** 1.337** 1.314** 1.166**
(17.194) (27.709) (13.850) (18.868) (29.455)
Gearing 0.000 0.002 -0.012 -0.010 0.003
(0.031) (0.354) (-1.521) (-1.355) (0.459)
Growth 0.089** 0.072** 0.060* 0.060* 0.079*
(2.357) (2.460) (2.064) (2.323) (2.243)
TINDEX -0.702**
(-10.675)
MINDEX -1.366** -1.059**
(-7.622) (-10.710)
VINDEX 0.241** -0.251**
(3.691) (-7.611)
Weighted
statistics
R 2 0.768 0.863 0.978 0.908 0.868
S. E. of
regression 0.330 0.314 0.304 0.304 0.327
Un-weighted
statistics
R 2 0.273 0.294 0.324 0.315 0.274
S. E. of
regression 0.333 0.328 0.321 0.324 0.333
Notes: t-values in parentheses. White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariance and
G L S  (cross-section  w eights); * *  S ign ifican t at 1% level; ^S ign ifican t at 5%  level. R  2 : ad ju sted  R
squared.
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T able (9 .5 ) T he im pact o f  d isc losu re le v e l upon M T B R  b efore  dropping the outliers.
D ep en d en t variable: In (M T B R ); Sam ple: 198 observations
Ln (MTBR): the natural logarithm of market-to-book ratio, measured as market value of equity to 
book value of equity at year-end where market value of equity: number of outstanding shares times 
the average of closing prices for six months after the fiscal year-end; Size: the natural logarithm of 
book value of total at the financial year-end; profit: the ratio of net income to book value of equity; 
gearing: the natural logarithm of the ratio long-term debt to book value of equity; growth: the natural 
logarithm of the ratio of sales in the current year divided by sales in the previous year (ln 
(sales/sales(-l)); MINDEX: the mandatory disclosure level; VINDEX: voluntary disclosure level; 
TINDEX: aggregate disclosure level.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant -1.744** -1.278** -0.673 -0.807** -1.664**
(-7.525) (-5.299) (-1.699) (2.526) (-8.871)
Size o o 00 t—^
 * * 0.073** 0.064** 0.067** 0.080**
(6.894) (7.455) (5.673) (6.297) (9.158)
Profit 2.585** 2.692** 2.708** 2.708** 2.652**
(49.989) (36.701) (32.499) (33.584) (42.888)
Gearing 0.060** 0.061** 0.059** 0.060** 0.062**
(5.302) (4.600) (4.334) (4.394) (4.991)
Growth 0.056** 0.035* 0.408* 0.037* 0.416*
(2.425) (1.735) (1.996) (1.888) (1.930)
TINDEX -0.446**
(-3.752)
MINDEX -0.890** -0.757**
(-2.713) (-3.758)
VINDEX 0.085 -0.161**
(0.802) (2.981)
Weighted
statistics
R 2 0.865 0.842 0.828 0.833 0.860
S. E. of
regression 0.618 0.615 0.614 0.613 0.618
Un-weighted
statistics
R 2 0.513 0.517 0.519 0.521 0.513
S. E. of
regression 0.632 0.629 0.628 0.627 0.632
Notes: t-values in parentheses. White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariance and
G L S  (cross-section  w eights); * *  S ign ifican t at 1%  level; *S ig n ifican t at 5%  level. R  2 : ad ju sted  R
squared.
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and un-weighted statistics show slight differences after including disclosure level 
proxy (s) in the model. Moreover, dropping the outliers did not change the original 
results (Table 9.6).
The results so far show a superior effect of profitability upon firm value in the 
Egyptian context. This particular result is not surprising since it was suggested that 
investors in Egypt pay much attention to income and dividends figures when making 
investment decisions, so they would tend to overvalue firms with more profits. The 
results for asset size are not surprising as well, since large firms in terms of asset size 
are expected to have higher market value. Although the results for gearing and 
growth come in line with expectations, they are less powerful and depend on the 
proxy used to estimate firm value.
In brief, the results68 for disclosure levels contradict prior expectations about the 
potential benefits of increased disclosure. More public disclosure, irrespective of its 
type, decreases firm value in the Egyptian case. However, the results also show the 
tiny incremental effect of disclosure levels in explaining firm value in terms of the 
difference in the adjusted R squared of the model after incorporating a measure (s) of 
disclosure level. The literature provides a number of potential explanations.
One possible explanation of these results is that costs of increased disclosure might 
have exceeded its benefits in the Egyptian market for the sample period, which 
supports the argument of firms’ managers that more disclosure reduces shareholders’ 
funds. In terms of mandatory disclosure, there were virtually no non-compliance
68 These results hold after the exclusion of loss making firms, which represent very few observations 
in the sample.
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Ln (MTBR): the natural logarithm of market-to-book ratio, measured as market value of equity to 
book value of equity at year-end where market value of equity: number of outstanding shares times 
the average of closing prices for six months after the fiscal year-end; Size: the natural logarithm of 
book value of total at the financial year-end; profit: the ratio of net income to book value of equity; 
gearing: the natural logarithm of the ratio long-term debt to book value of equity; growth: the natural 
logarithm of the ratio of sales in the current year divided by sales in the previous year (ln 
(sales/sales(-l)); MINDEX: the mandatory disclosure level; VINDEX: voluntary disclosure level; 
TINDEX: aggregate disclosure level.
T able (9 .6 ) T h e im pact o f  d isclosure le v e l u pon  M T B R  after dropping the outliers.
D ep en d en t variable: In (M T B R ); Sam ple: 166 observations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant -1.375** -0.684** 0.929* 0.396 -1.356**
(-8.678) (-2.918) (2.474) (1.248) (-9.772)
Size 0.065** 0.060** 0.044** 0.051** 0.069**
(7.587) (6.707) (3.974) (4.819) (10.180)
Profit 2.551** 2.873 2.895** 2.866** 2.747**
(35.962) (25.302) (24.481) (24.438) (33.452)
Gearing 0.059** 0.046** 0.038** 0.041** 0.057**
(5.017) (2.942) (2.383) (2.523) (4.320)
Growth 0.329** 0.199* 0.222** 0.205** 0.220*
(2.566) (2.151) (2.506) (2.352) (2.080)
TINDEX -0.960**
(-7.562)
MINDEX -2.445** -1.780**
(-7.803) (-8.578)
VINDEX 0.383** -0.320**
(3.930) (-6.320)
Weighted statistics 
R 2
S. E. of regression 0.865 0.816 0.858 0.849 0.873
0.632 0.614 0.607 0.609 0.624
Un-weighted
statistics
R 2 0.372 0.378 0.385 0.390 0.373
S. E. of regression 0.641 0.638 0.634 0.631 0.640
Notes: t-values in parentheses. White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariance and
GLS (cross-section weights); ** Significant at 1% level; * Significant at 5% level. R 2 : adjusted R 
squared.
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costs for the time period investigated here. This in turn means that compliance costs 
have exceeded non-compliance costs in terms of the costs of information production 
and dissemination and training preparers on the applicable standards. In addition, 
more voluntary information in a low informational environment could mean that 
more valuable information was available to competitors, which could lead to 
competitive disadvantages. This explanation supports the second scenario provided 
by Elliott and Jacobson (1994: 87-88) that ‘two costs decrease with more 
informative disclosure: information risk premium and litigation cost, and two 
increase: information cost (information production and dissemination) and net 
competitive cost (competitive disadvantages)’ . However, the observed significant 
correlation between mandatory and voluntary disclosures (0.55) might dismiss this 
explanation. Although this correlation is not perfect (does not equal one) it means 
that firms that were complying with mandatory disclosure tended to provide more 
information voluntarily. Assuming that voluntary disclosure will take place only if 
its perceived benefits exceed its perceived costs (Marston and Polei, 2004), this 
could mean that costs of increased disclosure in the Egyptian context did not 
outweigh its benefits. However, because the correlation between mandatory 
disclosure and voluntary disclosure is not perfect, it leaves a room for the possibility 
that costs of increased disclosure might have outweighed its benefits.
Some participants in the British Accounting Association annual conference in 2005 
expressed some reservations about these proxies for firm value. They argued that 
these measures could be proxies for growth rather than firm value; hence the results 
are the expected ones given that growth is a proxy for risk. Moreover, Debreceny, 
Gray and Rahman (2002) used market to book ratio as a proxy for growth and 
investigated the impact of growth on financial reporting on the Internet but found no
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relationship in the unrestricted model. These concerns could be compelling, since 
results (Appendix 9.1) from the univariate analysis show a significant positive 
association between different measures of growth and the different proxies for firm 
value. On the other hand, different types of disclosure have significant and negative 
associations with sales growth, but there is no association with other growth proxies: 
asset growth and earnings growth. However, growth might not be a good proxy for 
risk in the Egyptian context as explained earlier. The negative association between 
different measures of growth and different measures of market beta support this 
expectation. As a further check, further analysis (results not tabulated) has been done 
using the natural logarithm of market value of equity as a measure of firm value. The 
original results for the association between the extent of different types of disclosure 
and firm value did not change.
Recent studies such as Morris and Shin (2001) and Anctil et al. (2004) discuss the 
role of traders’ expectations and the coordination among these expectations in 
formulating the effect of increased information transparency. Walther (2004:197) 
explains this case as follows: ‘in situations where individuals do not make decisions 
in isolation but must coordinate (them) with others, individuals must incorporate 
their expectations about the beliefs of other decision makers, which leads to strategic 
uncertainty. Improvements in transparency can increase this strategy uncertainty. 
Thus, although increased transparency may provide information about economic 
fundamentals, the increased strategic uncertainty may negate these benefits of more 
transparent information’ . In other words, traders’ interpretations of public disclosure 
and their expectations about other traders’ beliefs could mitigate the effect of 
increased public disclosure upon firm value. Although this explanation seems
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convincing, it needs empirical evidence, which could be a fruitful area for future
research.
Other explanation of these unexpected signs might be due to omitted variables that 
are correlated with firm value, such as risk and industry type that were excluded 
from the estimations. So, before providing any possible explanation of these results, 
the researcher had to check whether eliminating both industry type and market beta 
from the analysis is responsible for these results. Thus the analysis has been run after 
including both industry type and market beta, which has led to a drastic reduction in 
the sample size (63 observations out of 272). The results for the test of omitted 
variables are provided in Table (9.7). The results show a very large value for 
computed F compared to the critical F-statistic, which means that the exclusion of 
industry type and market beta had led to a problem of omitted variable, hence these 
two variables should be included in the analysis.
Table (9.7) Test for omitted variables
Firm value Model K N G A B F
Ln(TQR) 1 7 63 2 20.98 2.10 252.09
2 8 63 2 19.88 2.07 236.09
3 9 63 2 19.34 1.81 260.75
4 8 63 2 19.43 2.07 230.69
5 8 63 2 20.63 1.23 435.37
Ln(MTBR) 1 7 63 2 73.63 8.98 201.53
2 8 63 2 72.59 8.27 213.82
3 9 63 2 72.04 8.03 215.18
4 8 63 2 72.15 8.46 207.00
5 8 63 2 73.31 8.29 215.70
A: Residuals sum of squares of restricted model
B: Residuals sum of squares of unrestricted model 
K: number of regressors in the unrestricted model including the constant 
N: number of observations in the unrestricted model 
G: number of restrictions
F: The computed value of the F test, equals [(A-B)/G]/[B/(N-K)]
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The new results after the inclusion69 of industry type and market beta provided in 
tables (9.8 and 9.9) show quite large improvements in both adjusted R-squared and 
the standard error of the regression for all models compared to those of the previous 
analysis. This in turn suggests that the inclusion of industry type and market beta in 
the analysis improves the analysis. The results show that, consistent with prior 
studies, increased voluntary disclosure enhances firm value whatever the proxy of 
firm value is. The results for mandatory disclosure are sensitive to the measure of 
firm value. Mandatory disclosure has a significant positive association with firm 
value, consistent with prior expectations, measured by the natural log of either 
market to book ratio or market value of equity, but it has a significant negative 
association with firm value measured by ln(TQR). This result for mandatory 
disclosure also affects the association between aggregate disclosure level and 
ln(TQR).
This result suggests that bias could be inherent in measuring Tobin’s q ratio, which 
is not surprising since its estimation is based on book value of total assets rather than 
replacement costs. In addition, the results for model (3) show that incorporating both 
mandatory disclosure and voluntary disclosure in the same model distorts the results 
for mandatory disclosure, which could be due to the significant correlation between 
mandatory and voluntary disclosures.
69 The inclusion of industry type and market beta does not lead to a multi-collinearity problem, since 
tests for collinearity show that the lowest tolerance coefficient is 0.444 and the highest VIF is 2.254 
when incorporating both mandatory and voluntary disclosures in the same model.
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Dependent variable: In (TQR); Sample: 63 observations
Ln (TQR): the natural logarithm of Tobin’s Q ratio, measured as total assets less book value of 
equity plus market value of equity in the numerator and total assets in the denominator, where market 
value of equity: number of outstanding shares times the average of closing prices for six months after 
the fiscal year-end; Size: the natural logarithm of book value of total assets at the financial year-end; 
profit: the ratio of net income to book value of equity; gearing: the natural logarithm of the ratio of 
long-term debt to book value of equity; growth: the natural logarithm of the ratio of sales in the 
current year divided by sales in the previous year (ln (sales/sales(-l)); Industry type: is a two- digit 
dummy variable; Market beta: estimated market beta using the pooled least square market model 
based on weekly returns and case30 as a proxy for the market; MINDEX: the mandatory disclosure 
level; VINDEX: voluntary disclosure level; TINDEX: aggregate disclosure level.
T able (9 .8 ) T he im pact o f  d isc losu re le v e l upon  T Q R  after con tro llin g  for om itted
variables.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant -1.041** -1.012** -0.756** -1.005** -1.173**
(-8.335) (-8.018) (-5.114) (-6.263) (-6.988)
Size 0.039** 0.039** 0.032** 0.039** 0.044**
(10.494) (11.405) (8.061) (8.388) (8.588)
Profit 1.205** 1.197** 1.063** 1.222** 1.205**
(25.300) (23.424) (14.846) (22.395) (26.358)
Gearing 0.015** 0.014** 0.006 0.015** 0.014**
(3.388) (3.323) (1.223) (3.531) (3.280)
Growth 0.104** 0.105** 0.075** 0.105** 0.112**
(5.375) (4.939) (5.087) (4.819) (5.130)
Industry type 0.001 0.001 0.008* 0.002 0.003
(0.363) (0.399) (1.950) (0.413) (0.701)
Market beta 0.019 0.030 -0.006 0.033 0.026
TINDEX
MINDEX
VINDEX
Weighted
statistics
(0.923) (1.282)
-0.029**
(-3.789)
(-0.262)
-0.394**
(-6.123)
0.284**
(5.502)
(1.438)
-0.047**
(-2.521)
(1.179)
0.049**
(2.637)
R 2
S. E. of
0.865 0.946 0.946 0.958 0.875
regression
Un-weighted
statistics
0.194 0.194 0.183 0.194 0.194
R 2
S. E. of
0.469 0.458 0.433 0.461 0.456
regression 0.207 0.209 0.214 0.209 0.209
Notes: t-values in parentheses. White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariance and
GLS (cross-section weights); ** Significant at 1% level; ^Significant at 5% level. R 2: adjusted R 
squared.
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Dependent variable: In (MTBR); Sample: 63 observations
Ln (MTBR): the natural logarithm of market-to-book ratio, measured as market value of equity to 
book value of equity at year-end where market value of equity: number of outstanding shares times 
the average of closing prices for six months after the fiscal year-end; Size: the natural logarithm of 
book value of total at the financial year-end; profit: the ratio of net income to book value of equity; 
gearing: the natural logarithm of the ratio long-term debt to book value of equity; growth: the natural 
logarithm of the ratio of sales in the current year divided by sales in the previous year (ln 
(sales/sales(-l)); Industry type: is a two- digit dummy variable; Market beta: estimated market beta 
using the pooled least square market model based on weekly returns and case30 as a proxy for the 
market; MINDEX: the mandatory disclosure level; VINDEX: voluntary disclosure level; TINDEX: 
aggregate disclosure level.
T able (9 .9 ) T he im pact o f  d isc losu re lev e l upon M T B R  after con tro llin g  for om itted
variables.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant -3.485** -4.525** -2.817** -4.573** -3.997**
(-9.826) (-9.137) (-5.347) (-8.541) (-9.079)
Size 0.134** 0.168** 0.118** 0.174** 0.148**
(11.903) (9.017) (7.058) (9.437) (8.394)
Profit 3.776** 3.627** 3.437** 3.964** 3.565**
(21.334) (22.472) (17.047) (22.587) (21.545)
Gearing 0.003 0.007 0 . 0 0 1 0.010 0.005
(0.285) (0.605) (0.063) (0.855) (0.425)
Growth 0.137** 0.178** 0.152** 0.165** 0.178**
(3.358) (4.039) (3.961) (3.664) (4.320)
Industry -0.007 -0.006 -0.002 -0.009 -0.004
type (-0.809) (-0.753) (-0.215) (-1.032) (-0.442)
Market beta 0.127* 0.186** 0.092 0.145* 0.160**
(2.015) (3.140) (1.603) (2.359) (2.869)
TINDEX 0.461**
(5.124)
MINDEX -0.794** 0.389**
(-3.575) (3.808)
VINDEX 0.698** 0.378**
(5.319) (5.670)
Weighted
statistics
R 2 0.986 0.885 0.890 0.935 0.876
S. E. of
regression 0.400 0.388 0.386 0.392 0.388
Un-
weighted
statistics
77  ?
0.669 0.658 0.649 0.658 0.660
R
S. E. of 0.410 0.416 0.422 0.416 0.415
regression
Notes: t-values in parentheses. White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariance and
GLS (cross-section weights); ** Significant at 1% level; S^ignificant at 5% level. R 2 \ adjusted R 
squared.
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The results also suggest that asset size, profitability, and growth have significant 
positive associations with firm value with the dominant influence being profitability. 
The association between firm value and gearing is sensitive to the measure of firm 
value, but generally it is in line with prior expectations. Surprisingly, the results for 
industry type and market beta, although excluding them led to problems of omitted 
variables, show that they both have no association with firm value measured by 
ln(TQR). Moreover, industry type has no association with firm value measured by 
ln(MTBR). Market beta has a positive association with firm value measured by 
ln(MTBR), which could be due to the positive association between asset size and 
market beta observed earlier.
Finally, the researcher has tried to test for a potential endogenity problem between 
firm value and disclosure level, which means that the relationship between 
disclosure level and firm value could be in two directions. For example Debreceny, 
Gray and Rahman (2002) tested the impact of market to book ratio (as a measure of 
growth) on financial reporting on the Internet (the opposite direction of the 
relationship investigated here in this research). In terms of firm value, this means 
that large firms could choose to disclose more information, and increased disclosure 
could enhance firm value. However due to missing data the researcher was unable to 
test for this potential problem.
9.4 Concluding remarks
In this chapter the relationship between disclosure levels and firm value in the
Egyptian emerging capital market has been investigated. Two proxies for firm value
have been used, namely: the natural logarithm of Tobin’s q ratio, and the natural
logarithm of market to book ratio. After controlling for asset size, profitability,
gearing and sales growth, the results show significant negative associations between
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individual measures of disclosure level and firm value. These results contradict prior 
expectations derived from finance theory that increased disclosure enhances firm 
value. However, further analysis proves that these results are due to the problem of 
omitted variables, namely industry type and market beta. The inclusion of both 
industry type and market beta brings the association between disclosure level and 
firm value to its expected direction. These results in turn highlight the important role 
of industry type and market beta in estimating firm value. Furthermore, the results 
show a dominant role for profitability in estimating firm value in the Egyptian 
market. The results also suggest that mandatory disclosure has a significant negative 
association with firm value measured by ln(TQR), which could be due to 
measurement biases in estimating the q ratio since it was based upon book value of 
assets rather than replacement costs of assets. Thus a re-estimation of the q ratio 
using alternative approaches in future research, for example using alternative 
measures of replacement costs compared to that estimated using the book value of 
assets, might explain these results.
Finally, consistent with prior studies the results from the unrestricted models 
generally suggest a positive association between disclosure levels and firm value; 
however, due to the small size of the sample in particular after including both 
industry type and market beta in the analysis, further research is necessary before 
reaching a definitive conclusion.
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Chapter (10) Conclusions
10.1 Summary
In this study, the researcher examines the implications of the extent of different types 
of information disclosure for market beta and firm value in the Egyptian emerging 
capital market using panel data analysis.
This study extends the literature in financial reporting and capital markets by 
investigating benefits of increased disclosure in an emerging capital market, whereas 
most prior studies are conducted for companies quoted in developed capital markets, 
mainly the US. In addition, this study contributes to the financial reporting literature 
by exploring the benefits of compliance with mandatory disclosure. Moreover, this 
study extends the empirical literature on the implications of increased disclosure for 
market beta and firm value for which little direct empirical evidence exist in general 
and in emerging capital markets in particular. Furthermore, this study uses panel data 
analysis in investigating benefits of increased disclosure, which possess advantages 
over both time series data sets and cross-section data sets, such as diminishing the 
problem of omitted variables. Panel data analysis, however, are rarely used in the 
accounting literature.
The results, consistent with expectations, suggest that disclosure level is negatively 
associated with market beta after controlling for other accounting measures of risk 
namely: asset size, profitability, gearing, growth, liquidity and dividend payout. 
However, the results are sensitive to the proxy of the market used in estimating 
market beta, and the specification of the model. This particular result, which is 
consistent with the research hypothesis, calls future empirical research to depend on 
alternative measures for market beta before drawing any inferences about it, since 
different estimations yield different results.
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The original results for firm value contradict prior expectations derived from finance 
theory. After controlling for asset size, profitability, gearing, and sales growth, the 
results suggest that more disclosure is negatively associated with firm value. 
However, further analysis proves that these results were sensitive to omitted 
variables, namely industry type and market beta. After including these two variables 
in the analysis, the results generally show, consistent with prior expectations, a 
significant positive association between firm value and disclosure level. 
Nevertheless, mandatory disclosure shows significant negative associations with 
firm value measured by Tobin’s q ratio, which could be due to measurement biases.
Nonetheless, given the limited number of empirical studies with respect to the 
implications of disclosure level for market beta and firm value in general and in 
emerging markets in particular, and the small size of the sample used in this 
research, further research is necessary before more robust conclusions can be stated.
The results present good news for investors, companies and regulators in emerging 
markets. Benefits of increased public disclosure are not limited to developed capital 
markets. Emerging capital markets as well could benefit from increased disclosure. 
Moreover, the benefits of increased disclosure are not limited to a particular type of 
disclosure. Investors will benefit from increased disclosure when planning their 
investment choices by reducing uncertainty surrounding corporate future 
performance. Companies could benefit from increased disclosure in terms of lower 
cost of capital and higher firm value. Moreover, more public information will 
enhance the market efficiency and transparency, which regulators aim at.
The researcher implements two approaches to estimate market beta, given that 
market beta estimation is subject to a choice of some factors such as data frequency,
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measurement period, and the market model used in estimating market beta, which 
could yield different estimations. Thus reaching conclusions based on a sole 
estimation of market beta might be misleading. Market betas were initially estimated 
via the OLS market model using daily returns over six months after (and before) the 
financial year-ends for the sample firms and two alternative proxies for the market. 
Market betas were then estimated via the pooled GLS market model using weekly 
returns over a moving five-year period of time and a different proxy for the market 
(case30). Firm value was estimated using two proxies: Tobin’s q ratio, and market 
to book ratio in order to check the robustness of the results.
The extent of different types of disclosure has been measured using the traditional 
disclosure index technique. Depending on a list of items of information, which is 
suitable for the Egyptian context, the researcher uses the unweighted approach to 
score each item of information in this list. An item of information scored one if it is 
disclosed and zero otherwise. The total index is calculated as the sum of scores 
awarded to a particular company in a particular year divided by the maximum 
number of applicable items of information.
In order to provide evidence on the reliability and validity of measures of disclosure 
level created in the current study, further tests have been carried out. Alpha 
coefficients for the different indices provide evidence of their internal consistency. 
In addition, these measures of disclosure level are found to be correlated with many 
of the firm characteristics suggested from prior studies. Moreover, the effect of other 
country related characteristics upon disclosure level have been examined, namely 
legal form and stock activity. In brief the results suggest that the different proxies for
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disclosure level created in this research could be seen as reliable and valid measures 
of disclosure level, hence they have been used to test the research hypotheses.
10.2 Limitations
The researcher wishes to qualify the results of the current study in several ways. This 
study is limited to the early stages of the revival and development of the ESE, which 
means that the data are expected to be very noisy due to discontinuous regulations 
and rules, and ‘dirty speculations’ . Moreover, the data are not expected to be as 
clean as US data, for example. This is because the data are hand-collected and are 
less strictly screened for errors. For example, there is a possibility of errors in 
handling listed companies’ annual reports such as missing some pages in the scan 
process. Therefore, the results should be interpreted on the basis of working with a 
lack of good data.
Another potential limitation of this study is that the research sample is not randomly 
selected, since the availability of data was the main criterion of gathering data in the 
Egyptian context.
In addition, although using a panel data set should provide a large number of 
observations, the sample size could be viewed as not sufficiently large. For example, 
few observations were available when estimating market beta over a five-year period 
of time (48 observations), which could limit the ability to generalize the results. 
Furthermore, although this research uses a panel data set, the researcher was unable 
to test for fixed effects due to missing data.
Moreover, a common limitation of studies on the benefits of increased disclosure is 
potential measurement errors. This is due to the fact that both disclosure and its 
benefits are theoretical concepts that cannot be measured directly in an objective
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way and hence they always carry the risk of incurring measurement error. For 
example, the measurement of firm value by Tobin’s q ratio has some drawbacks. In 
particular the use of the book value of total assets in the denominator makes it non­
comparable among companies, which might use different accounting policies to 
account for inventory and depreciation for example.
In addition, another potential limitation of this study is the use of the disclosure 
index technique to measure the extent of corporate disclosure. Results obtained from 
studies using the disclosure index to investigate disclosure level are only valid to the 
extent of the disclosure index used and time period investigated. In addition, the 
selection of the items included in the disclosure index, the classification into 
mandatory and voluntary disclosure indices, and the distinction between non- 
disclosed and non-applicable items of information, inevitably involved some degree 
of judgment and subjectivity. Although the researcher has tried to diminish 
subjectivity in creating the disclosure index, she cannot argue that it has been 
removed entirely.
Furthermore, due to missing data the research was unable to test for the potential 
endogenity problem with respect to the relationship between disclosure level and 
both market beta and firm value. This potential problem should be taken into 
consideration in future research.
10.3 Future research
This study depends on the disclosure index technique in investigating corporate 
disclosure in the Egyptian context. Two readily available lists of information: the 
CMA checklist and the CIFAR checklist have been used in order to create an initial 
list of items of information as a primary step to create the disclosure index. This
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initial list of information was then subject to a long process of refinements in order 
to bring it closer to what is happening in the real world. An alternative approach to 
study corporate disclosure might rely on a comprehensive content analysis of 
companies’ annual reports and/or other disclosure vehicles such as companies’ 
websites. The content analysis also could be limited to individual industries in order 
to get a more comprehensive view on disclosure practice in particular industries.
Future research could investigate issues relating to the extent and quality of financial 
disclosure in the Egyptian context. For example, future research might examine the 
impact of the new listing rules upon the level of compliance with mandatory 
disclosure in order to evaluate the effectiveness of these new regulations in 
enhancing compliance with mandatory disclosure. In addition, future research might 
investigate the impact of other potential explanatory variables such as industry type, 
ownership structure and board composition upon level of disclosure. More research 
could be carried out to investigate what motivate companies to change their 
disclosure practice. A  comparative study of disclosure practice for different countries 
in the region complying with IFRS might also be fruitful.
The current study investigates implications of increased disclosure for market beta 
and firm value. Further research is necessary for the implications of the extent and 
quality of different types of disclosure for market beta in different types of 
information environments. In addition, other proxies for firm value that could 
overcome problems in the current proxies are needed. Other implications of 
increased disclosure for stock liquidity and an overall measure of firm’s cost of 
capital might be a fruitful expansion of this research.
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Furthermore, one potential extension of the current study is to examine the 
implication of applying new regulations or new listing rules to the cost of capital and 
firm value. A  comparative study among different nations with different accounting 
standards of different qualities could be a fruitful expansion of this research.
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Appendixes
Appendix (4.1) Summary of Observance of OECD Corporate Governance 
Principles
Principle O LO PO MO NO
I. THE RIGHTS OF SHAREHOLDERS
IA Basic shareholder rights
X • Basic rights observed. Some 
compliance gaps in clearing and 
settlement.
IB Rights to participate in fundamental decisions.
X • Shareholders participate in most 
fundamental decisions with 66/75 
percent supermajority.
IC Shareholders AGM rights
X • No major reported problems. Notice 
period 15 days.
ID Disproportionate control disclosure
X • Companies disclose at 5 percent 
level. Most ownership reportedly 
formally and informally well 
understood.
IE
Control arrangements 
should be allowed to 
function.
X • Very limited takeover rules. CMA 
informally enforcing mandatory bid 
rule.
IF Cost/benefit to voting
X • At present, uncommon for 
institutional investors to have voting 
policies, and some don’t vote.
II. EQUITABLE TREATMENT OF SHAREHOLDERS
IIA
All shareholders 
should be treated 
equally
X • Share voting info may be difficult to 
obtain. Slow court system. CMA is 
powerful redress mechanism.
IIB Prohibit insider trading
X • Insider trading not specifically 
addressed in law, but is 
administratively enforced.
IIC Board/Mgrs. disclose interests
X •Accounting standards follow IAS 24. 
New listing rules add to RPT 
disclosure requirements.
III. ROLE OF STAKEHOLDERS IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
IIIA Stakeholderrespected
rights X
IIIB Redress for violation X of rights
IIIC Performanceenhancement
X
HID Access to information
X
•Stakeholders have a number of legal 
protections. Employee board 
representation relatively rare.
•Stakeholder have access to legal 
process to obtain redress.
•Company law grants employees 
automatic rights to 10 percent profit 
sharing. Employee share ownership in 
some privatized companies.
•Employees, bondholders, others 
have rights to information by law.
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IV . D IS C L O S U R E  A N D  T R A N S P A R E N C Y
X
IVA Disclosure standards
jy g  Standards of X
accounting and audit
X
Tvr, Independent audit
annually
jy p  Fair and timely X
dissemination
V. RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE BOARD
VA Acts with diligence, care
due
X
VB Treat all shareholders fairly
VC Ensure compliance w/ law
The board should 
VD fulfill certain key 
functions
X
X
X
The board should be X
VE able to exercise 
objective judgment
X
VF Access to information
• Annual and quarterly reports. Some 
missing non-financial disclosure 
(forward-looking MD&A, risk 
factors, governance).
• Standards generally close to IAS; 
compliance uncertain.
• No audit oversight board (but 
included in draft accounting law). 
New listing rules require audit 
committee, but slow adoption.
• Many channels of information.
• Single tier boards. Frequently, 
Chairman and CEO are same person. 
Two members can be appointed 
“experts.”
• Limited legislative guidance on duty 
of care and duty of loyalty, but some 
jurisprudence.
• Company law requires board to take 
interests of employees into account.
• In practice, boards of most 
companies do not play central / 
strategic role, and are not clearly 
different from management.
• No rules that govern independence. 
Few companies appoint independent 
directors.
• Most directors are insiders and have 
access to information. Can be more 
difficult for non-executives 
sometimes, because information is 
not available.
Observed means that all essential criteria are met without significant deficiencies. Largely observed 
means only minor shortcomings are observed, which do not raise questions about the authorities’ 
ability and intent to achieve full observance in the short term. Partially observed means that while the 
legal and regulatory framework complies with the Principle, practices, and enforcement diverge. 
Materially not observed means that, despite progress, shortcomings are sufficient to raise doubts 
about the authorities’ ability to achieve observance. Not observed means no substantive progress 
toward observance has been achieved. Source: ROSC, 2004.
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The Egyptian legal system is largely influenced by the French Civil Code. However, 
the laws governing capital market performance, such as the Central Depository Law 
and the Capital Market Law, are based on Anglo-American law. The following 
major laws regulate capital market performance:
Appendix (4.2) LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Law Description
The Law on Joint 
Stock Companies, 
Limited by Shares 
Companies and 
Limited Liability 
Companies (No. 
159 of 1981) or the 
“Company Law.”
The Investment 
Guarantees and
Incentives law
(No. 8 of 1997).
Company Law 159 establishes 
the basic company forms.
Law No. 8 was designed to 
boost investments in various 
economic sectors and specific 
industrial zones through 
income tax exemptions of 5, 
10, 20 years or permanently in 
tax-free zones. In all other 
respects, companies
established under this law use 
Law 159.
Capital Market 
Law (No. 95 of 
1992) and its 
executive 
regulations.
The Capital Market Law 
regulates the capital market, 
provides the legal framework 
for the Cairo and Alexandria 
Stock Exchange, and regulates 
the incorporation and 
operations of market 
participants.
The Central
Depository and 
Registry Law (No. 
93 for the year 
2000) and its 
executive 
regulations.
The Central Depository and 
Registry Law establishes the 
MCSD and provides the rules 
for shareholder recordkeeping, 
custody, and clearance and 
settlement. The law went into 
effect after its executive 
regulations were issued by the 
Minister of Foreign Trade 
(No. 906) in November 2001.
Future Plans
The government intends to 
develop a new company law 
to replace the current laws 
and dispersed provisions and 
to place all companies of 
different types in Egypt under 
a unified, modernized 
regulatory system.
A  draft law has been in 
preparation since 1998.
The Capital Market Law was 
redrafted for submission to 
the People’s Assembly. The 
current position of the 
government is that most of 
the changes in the draft law 
could be introduced by 
executive regulation in the 
existing law and through the 
CASE listing rules. 
Therefore, the introduction of 
the draft capital markets law 
has been given lower priority.
No revisions planned.
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Law Description Future Plans
Accounting The Accounting Law governs professional Law considered
Practice Law accountants and auditors, particularly in the to be outdated by 
(Law 133 of private sector. Governs registration / licensing most
1951). of accountants and auditors, provides a broad practitioners, 
framework for bookkeeping and financial 
reporting, and authorizes the Ministry of 
Finance to develop a standardized chart of 
accounts and detailed instructions on the 
accounting treatments and reporting formats.
Source: ROSC, 2004.
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Appendix (4.3) Gross Domestic Product at Factor Cost
Current prices- Annual Profile (in Millions Egyptian pounds)
1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 1999/00 2000/20012001/2002
Total GDP 214,185 247,028 266,758 282,578 315,667 332,544 354,564
Total Commodity Sector 104,684 118,992 127,978 136,296 157,432 165,899 176,084
Agriculture 36,968 41,882 45,652 48,935 52,845 55,065 58,369
Industry and Mining 37,936 43,383 48,798 55,225 61,211 63,483 68,086
Petroleum and Products 14,760 17,461 15,534 12,995 23,300 26,300 27,280
Electricity 3,980 4,172 4,264 4,586 4,936 5,291 5,789
Construction 11,040 12,094 13,730 14,555 15,140 15,760 16,560
Total Production Services 69,850 82,889 89,072 95,573 101,794 106,858 112,911
Transportation 2/ 21,500 22,695 24,049 25,916 27,909 30,112 32,694
Trade, Finance, and Insurance 45,109 56,364 61,690 63,975 68,960 71,389 75,110
Hotels and Restaurants 3,241 3,830 3,332 3,682 4,925 5,357 5,107
Total Social Services 39,651 45,147 49,708 52,709 56,441 59,787 65,268
Housing and Real Estate 3,816 4,375 4,860 5,412 6,003 6,879 7,575
Utilities 843 915 1,038 1,179 1,305 1,445 1,601
Social Insurance 140 165 185 214 236 261 289
Government Social and Personal 
Services 34,852 39,692 43,625 45,904 48,897 51,202 56,104
Source: Ministry of Planning.
1/ Does not include net indirect taxes. 
2/ Includes Suez Canal.
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Appendix (4.4) Main market indicators for the period (1992-June 2002)
Indicators 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Jan-Jun
2002
Jan-Jun
2001
Volume of listed 
securities
20.7 13.7 29.3 43.7 170.5 286.7 440.3 841.1 1,029.30 1,183.80 348.3 556.5
Value traded (listed 
securities)
371.4 274.9 1,214.00 2,294.20 8,769.20 20,282.40 18,500.60 32,851.00 45,789 24,659.90 13,575 10,480
Number of listed 
companies
656 674 700 746 649 654 870 1033 1076 1110 1136 1070
Number of traded 
companies
239 264 300 352 354 416 551 663 659 643 553 522
Market capitalization 10.8 
end of year 
(L.E.billion)
12.8 14.5 27.4 48.1 70.8 82.2 112.3 120.9 112.3 118.6 110.3
Turnover Ratio (%) 3.42 2.15 8.38 8.37 18.24 28.62 22.5 29.24 37.85 21.97 11.45 9.5
Securities include stocks, bonds and mutual funds; Market capitalization = number of listed shares * market price end of year
Turnover ratio (%) = value traded of listed securities / market capitalization 
Source: Cairo and Alexandria Stock Exchange fact book (2002, 65).
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Appendix (4.5) Summary of the old listing rules
70Summary of listing requirements 
General listing requirements
Shares, bonds and other securities will be either in printed form or placed within 
Central Depository. The titles of securities must be in denomination of a single share 
or five shares or their multiple, not exceeding 500.
The company by laws should have no restrictions on trading.
The company must provide quarterly financial statements to the exchange of its 
activities and financial results including an audit report from its auditor, after a 
month from its preparation.
The company should list any unlisted issues within a three months period from the 
closing of their public offering date.
The company should assign a senior level employee to act as its contact person with 
the stock exchange. The main responsibility of the contact person is to answer any 
queries by the exchange with regard to any information pertaining to the 
performance of the company.
Listing rules for official schedule
The shares and other securities issued by private sector companies, provided that 30 
percent of them are sold in a public offering.
The private sector company should have no less than 150 shareholders, including 
foreigners.
All debt securities issued by government, treasury bills and treasury bonds, provided 
that they are sold in a public offering irrespective of the number of shareholders.
All securities issued by public sector companies, which may not necessarily be sold 
in a public offering or have a given number of shareholders.
The company must abide by the information disclosure rules stated in Article 6 of 
Law 95/ 1992. In addition, the company should disclose any unusual circumstances 
or events that could affect its financial position and provide an annual report 
explaining what it retained from net profit to accumulate its reserves.
The par value of the shares should be paid in full and the shareholder’ s equity should 
not be less than the company’s paid-up capital. 70
70 CASE Fact Book, 1999,73-74.
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Listing rules for unofficial schedule (1)
Egyptian Securities
The company is either a private sector closed company or a publicly offered 
company that does not fulfill one or more of the listing rules of the official schedule.
The paid-up portion of the issue value of the security is not less than 50 percent. The 
shareholder’s equity should not be less than the issuer’s paid-up capital.
The company should comply with preparing and auditing its financial statements 
according to both Egyptian accounting and auditing standards. The company should 
publish its financial statements in an Egyptian widely circulated morning newspaper.
Foreign Securities
Foreign shares are only listed on unofficial schedule (1).
The securities are listed in an international stock exchange that is governed by a 
well-known securities commission.
The company should comply with preparing and auditing its financial statements 
according to internationally accepted accounting and auditing standards.
Listing rules for unofficial schedule (2)
The paid-up capital may be less than 50 percent.
The shareholder’s equity could be less than the paid-up capital.
It is not necessary for the company to have published its financial statements for the 
last fiscal year.
The company should comply with preparing and auditing its financial statements 
according to Egyptian accounting principles and international auditing standards, as 
well as the financial statement format issued in the Minister of Economy’s Decree 
No. 503 for year 1997.
The temporary or public offering certificates of the company can be listed, provided 
that the company prints its shares within two years after being listed.
Appendix (4.6) Summary of new listing rules
Summary of new listing rules set by CASE and approved by the Capital Market 
Authority on 18-06-200271
71 CASE Fact book, 2002, 104-105.
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General guidelines to listing
All financial securities (shares, bonds, close-ended funds etc.) that request for listing 
on CASE, must first be part of the Central Depositary System.
Listed companies must have no restrictions in their statutes or laws, against the 
trading of their securities on CASE.
Listing and de-listing decisions is the sole responsibility of the Listing Committee at 
CASE, which is formed according to the Exchange’s Board of Directors. The Listing 
Committee is chaired by the Chairman of CASE and its members are selected from 
the following:
• One member appointed by CMA.
• Two employees from CASE chosen by the Board of Directors of CASE.
• One member from the 10 most active listed and traded companies on 
CASE.
• One member from the securities firms operating under capital market law 
95/1992.
• One member from the Egyptian Society of Accountants and Auditors.
The issuer or the listed company’s request for listing will be published at the 
Exchange’s web site (www.egyptse.com), the daily bulletins issued by the Exchange 
and on the trading floors of Cairo and Alexandria for a ten days period, prior to its 
listing. During this period, public comments can be submitted in writing, to the 
Listing Committee of CASE.
Official Schedule (1)
Issuers listed on Official Schedule (1) must satisfy the following conditions:
• Must have 30% free float of their shares with at least 150 shareholders.
• Provide financial statements for the last three years of operation.
• Minimum fully paid issued capital amounts to LE 20 million.
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• Most recent annual earnings before tax amounts to 5% of the paid up 
capital.
• Total shareholders equity should be more than paid up equity for the last 
two years.
• The minimum number of shares is 2 million.
Official schedule (2)
The following securities are automatically listed on the official schedule (2)
• Securities issued by the government.
• Shares and other securities issued by the “public sector companies” .
• Issuers listed on Official Schedule (2) must fulfil the same financial 
criteria applicable to Official Schedule (1) stated above in points (a) 
through (f).
Unofficial Schedule (1)
Issuers listed on Unofficial Schedule (1) must satisfy the following conditions:
• Must have a 10% free float of their shares with at least 50 shareholders.
• Provide financial statements for at least one year of operation.
• Minimum fully paid issued capital amounts to LE 10 million.
• Most recent annual earnings before taxes amount to 5% of the paid up 
capital.
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Total Shareholders equity should be more than paid up capital at least for
one year.
• The minimum number of shares is 1 million.
Unofficial Schedule (2)
Issuers listed on Unofficial Schedule (2) must satisfy the following conditions:
• Provide financial statements for at least one year of operation.
• Minimum fully paid issued capital amounts to LE 5 million.
• Most recent annual earnings before taxes amount to 1% of the paid up 
capital.
• Total shareholders equity must be more than the paid up capital for one 
year.
• The minimum number of shares is 500,000.
Disclosure Rules
Disclosure rules are mandatory for all listed companies on all CASE schedules, 
unless otherwise explicitly stated.
The issuer or listed company should refrain from engaging in promotional activities, 
which might affect investors negatively and prevents them from taking well- 
informed investment decisions. Such acts includes inappropriately worded news 
releases, public announcements that are not justified by actual or factual business, 
exaggerated reports or predictions, flamboyant and other forms of overstated or 
over-zealous disclosure activities, which could mislead investors and cause 
unfavourable and unusual price movements in the issuers’ securities prices.
The issuer or listed company should refrain from disclosing any given or other 
parties, before disclosing to the market as a whole. (Ensure fair disclosure to all 
entities at the same time).
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The issuer must appoint a senior employee as an “Investor Relations Officer” , whose 
main responsibility is to provide information and answer queries of the Exchange, 
respond to queries from shareholders and institutional investors. The Investor 
Relations Officer must prepare and provide press releases to the market, as requested 
by the Exchange.
A- Regarding organization and corporate governance
Notify CASE in detail about the board of directors of the issuer, its key officers 
including their work experience, background, qualifications, training, expertise etc.
Business contracts between the company and its directors, management or 
shareholders.
Business contracts with related parties.
Organizational structure of the issuer (it must be shown if the company is a holding 
company or a subsidiary).
Detailed percent of shareholders structure (detailed ownership) in both the holding 
company and subsidiaries that exceeds 5%.
All transactions between the issuer and any of its shareholders or any of the 
shareholders in its subsidiaries.
The existence of a nominating committee that nominates directors.
The existence of an audit committee, the names of its members and the description 
of duties.
The internal procedures and regulations undertaken by the issuer, which do not 
permit a director or any other insider, from purchasing or selling securities of the 
company, based on insider information.
B- Regarding financial statements and financial reporting:
Send a copy of the financial statements, immediately after the issuance of Auditors 
Report to the Exchange, within a maximum of three month after the fiscal year end.
Publish a “Board Report” that provides an overview about the company activities 
during the year.
The quarterly financial statements, accompanied by a review report, should be 
provided to the Exchange, within a maximum of forty-five days after their issuance.
The financial statements of the issuer must be prepared, in accordance with the 
Egyptian Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (EGAAP). The EGAAP follow 
the International Accounting Standards, with few exceptions.
Issuers whose securities are listed on the official schedule (1), (2) and unofficial 
schedule (1) must publish their financial statements, together with the footnotes and
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the auditor’ s report, in two daily morning and widely circulated newspapers, one of 
which, must be in Arabic.
Issuers whose securities are listed on unofficial schedule (2) must publish the annual 
financial statements, together with the footnotes and the auditor’s report, as soon as 
being approved by the General assembly, in the daily bulletins published by the 
Exchange.
C- Regarding Material Events
If a material or significant event (change) occurs, the issuer must immediately notify 
the Exchange. Material events include: a new issue of bonds, material changes in 
shareholders’ structure, purchase of treasury securities, a change in financial 
leverage, material changes in investment policies, government decrees that might 
affect the companies activities etc.
Directors and senior managers of the company must inform the Exchange of their 
trading on the company’ s shares, before their execution.
D- Regarding Dividends
The issuer must publish the decisions of the General Assembly Meeting concerning 
the declaration of cash or stock dividends in two daily morning, widely spread 
newspapers, one of them in Arabic.
The listed company must start the legal procedures concerning the increase of capital 
by issuing stock dividends, once the general assembly decision is taken.
The issuer must inform the Exchange of the payment date (cash or stock dividends) 
fifteen days prior to such date, together with the announcement in two daily 
morning, widely spread newspapers.
Penalties
1. De-listing
The securities are de-listed:
If the Exchange discovers that the listing was based according to incorrect 
information.
If the company does not comply with any part of the listing rules, a month from 
being informed by the Exchange.
If the financial statements of the company of two successive years, after listing does 
not comply with the financial standards set in the listing rules.
Foreign securities are automatically de-listed if they were de-listed from the home 
markets, and if they fail to meet the obligations stated in these rules. The foreign 
securities are de-listed, three months after being informed by the CASE.
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2. Administrative Penalties
A  penalty of LE 5000 if the issuer failed to disclose information that results in loss to 
investors. The penalties could be doubled in case of reoccurrence during the same 
year.
Failure to send the required financial statements and information or publish them at 
the required time results, in a penalty of LE 500 within the first five days of delay. 
This amount is to be increased by LE 100 for each day subsequent to this period. In 
case of a delay period exceeding thirty days, the Exchange may consider de-listing 
of the company.
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Appendix (6.1) The questionnaire
Dear Sir or Madam,
My name is Omaima Ahmed Gomaa Hassan, an assistant lecturer at the Faculty of 
Commerce, Ain Shams University. I have a scholarship from the Egyptian 
Government to study for a PhD in accounting at the University of Abertay Dundee, 
UK. My research title is: “The impact of company characteristics upon the 
relationship between accounting disclosure and stock prices in the Egyptian Stock 
Exchange” .
The main purpose is to create a disclosure index to measure both the quality and the 
quantity of the disclosed information by listed companies. To achieve this, the views 
and opinions of a sample of financial analysts working in Egypt regarding the 
usefulness of some items of information that a listed company might report are 
investigated. You have been selected for the sample, so that I appreciate it if you 
could complete and return the attached questionnaire using the attached stamped 
addressed envelope.
Your reply will be treated as confidential. I guarantee anonymity. However, if you 
wish I could acknowledge your contribution in the thesis and in any academic 
publications resulting from the use of the questionnaire. Copies of the questionnaire 
results will be available upon request.
Thank you very much for your cooperation. I look forward to hearing from you 
soon. For any information, please do not hesitate to contact me.
With my kind regards and best wishes.
Yours sincerely,
Omaima Hassan
Instructions:
This questionnaire includes a list of items of information, which might be disclosed 
in the annual reports of a corporation relating to non-financial sector (all sectors 
other than the financial sector). These items of information have been classified into 
seven groups:
Group (A): general information 
Group (B): income statement 
Group (C): balance sheet 
Group (D): cash flow statement 
Group (E): accounting policies 
Group (F): stockholders information 
Group (G): supplementary information.
You are kindly asked to the rank each item of information according to its usefulness 
for investment-decision making process in the common shares of a non-financial 
company, and then to order the seven groups from l(the most useful) to 7(the least 
useful) according to their relative importance for investment-decision making.
When deciding, you should take the point of view of an investor (a user of the 
information) evaluating an investment in the firm’s common stocks, rather than the 
point of view of a provider of information.
In deciding the relative usefulness, remember that the reporting company has limited 
amounts of money to provide information, and the providing of each additional item 
of information involves additional cost. Therefore, firms should first provide the 
‘very useful’ rated items. If funds are still available, then the ‘useful’ rated items 
should also be provided and so on down to the items rated ‘slightly useful’ .
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From an investor point of view, what is the usefulness of each item of information 
provided below for making an investment decision in a common share of a non - 
financial company? (Please tick the appropriate box by putting * in it)
List of variables Not-
useful
1
Slightly
useful
2
Moderately
useful
3
Useful
4
Very
useful
5
Group A: general 
information
1.1 Company name.
1.2 Address / telephone / fax.
1.3 The currency used for the 
preparation of financial 
statements.
1.4 Company legal status 
(private sector or privatization 
companies).
1.5 Purpose of the company’s 
activity.
1.6 The period covered by 
financial statement
1.7 List of board members and 
their affiliations.
1.8 Number of employees.
1.9 Market share.
1.10 Geographic segment.
1.11 Business segment.
1.12 Comparative financial 
statements.
1.13 Future plans.
1.14 Chairman’s or CEO’s 
statement.
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List of variables Not-
useful
1
Slightly
useful
2
Moderately
useful
3
Useful
4
Very
useful
5
Group B: income statement
2.1 Sales / total revenue.
2.2 Credit interest.
2.3 Non-operating revenues.
2.4 Cost of good sold.
2.5 Selling, general and 
administrative expenses.
2.6 Operating income.
2.7 Interest expense.
2.8 Income tax expense.
2.9 Non-operating expenses.
2.10 Non-operating gains or 
losses.
2.11 Foreign exchange gains / 
losses.
2.12 Depreciation & 
amortization expenses.
2.13 Net income.
2.14 Minority interests.
2.15 Effect of transactions with 
holding / subsidiary / 
associated companies.
2.16 Effect of significant 
changes in accounting 
estimates
2.17 Fundamental errors and 
how they are treated.
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List of variables Not-
useful
1
Slightly
useful
2
Moderately
useful
3
Useful
4
Very
useful
5
2.18 Effect of significant changes 
in accounting policies.
Group C: balance sheet
3.1 Current assets separated from 
fixed assets.
3.2 Current liabilities separated 
from long-term liabilities
3.3 Owners’ equity separated 
from liabilities.
3.4 Separation of reserves and 
retained earnings.
3.5 Cash and cash equivalents.
3.6 Inventories reported.
3.7 Accounts receivables.
3.8 Classification of other 
receivables
3.9 Investment in each subsidiary 
& associated company.
3.10 Other investments and their 
market values if different from 
book value.
3.11 Items and values of 
intangible assets.
3.12 Investments in projects 
under construction.
3.13 The value of each item of 
fixed assets and its accumulated 
depreciation.
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List of variables Not-
useful
1
Slightly
useful
2
Moderately
useful
3
Useful
4
Very
useful
5
3.14 Total assets can be derived.
3.15 Restrictions on ownership of 
assets.
3.16 Classification of short-term 
liabilities.
3.17 Classification of long-term 
liabilities.
3.18 Classification of loans.
3.19 Classification of provisions
3.20 Number of issued shares and 
par value per share.
3.21 The un-paid amount of 
capital.
3.22 Changes in equity accounts 
during the year.
3.23 Priorities to preferred shares 
as to dividends.
3.24 Accumulated preferred 
dividends due.
3.25 Number and cost of treasury 
stock
3.26 Paid-in capital in excess of 
par value
3.27 Classification of reserves.
3.28 Appropriation of retained 
earnings.
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List of variables Not-
useful
1
Slightly
useful
2
Moderately
useful
3
Useful
4
Very
useful
5
Group D: cash flow statement
4.1 Operating activities disclosed 
according to direct/indirect 
method.
4.2 Disclosing the necessary 
reconciliation of net income when 
the indirect method is used.
4.3 Main items of cash inflow 
from different activities.
4.4 Main items of cash outflow 
from different activities.
4.5 Net cash flow from different 
activities.
4.6 Cash flow from/for interests, 
dividends, extraordinary items 
disclosed separately.
4.7 Cash outflow for taxes.
4.8 Cash flow related to 
purchase/sale of interest in 
holding, subsidiary and associated 
companies.
4.9 Non-cash investment and 
finance transactions disclosed 
separately.
4.10 Breakdown of cash & cash 
equivalents.
4.11 Balances of cash & cash 
equivalents that are not available 
for use.
4.12 Amount of facilities available 
for the company but not used yet.
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List of variables Not-
useful
1
Slightly
useful
2
Moderately
useful
3
Useful
4
Very
useful
5
4.13 Cash flow representing 
increase in operating capacity 
disclosed separately from that 
representing maintenance of 
current operating capacity.
4.14 Disclosing the necessary 
reconciliation if the balances 
appearing in the cash flow 
statement are different from the 
corresponding balances appearing 
in the balance sheet.
Group E: accounting policies
5.1 Accounting standards.
5.2 Financial statements cost 
basis.
5.3 Research & development 
costs.
5.4 Pension costs.
5.5 Reasons for extraordinary 
items.
5.6 Inventory physical count & 
valuation.
5.7 Acquisition method.
5.8 Treatment of intangible assets.
5.9 Deferred taxes.
5.10 Outside manager of pension 
funds.
5.11 Foreign currency transaction 
method.
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List of variables Not-
useful
1
Slightly
useful
2
Moderately
useful
3
Useful
4
Very
useful
5
5.12 Foreign currency transaction 
gains/losses.
5.13 Discretionary reserves.
5.14 Minority interest.
5.15 Contingent liabilities.
5.16 Treatment of investments.
5.17 Revenue recognition basis.
5.18 Long-term contracts, long­
term leases, capital leases, sales 
on installments and related 
interest.
5.19 Events after the balance sheet 
date.
5.20 The policy used for 
determination of cash & cash 
equivalents.
Group F: stockholders 
information
6.1 Earnings distribution 
statement.
6.2 Earnings per share
6.3 Total dividends.
6.4 Dividends per share.
6.5 Stock split / dividend / right 
issues.
6.6 Stock price.
6.7 Trading volume.
6.8 Diluted earnings per share.
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List of variables Not-
useful
1
Slightly
useful
2
Moderately
useful
3
Useful
4
Very
useful
5
6.9 Composition of shareholdings.
6.10 Significant shareholders.
Group G: supplementary 
information
7.1 Earning per share numerator.
7.2 Earnings per share 
denominator.
7.3 Notes to accounts.
7.4 Disclosure of subsequent 
events.
7.5 Remuneration of directors and 
officers.
7.6 Exports.
7.7 Financial ratios disclosed.
7.8 Qualitative and quantitative 
forecasts of revenues, expenses, 
profits, and cash flows.
7.9 Assumptions underlying 
forecasts.
7.10 Schedule of interest and 
principal due on long-term debt in 
future years.
7.11 Auditor’s report.
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From an investor point of view, please rank the seven categories of information from 
l(the most important) to 7 (the least important) according to their relative 
importance for investment decision-making
Information category Rank
General information
Income statement
Balance sheet
Cash flow statement
Accounting policies
Stockholders information
Supplementary information.
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Personal information: please answer the following questions:
What is the nature of your employment business? (Please tick the appropriate box by 
putting * in it)
Broker Fund Manager Bank Insurance company Financial service company
What is your level of education? Please tick the appropriate box by putting * in it)
Pre-
University
level
University
level
Diploma Master
Degree
PhD
degree
Other (specify)
3. For how long have you been personally involved with the analysis of company 
performance for the purpose of determining the desirability of investing in their 
common stock?
(Please specify)
4. Would you like to have a copy of the questionnaire results? (Please tick the 
appropriate box by putting * in it)
Yes (if yes please write the correspondence address below) No
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A p p e n d i x  ( 6 .2 )  M a n n - W h i t n e y  t e s t  f o r  n o n - r e s p o n s e  b i a s
Items72 of Obtained 
information U73
Item 1/1 25.5
Item 1/2 23.5
Item 1/3 24.5
Item 1/4 23.5
Item 1/5 16
Item 1/6 28
Item 1/7 17.5
Item 1/8 17
Item 1/9 31.5
Item 1/10 22.5
Item 1/11 24
Item 1/12 28
Item 1/13 19
Item 1/14 31.5
Item 2/1 27
Item 2/2 31.5
72 I refer to each item of 
information using the same 
code revealed on the face of 
the questionnaire.
73 The critical value of U 
for items 3/28, 4/9 and 4/10 
is 10 since the sample sizes 
are 7 and 8. This in turn 
means that the researcher is 
able to retain H0 for these 
items.
Item 2/3 25
Item 2/4 24.5
Item 2/5 19.5
Item 2/6 32
Item 2/7 31.5
Item 2/8 29.5
Item 2/9 22
Item 2/10 25
Item 2/11 24.5
Item 2/12 19.5
Item 2/13 23.5
Item 2/14 28
Item 2/15 17
Item 2/16 12
Item 2/17 28
Item 2/18 28
Item 3/1 18.5
Item 3/2 23
Item 3/3 30
Item 3/4 19
Item 3/5 16
Item 3/6 21
Item 3/7 29
Item 3/8 18
Item 3/9 27
Item 3/10 28
Item 3/11 22
hern 3/12 30
Item 3/13 17
Item 3/14 15.5
Item 3/15 21.5
Item 3/16 16
Item 3/17 17
Item 3/18 20
Item 3/19 4
Item 3/20 21
Item 3/21 28.5
Item 3/22 27
Item 3/23 19.5
Item 3/24 23.5
Item 3/25 23
Item 3/26 26
Item 3/27 14.5
Item 3/28 12
Item 4/1 26
Item 4/2 22
Item 4/3 23
Item 4/4 21
Item 4/5 15
Item 4/6 18
Item 7/1 23
Item 7/2 26.5
Item 7/3 23.5
Item 7/4 31
Item 7/5 29
Item 7/6 26.5
Item 7/7 28
Item 7/8 28
Item 7/9 32
Item 7/10 28
Item 7/11 22
Group a 28.5
Group b 27.5
Group c 20.5
Group d 32
Group e 20
Group f 21.5
Group g
22
Item 4/7 10
Item 4/8 19
Item 4/9 13
Item 4/10 12
Item 4/11 13.5
Item 4/12 24.5
Item 4/13 11.5
Item 4/14 30
Item 5/1 22
Item 5/2 26
Item 5/3 21.5
Item 5/4 23
Item 5/5 30
Item 5/6 30
Item 5/7 26
Item 5/8 24.5
Item 5/9 31
Item 5/10 20
Item 5/11 31
Item 5/12 31.5
Item 5/13 29
Item 5/14 25
Item 5/15 25
Item 5/16 29.5
Item 5/17 25
Item 5/18 28
Item 5/19 18.5
Item 5/20 28.5
Item 6/1 25.5
Item 6/2 20
Item 6/3 31
Item 6/4 27
Item 6/5 26
Item 6/6 28.5
Item 6/7 15.5
Item 6/8 15.5
Item 6/9 12
Item 6/10 21
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A p p e n d i x  ( 6 .3 )  T h e  q u e s t i o n n a i r e  d e s c r i p t i v e  a n a l y s i s
Min. Mean Std. D.
Item 1/1 1 4.17 1.15
Item 1/2 1 3.14 1.32
Item 1/3 1 4.18 1.26
Item 1/4 3 4.39 0.72
Item 1/5 4 4.61 0.50
Item 1/6 2 4.35 0.71
Item 1/7 1 3.18 1.53
Item 1/8 1 3.10 1.37
Item 1/9 1 3.83 1.30
Item 1/10 1 2.95 1.16
Item 1/11 1 3.59 1.37
Item 1/12 2 4.64 0.79
Item 1/13 3 4.30 0.70
Item 1/14 2 4.00 0.95
Item 2/1 2 4.57 0.95
Item 2/2 1 4.26 1.10
Item 2/3 2 4.04 1.02
Item 2/4 1 4.04 1.30
Item 2/5 2 4.14 1.04
Item 2/6 4 4.87 0.34
Item 2/7 2 4.30 0.82
Item 2/8 2 3.96 1.07
Item 2/9 2 4 14 1.08
Item 2/10 2 4.27 1.03
Item 2/11 1 4.09 1.04
Item 2/12 2 4.23 0.75
Item 2/13 2 4.65 0.78
Item 2/14 1 3.52 1.34
Item 2/15 1 3.74 1.10
Item 2/16 1 3.78 1.09
Item 2/17 1 3.91 1.16
Item 2/18 1 3.83 1.19
Item 3/1 1 4.09 1.00
Item 3/2 1 4.04 0.98
Item 3/3 1 4.17 1.03
Item 3/4 1 3.96 1.11
Item 3/5 1 4.14 0.94
Item 3/6 1 4.00 1.34
Item 3/7 1 4.17 1.11
Item 3/8 1 3.95 1.05
Item 3/9 1 3.87 1.18
Item 3/10 1 4.09 1.04
Item 3/11 1 3.59 1.22
Item 3/12 1 3.74 0.92
Item 3/13 1 3.43 1.20
Item 3/14 1 3.22 1.24
Item 3/15 1 3.77 1.15
Item 3/16 1 3.48 1.27
Item 3/17 1 3.65 1.27
273
Item 3/18 1 4.00 1.09
Item 3/19 1 3.91 1.15
Item 3/20 3 4.50 0.67
Item 3/21 1 4.30 1.11
Item 3/22 2 4.17 0.98
Item 3/23 1 4.09 1.20
Item 3/24 2 4.04 1.07
Item 3/25 1 3.91 1.16
Item 3/26 1 3.91 1.12
Item 3/27 1 3.91 1.20
Item 3/28 2 4.27 0.98
Item 4/1 1 3.73 1.16
Item 4/2 1 3.64 1.05
Item 4/3 1 3.78 1.09
Item 4/4 1 3.78 1.17
Item 4/5 1 3.86 1.01
Item 4/6 1 3.96 1.07
Item 4/7 1 3.26 1.18
Item 4/8 2 3.61 1.12
Item 4/9 2 3.55 1.01
Item 4/10 1 3.55 1.10
Item 4/11 1 3.57 1.33
Item 4/12 1 3.52 1.08
Item 4/13 1 3.13 0.92
Item 4/14 1 3.48 1.27
Item 5/1 2 3.95 1.00
Item 5/2 1 3.57 1.08
Item 5/3 1 3.41 1.01
Item 5/4 1 2.52 1.27
Item 5/5 1 2.86 1.32
Item 5/6 1 3.22 1.38
Item 5/7 1 2.96 1.43
Item 5/8 1 3.13 1.25
Item 5/9 1 3.35 1.27
Item 5/10 1 2.65 1.37
Item 5/11 1 3.70 1.29
Item 5/12 1 3.83 1.11
Item 5/13 1 3.65 1.11
Item 5/14 1 3.13 1.25
Item 5/15 1 2.87 1.25
Item 5/16 1 3.39 1.31
Item 5/17 1 3.57 1.27
Item 5/18 1 3.22 1.24
Item 5/19 1 3.39 1.37
Item 5/20 1 3.22 1.35
Item 6/1 3 4.50 0.74
Item 6/2 1 4.61 0.99
Item 6/3 3 4.61 0.66
Item 6/4 3 4.74 0.54
Item 6/5 2 4.48 0.79
Item 6/6 2 4.30 1.02
Item 6/7 2 4.17 1.03
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Item 6/8 2 4.00 1.02
Item 6/9 1 3.57 1.27
Item 6/10 1 3.96 0.98
Item 7/1 1 3.81 1.40
Item 7/2 1 3.83 1.30
Item 7/3 1 3.61 1.08
Item 7/4 2 3.78 1.00
Item 7/5 1 3.09 1.08
Item 7/6 1 3.65 1.27
Item 7/7 1 4.18 1.14
Item 7/8 2 4.30 0.93
Item 7/9 2 4.09 1.00
Item 7/10 2 3.65 0.93
Item 7/11 2 4.30 0.82
Group a 1 4.87 1.89
Group b 1 1.87 0.97
•
Group c 1 1.96 1.26
Group d 2 3.70 1.46
Group e 3 4.65 1.07
Group f 1 4.35 1.80
Group g 3 6.04 1.11
A p p e n d i x  ( 6 .4 )  M a n n - W h i t n e y  t e s t  r e s u l t s  f o r  d i f f e r e n c e s  a m o n g  r e s p o n d e n t s  i n
s c o r i n g  i t e m s  o f  i n f o r m a t i o n  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e i r  l e v e l  o f  e d u c a t i o n  o r  e x p e r i e n c e .
!
|
U/EXPU/ED1
Item 1/1 38.5 51.5
Item 1/2 48 44.5
i
Item 1/3 44 44
Item 1/4 64.5 39
(Item 1/5 64 53
Item 1/6 55 43.5
Item 1/7 52 43
Item 1/8 45.5 43
jltem 1/9 60 33
Item 1/10 42.5 37.5
Item 1/11 54.5 35
Item 1/12 55 48
Item 1/13 60 40.5
Item 1/14 
Item 2/1
49.5
50
29
48.5
L
Item 2/2 63.5 55
Item 2/3 54.5 51.5
Item 2/4 53 43
Item 2/5 50.5 47.5
L
Item 2/6 61.5 55
Item 2/7 59.5 51
Item 2/8 54 53.5
Item 2/9 45.5 A Ai  r
Item 2/10 
litem 21/11
50
62.5
_ _
53.5
1
Item 2/12 60 51 1|
Item 2/13 61 38.5
Item 2/14 55 42
Item 2/15 58 45.5
I
Item 2/16 57 47
Item 2/17 51.5 47
Item 2/18 51 40.5
Item 3/1 62 49.5
Item 3/2 58 46.5
Item 3/3 55.5 28.5 ! j
Item 3/4 63 31
jltem 3/5 48.5 49
1
item 3/6 49.5 41.5
Item 3/7 58 53.5 j
Item 3/8 59.5 36
Item 3/9 63.5 52
Item 3/10 58 53.5
Item 3/11 42 48.5
Item 3/12 59 -46
Item 3/13 59.5 42
Item 3/14 63
I
50
Item 3/15 57 50.5
Item 3/16 64 55.5 |
1
Item 3/17 56 50 I
Item 3/18J§
61.5 53
Item 3/19 59 33
Item 3/20
1I
56 45.5
L
Item 3/21 58 49.5
Item 3/22 46 55
Item 3/23 63 53.5
Item 3/24 64 41
jltem 3/25 48 38
[Item 3/26 41 37.5
Item 3/27 48.5 41.5
Item 3/28 54 41
Item 4/1 50.5 45
Item 4/2 53.5 41
Item 4/3 38 54
Item 4/4 40 56
Item 4/5 30 41
Item 4/6 43.5 44.5
Item 4/7 59 40.5
Item 4/81 .. 42 46
Item 4/9 58 51
Item 4/10 56.5 31.5
Item 4/11 48 42
Item 4/12 52 55.5 Item 5/17 63.
Item 4/13 59 43 Item 5/18 45.
Item 4/14 59 37 Item 5/19 36.
Item 5/1
\
50.5 40 Item 5/20 40.
\
Item 5/2 48.5 42.5 (Item 6/1 56.
Item 5/3 40.5 43.5 Item 6/2 56.
Item 5/4 49 56 Item 6/3 54.
Item 5/5 40 38.5 Item 6/4 53.
Item 5/6 57.5 48 Item 6/5 53.
Item 5/7 54 40.5 Item 6/6 60
Item 5/8 36 55.5 | Item 6/7 47.
Item 5/9 45 45 Item 6/8 57
Item 5/10 52.5 44 Item 6/9 54.
Item 5/11 46 55.5 Item 6/10 45.
Item 5/12 46 48 Item 7/1 52.
Item 5/13 45 44 Item 7/2 57
Item 5/14 51.5 34 Item 7/3 48.
Item 5/15 37 5J Item 7/4 57.
Item 5/16 51.5 46 Item 7/5 39.
~ 5 C T litem 7/6 28 31.5
50 Item 7/7 39.5 38.5
41.5 Item 7/8 59.5 33.5
46.5 |
47.5 |
Item 7/9 50 
(item 7/10 53.5
33.5
50.5
1
47 Item 7/11 55
1
44
31.5 GROUP A  58 29
49.5
\
GROUP B 50.5 51
50.5 1 GROUP C 59 41 1
51 GROUP D 55 44 1
55.5 j [GROUP E 60.5 42.5
45 (GROUP F 63 29.5 |
51 GROUP G 48 39
51.5
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35.5 U / E X P :  M an n -W h itn ey  test results 
fo r  level o f experience.
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Appendix (6.5) Rarely or never 
disclosed items of information
Group A: general information
1.9 Market share.
1.10 Geographic segment.
1.13 Future plans.
Group B: income statement
2.10 Non-operating gains or losses.
2.14 Minority interests.
2.16 Effect of significant changes in 
accounting estimates.
2.17 Fundamental errors and how they 
are treated.
2.18 Effect of significant changes in 
accounting
Group C: balance sheet
3.18 Classification of loans.
3.22 Changes in equity accounts 
during the year.
3.23 Priorities to preferred shares as to 
dividends.
3.24 Accumulated preferred dividends 
due.
3.25 Number and cost of treasury 
stock
3.26 Paid in capital in excess of par 
value
Group D: cash flow statement
4.1 Operating activities disclosed 
according to direct/indirect method.
4.8 Cash flow related to purchase/sale 
of interest in holding subsidiary and 
associated companies.
4.11 Balances of cash and cash 
equivalents that are not available for 
use.
4.12 Amount of facilities available for 
the company but not used yet.
4.13 Cash flow representing increase 
in operating capacity disclosed 
separately from that representing 
maintenance of current operating 
capacity.
4.14 Disclosing the necessary 
reconciliation if the balances 
appearing in the cash flow statement 
are different from the corresponding 
balances appearing in the balance 
sheet.
Group E: accounting policies
5.3 Research and development costs.
5.4 Pension costs.
5.5 Reasons for extraordinary items.
5.7 Acquisition method.
5.8 Treatment of intangible assets.
5.10 Outside manager of pension 
funds.
5.13 Discretionary reserves.
5.14 Minority interest.
5.15 Contingent liabilities.
5.18 Long-term contracts long-term 
leases capital leases sales on 
installments and related interest.
5.19 Events after the balance sheet 
date.
5.20 The policy used for 
determination of cash and cash 
equivalents.
Group F: stockholders information
6.5 Stock split / dividend / right 
issues.
6.6 Stock prices.
6.7 Trading volumes.
6.8 Diluted earnings per share.
2 7 8
Group G: supplementary information
7.4 Disclosure of subsequent events.
7.8 Qualitative and quantitative 
forecasts of revenues expenses profits 
and cash flows.
7.9 Assumptions underlying forecasts.
7.10 Schedule of interest and principal 
due on long-term debt in future years.
Appendix (6.6) List of items of 
information included in the 
disclosure index74
Group A: general information
1.1 Company name.
1.2 Address, telephone, fax.
1.3 The currency used for the 
preparation of financial statements.
1.4 Company legal status.
1.5 Purpose of the company’s activity.
1.6 The period covered by financial 
statement
1.7 List of board members.
1.8 Number of employees.
1.11 Business segment.
1.12 Comparative financial statements
1.14 Board of directors’ report.
Group B: income statement
2.1 Sales or turnover
2.2 Credit interest.
2.3 Non-operating revenues.
74 Underlined items of information are items 
that are treated as voluntary, the rest are 
mandatory. Highlighted items of information 
are items drawn from CIFAR checklist.
2.4 Cost of good sold.
2.5 Selling general and administrative 
expenses.
2.6 Operating income.
2.7 Interest expense.
2.8 Income tax expense.
2.9 Non-operating expenses
2.11 Foreign exchange gains or losses.
2.12 Depreciation & amortization 
expenses.
2.13 Net income.
2.15 Effect of transactions with related 
parties: holding, subsidiary, and 
associated companies
Group C: balance sheet
3.1 Classification of assets to long­
term assets and current assets.
3.2 Classification of liabilities to long­
term liabilities and short-term 
liabilities.
3.3 Owners’ equity separated from 
liabilities.
3.4 Separation of reserves and retained 
earnings.
3.5 Cash and cash equivalents.
3.6 Inventories reported.
3.7 Accounts receivables.
3.8 Classification of other receivables.
3.9 Investment in each subsidiary & 
associated company.
3.10 Other investments and their 
market values if different from book 
value.
3.11 Items and values of intangible 
assets.
3.12 Investments in projects under 
construction.
2 7 9
3.13 The value of each item of fixed 
assets and its accumulated 
depreciation.
3.14 Total assets can be derived.
3.15 Restrictions on ownership of 
assets.
3.16 Classification of short-term 
liabilities.
3.17 Classification of long-term 
liabilities.
3.19 Classification of provisions
3.20 Number of issued shares and par 
value per share.
3.21 The paid amount of capital.
3.27 Classification of reserves.
3.28 Retained earnings.
Group D: cash flow statement
4.2 Disclosing the necessary 
reconciliation of net income when the 
indirect method is used.
4.3 Main items of cash inflow from 
different activities.
4.4 Main items of cash outflow from 
different activities.
4.5 Net cash flow from different 
activities.
4.6 Cash flow related to interests, 
dividends, and extraordinary items 
disclosed separately.
4.7 Cash outflow for taxes.
4.9 Non-cash investment and finance 
transactions disclosed separately.
4.10 Breakdown of cash & cash 
equivalents.
5.6 Inventory physical count & 
valuation.
5.9 Taxation.
5.11 Foreign currency transaction 
method.
5.12 Foreign currency transaction 
gains or losses.
5.16 Treatment of investments.
5.17 Revenue recognition basis.
Group F: stockholders information
6.1 Earnings distribution statement.
6.2 Earnings per share
6.3 Total dividends.
6.4 Dividends per share.
6.9 Composition of shareholdings.
6.10 Significant shareholders.
Group G: supplementary 
information
7.1 Earning per share numerator.
7.2 Earnings per share denominator.
7.3 Notes to accounts.
7.5 Remuneration of board of 
directors.
7.6 Exports.
7.7 Financial ratios disclosed.
7.11 Auditor’s report
Group E: accounting policies
5.1 Accounting standards.
5.2 Financial statements cost basis.
2 8 0
Appendix (9.1) The Spearman cross-product correlation matrix (2-tailed test)
Ln(MVEYE) Ln(TQR) Ln(MTBR)
Sales
Growth
Beta
Total-
Weeklv
Beta
Traded-
Weeklv
Beta
CASE
Assets
Growth
Earnings
Growth TINDEX MINDEX
Ln (TQR) 0.628**
(0.000)
Ln (MTBR) 0.638** 0.959**
(0.000) (0.000)
Sales growth 0.199** 0.228** 0.223**
(0.002) (0.000) (0.001)
Beta total-weekly -0.108 -0.195* -0.250** -0.088
(0.250) (0.037) (0.007) (0.333)
Beta traded-weekly -0.133 -0.186* -0.249** -0.064 0.954**
(0.163) (0.051) (0.008) (0.488) (0.000)
Beta CASE -0.082 -0.140 -0.283** -0.129 0.803** 0.830**
(0.478) (0.222) (0.012) (0.240) (0.000) (0.000)
Assets growth 0.206** 0.134* 0.154* 0.136* -0.323** -0.354** -0.311**
(0.001) (0.037) (0.016) (0.030) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003)
Earnings growth 0.096 0.172** 0.161** 0.394** -0.082 -0.089 -0.143 0.090
(0.142) (0.008) (0.014) (0.000) (0.368) (0.337) (0.193) (0.151)
TINDEX -0.048 -0.105 -0.072 -0.218** -0.118 -0.154 -0.205 -0.044 -0.055
(0.435) (0.085) (0.235) (0.001) (0.210) (0.106) (0.071) (0.491) (0.401)
MINDEX -0.149** -0.116 -0.091 -0.167** -0.210* -0.260** -0.352** -0.077 -0.032 0.839**
(0.014) (0.056) (0.136) (0.010) (0.024) (0.006) (0.002) (0.230) (0.629) (0.000)
VINDEX 0.026 -0.081 -0.056 -0.200** -0.065 -0.087 - 0.111 0.046 -0.044 0.900** 0.554**
(0.670) (0.183) (0.356) (0.002) (0.489) (0.362) (0.333) (0.476) (0.499) (0.000) (0.000)
Numbers in parentheses are probabilities of significance. ** Significant at 1% level (2-tailed). * Significant at 5 %  level (2-tailed).
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